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1 
Introduction 
     Since the middle of the 20th century, there has been a growing trend towards 
environmental protection in America. This can be seen not only in society, but also in federal 
government environmental programs. This study will focus mainly on how the U.S. federal 
government manages environmental protection. Before viewing the study in detail, it is 
necessary to look at history, understand how and why Americans became aware of the 
importance of protecting the environment, and what makes them continue to do this. 
1.1. Environmental Protection: Preconditions, Push-Factor and Value Change 
     In American history, affluence and good education were the preconditions of expanding 
environmental protection. This remains so today, poor people generally engage in acquiring 
material wealth and making money rather than protecting the environment. Affluent people 
with poor education may not realize the importance of protecting the environment, and thus 
not do it. The United States in the 1960s became mature for expanding environmental 
protection. Americans had become more affluent and better-educated following two decades 
of steady economic growth since the end of World War II. The percentage of adults with 
some college education rose from 13.4 to 25.2 percent between 1950 and 1974 (McFarland 
6).  
     At the same time, due to worsening environmental surroundings in urban areas of major 
cities, more and more Americans were moving to the suburbs. The expanding 
suburbanization became another main cause for pollution, because human activities like 
occupying more free land, cutting more plants, killing more animals for human use, and 
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consuming more water, coal, gas and oil continually damaged the environment. White collar 
workers left crowed cities for suburban clean air, gardens, and green grass, but the increasing 
problems of suburban life like smog, traffic jams and sprawl somehow shattered their dreams 
(Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 22). Therefore, the demand for clean air and water became 
essential for each American during the 1960s. 
Push-Factor: Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
     The increasing use of synthetic chemical insecticides after the Second World War had 
become the subject of a continuing controversy. In 1959, differences of opinion reached their 
first climax with two cases. One was ornithologist Robert Cushman Murphy v. the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture‘s gypsy moth control spraying of Long Island, N.Y. The other 
was the common-front opposition of the nation‘s private conservation organizations against 
the same agency‘s fire ant eradication program in the Southeast (Brown 76-78). Although 
these differences of opinion made the government agencies more cautious, governmental 
policy remained unchanged. On March 31st 1960, Michigan Congressman, Leonard G. Wolf, 
introduced a Chemical Pesticides Coordination Act in the 86th congress. This act was, 
however, countered by the administration with the Interagency Pesticide Review Board. Still 
nothing was changed (Clement 247). Fortunately, the government founded a Federal 
Pesticide Control Review Board with the secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Interior, Health 
Education and Welfare to make a better governmental decision in 1961. 
     Rachel Carson‘s book Silent Spring, which was published in installments in the June 1962 
New Yorker magazine,
1
 drew public attention to the negative effects of chemical pollution. 
The pesticide DDT was particularly vilified for its presence in the environment and effect on 
raptors. Rachel Carson was supported by many scientists, politicians, policy makers, garden 
clubs, and the media through praising her science and her questioning of the ―irresponsibility 
                                                 
1
 Appeared serialized in three parts in the June 16th, June 23rd, and June 30th 1962 issues. 
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of an industrialized, technological society toward the natural world‖ (Carson xii). Meanwhile, 
pesticide manufacturers still made efforts to educate the public about the benefits and 
importance of pesticides. The Manufacturing Chemists Association mailed monthly stories to 
the media, detailing the positive aspects of agricultural chemicals (Graham 333). However, 
pesticide pollution continued to be implicated in several massive fish kills in the Midwest in 
the 1960s, including one involving the death of over one million fish in the Mississippi River 
in 1964 (Hoffman, From Heresy 52). These incidents further proved Carson‘s statement and 
helped make Silent Spring popular. At a press conference on August 29th 1962, a journalist 
asked President Kennedy: ―There appears to be growing concern among scientists as to the 
possibility of dangerous long-range side effects from the widespread use of DDT and other 
pesticides. Have you considered asking the Department of Agriculture or the Public Health 
Service to take a closer look at this?‖ Kennedy responded: ―Yes, and I know they already are. 
I think particularly, of course, since Miss Carson‘s book, but they are examining the matter‖ 
(McLaughlin). President Kennedy appointed his scientific advisor, Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, to 
study the pesticide issue and to produce a report containing recommendations for the use and 
regulation of pesticides in the United States. On May 15th 1963, the President‘s Science 
Advisory Committee report, The Use of Pesticides, was issued, calling for the reduced use of 
toxic chemicals (Ibid.). 
     Silent Spring awakened American health consciousness with scientific arguments against 
the use of common pesticides, such as DDT, whose presence and ecological magnification in 
the food chain caused severe damage to such birds of prey as eagles, ospreys, and pelicans 
(Graff 11). It also educated Americans about the danger of indiscriminate pesticide use, 
asked for them to be informed, and encouraged them to take action. Both Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson made the environment an issue in their speeches and legislative programs. 
President Johnson spoke forcefully in his 1964 and 1965 messages to Congress about 
safeguarding wilderness and repairing damaged environments. Silent Spring also had strong 
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impact on the following American generations. Former Vice-President, Al Gore, in his 
introduction to the 1992 edition of Carson‘s book said: ―For me personally, Silent Spring had 
a profound impact...Indeed, Rachel Carson was one of the reasons that I became so conscious 
of the environment and so involved in environmental issues...Carson has had as much or 
more effect on me than any, and perhaps more than all of them together‖ (McLaughlin). 
     Encouraged by Rachel Carson‘s Silent Spring, more and more affluent and well-educated 
Americans urged the public to focus on the theme of ―public health‖ and the natural world 
rather than on ―bread and butter‖ (McFarland 24). They also encouraged the public to 
become more aware of the harmful effects of industrial development on the quality of the 
environment. More and more Americans began to be concerned about their exposure to toxic 
chemicals, as well as wilderness protection. Stimulated by this, the public campaigned for 
environmental legislation and called for strong government intervention to reduce levels of 
air and water pollution. The biggest protest was the first Earth Day in 1970. These public 
protests resulted in a series of environmental statutes and increasingly stringent regulations to 
prevent and reduce pollution, and to emphasize greater industry accountability for the 
environment in the 1970s. 
Value Change 
     During the 1960s, environment and equity became of particular concern to Americans 
with the environmental and Civil Rights movements. These concerns expanded to cover 
more subtle threats to public health. The American way of life, characterized by freedom, 
liberty and the acquisition of material goods, was improved by health and better living 
conditions like clean water and fresh air. Thus, environmental protection in the 1970s was 
pushed to focus on improving public health. As the United States shifted from the ―Empire of 
Production‖ to the ―Empire of Consumption,‖ mass consumption became the subject of 
pollution by the 1980s. Meanwhile, public health concerns gradually began to cover not only 
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air and water quality, but also diet, food additives, and organic foods. Health meant more 
than the absence of illness, and it began to include physical well-being, which was connected 
with environmental well-being (Paehlke, ―Environmental‖ 81). These public health concerns 
were developed in the 1990s which characterized the shift in the economy from materially-
intensive to knowledge-intensive, and began to focus on ecosystems and sustainability, 
pursuing a radically reduced dependence on non-renewable resources and minimization of all 
human impact on natural ecosystems. At this time, due to the strengthened environmental 
regulations and the increasing environmental awareness of the public, industries began to 
take environmental protection as a way to build image, make product brands, attract 
customers, and thus enlarge market share. 
     From Silent Spring to today‘s organic products and cooperative actions against global 
warming, there has not only been a shift in the American social model, away from excess 
consumption towards a more sustainable ecological pattern (Freedland 20), but also a change 
in American environmental values, from ecology to environmentalism. Environmental values 
extend beyond conservation, ecology and health, and now include social responsibility and a 
new lifestyle. These values spread deep into the hearts of Americans. As the result, more and 
more Americans are taking initiative to protect the environment through changing their 
lifestyles, for example, moving away from excess consumption of water and electricity, and 
demanding environmentally-benign and energy-efficient products (Kraft, Environmental 
Policy and Politics 235). Today, safety from harm caused by toxic substances, the provision 
of fishable and swimmable rivers and cleaner air are viewed by many Americans as 
entitlements (Vig and Kraft 58). 
1.2. Development of Federal Environmental Protection from the Nixon to the Clinton 
Administration 
     The U.S. federal government protects the environment through both Congress-enacted 
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environmental laws and administrative institutions that implement these laws. Before 1970, 
the responsibility for protecting the environment was scattered over different departments 
and different administrative bureaus. 
     In the 1960s, environmental protection began to win government support. In 1963, 
Congress passed the Clean Air Act to reduce smog and air pollution, followed by the Water 
Quality Act in 1965. Environmental problems and increasing public environmental 
awareness urged the government to make the 1970s a decade of pollution control. It began 
with the birth of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in December 1970. This new, 
central, federal administrative regulatory agency was given the responsibility of 
implementing environmental laws, making detailed regulations, and organizing existing 
environmental programs that were previously housed within various federal departments or 
offices. The federal environmental protection organized by the EPA emphasized preventing 
and reducing pollution in the 1970s, cleaning up pollutants while preventing and reducing in 
the 1980s, and reducing pollution from the source since the end of 1980s. In this evolution, 
the target group shifted from concentrating on public health in the 1970s and 1980s to the 
whole environment, including non-human species since the end of the1980s. 
     In the ―environmental decade,‖ a number of environmental statutes focusing mainly on 
protecting public health were enacted by Congress. Alone during the Nixon-Ford 
Administration and the Carter Administration, acts such as the Clean Air Act (CAA), the 
Clean Water Act (CWA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) were passed. President Nixon and his EPA 
Administrator Ruckelshaus set strict environmental regulations and standards, and rigorously 
implemented environmental laws, thereby establishing the EPA‘s credibility. However, the 
oil crisis in 1973 discouraged President Nixon from protecting the environment, and led to 
the EPA‘s budget being cut by Congress. This caused the reversal of some restrictions on 
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refineries and oil pollution. In 1977, the democratic government returned the topic of 
environmental protection to the U.S. political agenda. Environmental statutes were expanded 
and the EPA budget was increased. During the 1980s, environmental accidents became the 
subject of public concern. For instance, in 1984, at a plant in Bhopal, India, methyl 
isocyanate was accidentally released, killing over 3,000 people and injuring another 300,000 
(Hoffman, ―Institutional‖ 363). The accidents at Love Canal, Times Beach, and elsewhere 
further provided the media with a seemingly endless supply of stories. These accidents kept 
environmental issues at the forefront of public consciousness and motivated a new wave of 
federal regulations with the aim of cleaning up and enhancing industry‘s accountability to the 
public for the environmental impact of their operations. As the result, during the Reagan 
Administration, Congress enacted environmental laws such as the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund), the 
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, the Safe Drinking Water Act 
Amendments of 1986 and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act in 1986. 
However, the Reagan Administration was pressure from the Cold War, and therefore tried to 
reduce federal expenses and stimulate economic growth at the expense of the environment. 
Together with his EPA Administrator, Anne Burford, President Reagan cut the EPA budget, 
diminishing the agency‘s credibility. Despite of the environmental deregulation from 
Administrator Burford, environmental protection continued with the help of Administrators 
William Ruckelshaus and Lee Thomas. In the late 1980s, a hole in the Earth‘s ozone layer 
was discovered, and ozone depletion was taken seriously for the first time. Meanwhile, 
problems like smog, congestion and sprawl intensified as part of the cost of rapid economic 
growth. Congress enacted, and President Bush signed, legislation to phase out ozone-
destroying chlorofluorocarbons. Later, the CAA Amendment of 1990 was also passed. Thus, 
relationships not only between the environment and humans, but between the environment 
and plants and animals were emphasized by the EPA (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 5). 
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However, the environmental protection led by the EPA became increasingly constrained by 
the Council on Competitiveness headed by Vice-President Quayle. The Clinton 
Administration realized ―the environment and the economy go hand in hand‖ (Collin 275), 
and promoted protecting the environment while fostering economic growth through 
accelerating environmental industries like the clean industry. It concentrated on a ―win-win‖ 
solution that created substantial cost savings and pollution reduction (Ehrenfeld 228), and 
thus enhanced cooperation with business groups and made them more responsible for the 
environment by building partnerships and making stakeholders while enforcing 
environmental regulations. The Clinton Administration further stimulated market incentives 
while implementing environmental laws. In the development of federal environmental 
protection, the cost-versus-health conflict had been continually challenging different 
administrations, as environmental protection entailed considerable expense. It is estimated 
that U.S. spending on pollution control and abatement increased almost fourfold from $30 
billion (in 1990 dollars), or 0.9 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1972, to $115 
billion, or 1.9 percent of the GDP in the end of 1990 (Kraft, Environmental Policy and 
Politics 133).  
1.3. Description of this Study 
     This study illustrates the role played by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
in federal environmental protection. It traces the EPA‘s thirty years of institutional history, 
beginning with the founding of the agency in 1970 and ending at the turn of the century. 
1.3.1. Why does this Study focus on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency? 
     Firstly, it is necessary to take a close look at environmental controversy in the U.S. The 
U.S. is the world‘s biggest polluter (or at least the biggest emitter of carbon dioxide in the 
world (Bremner)), despite the fact that it has one of the most influential environmental 
agencies in the world. 
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     Secondly, environmental problems potentially affect all Americans. Americans with 
different concerns are involved in protecting the environment, because numerous issues fall 
into the environmental category. For instance, hunters and animal protection advocates favor 
wildlife habitat protection; urban residents are particularly affected by air pollution; rural 
dwellers by strip mines and well contamination caused by toxic wastes; and citizens with 
little interest in nature and wildlife may be sensitive to the public health threat posed by toxic 
wastes or drinking water contamination (Mitchell, ―Public‖ 57). The implementation of 
environmental laws and regulations from the EPA also affects a broad range of interests from 
nearly every sector of the U.S. economy, thousands of organized groups and millions of 
individual citizens (Davies, ―Environmental‖ 157). 
     Thirdly, EPA history is accompanied by different environmental problems and the 
experience of solving them from former governmental administrations. The ideas, wisdom 
and experiences on managing environmental protection did not come suddenly without 
reason, but changed, grew and coalesced around the EPA history. As Peter Burke wrote, ―the 
culture history of nations is an example of what might be called ‗the culture history of 
ideas‘‖ (132). The history of the EPA is the accumulation of ideas and wisdom on managing 
environmental protection, which is linked to factors like economic concerns, energy 
conservation, and social development. Many important ideas from the EPA on governmental 
environment management have been developed and employed in different countries, for 
instance, the Command-and-Control strategy and the speed limit. Studying the EPA helps 
people to better understand environmental problems. It can also inspire more people to 
develop new ideas to improve environmental protection. 
1.3.2. Why does this Study focus on the Era from 1970 to 2000?  
     The era from 1970 to 2000 covers the period from the Nixon to the Clinton 
Administration. During this era, the EPA had two extreme roles and one balanced role in 
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protecting the environment. These typical roles were formed by different factors dependent 
on the concrete situation and time period. 
     Because environmental laws can be interpreted in a strict or lax way, and environmental 
regulations and standards can be implemented strongly or weakly, the writing and 
implementing of these environmental regulations and standards are flexible. This means that 
the achievement of federal environmental protection depends on what the EPA has been 
doing. However, the EPA‘s roles in protecting the environment depend, amongst other 
factors, on the political climate of the President and Congress. Congress establishes the 
EPA‘s authority and framework by writing the environmental laws. Various committees and 
subcommittees from Congress also influence environmental regulations through interpreting 
the environmental statutes. In addition, as part of the executive branch of government, the 
EPA is responsible to the President. As administrations change, different presidents bring 
different philosophies, environmental understanding and programs to environmental 
protection. The executive branch in 50 States and some 80,000 local units can also determine 
the result of regulations in carrying out environmental duties. Therefore, the EPA‘s role in 
protecting the environment is largely influenced by changes of Congress and administrations. 
Since members of Congress are independent of the White House, sometimes the White 
House and Congress come into direct conflict in their overseeing of the EPA. Thus, the EPA 
has to face this controversy. 
Congress 
     Since the Vietnam War, the Republican Party has been known for national security, while 
the Democrat Party has been long trusted by Americans concerning the environment, the 
economy, education and healthcare (S. Power 66). Trends in environmental statutes tend to 
be linked to the party in power in Congress. Examples of this include the ―environmental 
decade,‖ characterized by a series of environmental statutes, under Democratic control in 
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both the House and the Senate. The biggest environmental success was achieved by the 
single Democratic government from 1977 to 1980, and the CAA Amendment in 1990 was 
also accomplished under a Democratic Congress (see table 1). 
President 
     As can be seen from the achievement of federal environmental protection made by the 
EPA from the Nixon to the Clinton Administration, the President dominated the EPA‘s role 
in protecting the environment. The President directs the EPA on how to implement 
environmental laws. He can also use his veto authority to block bills in Congress. For 
instance, when the Republican Party gained control of Congress in 1995, President Clinton 
often vetoed bills containing legislative riders that would have weakened environmental 
protection (U.S. Cong. CRS, Environmental 1). The President‘s dominance was also 
reflected in the EPA budget. The EPA budget clearly shows that President Nixon lost interest 
in protecting the environment in 1973, and also bears witness to President Carter‘s pro-
environment position between 1977 and 1980, President Reagan‘s anti-environment position 
(see figure 1) and the single Democratic government in 1993. 
     Additionally, the EPA‘s role in protecting the environment is further formed by the 
agency itself, interest groups and courts. Because the EPA‘s roles influence how the agency 
looks today, and will have strong impact on the EPA in the future, it is worth looking at why 
and how the EPA changed its roles in protecting the environment from 1970 to 2000. 
1.3.3. Subject, Method and Procedures 
     Many indirect, historical, and political studies on the EPA have been carried out. They 
mostly focus on environmental policy and politics. Mazimanian and Kraft divide modern 
environmental policy since the 1960s into three epochs. The first epoch was the 1960s and 
1970s, which were characterized by the Command-and-Control government regulation of 
single-issue environmental problems, for instance air or water pollution. The second one was  
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Table 1 
Patterns of Party Control of Congress and the Presidency, 1972-2000 
Year  Congress  President  Senate (100) House (435)  Party Control 
1999  106th D  R – 55 R – 223 Split 
1997  105th D  R – 55 R – 228 Split 
1995  104th D  R – 52  R - 230  Split 
1993  103rd D  D – 57 D – 258 Single 
1991  102nd R  D – 56 D – 267 Split 
1989  101st R  D – 55 D – 260 Split 
1987  100th R  D – 55 D – 258 Split 
1985  99th R  R – 53 D – 253 Split 
1983  98th R  R – 54 D – 269 Split 
1981  97th R  R – 53 D – 242 Split 
1979  96th D  D – 58 D – 277 Single 
1977  95th D  D – 61 D – 292 Single 
1975  94th R  D – 60 D -291 Split 
1973  93rd R  D – 56 D – 242 Split 
1971  92nd R  D – 54 D – 255 Split 
 
Sources: U.S. Senate, House 
Yellow years mark Presidential inauguration. 
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Figure 1. The EPA‘s Budget and Workforce, 1970-2003 
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 Fiscal 
 Year FY 1970  FY 1971 FY 1972 FY 1973 FY 1974 FY 1975 FY 1976 FY 1977 FY 1978 FY 1979 
Budget 
(USD) 1.003.984.000 1.288.784.000 2.447.565.000 2.377.226.000 518.348.000 698.835.000 771.695.000 2.763.745.000 5.498.635.000 5.402.561.000 
Workforce 4.084 5.744 8.358 9.077 9.743 10.438 9.481 11.315 11.986 12.160 
 Fiscal 
 Year FY 1980 FY 1981 FY 1982 FY 1983 FY 1984 FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1987 FY 1988 FY 1989 
Budget 
(USD) 4.669.415.000 3.030.669.000 3.676.013.000 3.688.688.000 4.067.000.000 4.353.655.000 3.663.841.000 5.364.092.000 5.027.442.000 5.155.125.000 
Workforce 13078 12667 11402 10832 11420 12410 12892 13442 14442 14370 
 Fiscal 
 Year FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1996 FY 1997 FY 1998 FY 1999 
Budget 
(USD) 5.461.808.000 6.094.287.000 6.668.853.000 6.892.424.000 6.658.927.000 6.658.227.000 6.522.953.000 6.799.393.000 7.360.946.000 7.590.352.000 
Workforce 16318 16415 17010 17280 17106 17663 17081 17951 18283 18375 
 Fiscal 
 Year FY 2000                   
Budget 
(USD) 7.562.800.000                   
Workforce 18100                   
 
Source: Colin, Robert W. The Environmental Protection Agency: Clean up America’s Act.  Westport: Greenwood, 
2006. 3. Print. 
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the 1980s, which were characterized by the balancing of environmental and social economic 
priorities through market-based and collaborative approaches. And the third one, from 1990 
onward marks the transition to sustainable community approaches that take a comprehensive, 
multi-resource approach to environmental problems and involve collaboration between 
different actors and sectors (Mazimanian and Kraft 10-13). Under these three epochs, 
Mazimanian and Kraft sum up the characteristics of different policy objectives, such as 
implementation philosophy, points of intervention, policy approaches and ―tools‖, 
information and data management needs, predominant political or institutional context, key 
events and public actions. Mazimanian and Kraft analyze environmental policy clearly and 
completely, but mainly focus on the changes between decades. Fiorino also carries out 
complex research on environmental politics. He overviews theories underpinning 
environmental policy making and defines and characterizes environmental problems. He 
argues that environmental policy is government‘s inability or unwillingness to deal with 
heavy dependency on fossil fuels and its inefficiency, for instance, on energy use and large 
cars. He also argues that Congress, the OMB and the executive branch, other federal 
agencies, non-governmental forces and citizens, especially the EPA, have an effect on 
environmental policy. The EPA is an agency implementing federal environmental politics. 
Its variance is contained in the changes in the three epochs defined by Mazimanian and Kraft 
and accompanied by a shift in environmental policies. Authors like Mazimanian, Vig, and 
Kraft define U.S. environmental decades since the 1960s, and show ―the underlying trend, 
institutional shortcomings, and policy dilemmas that all policy actors face in attempting to 
resolve environmental controversies‖ (Vig and Kraft vii). The other authors supplement or 
add new issues and ideas in this framework. But they all focus on environmental policy and 
politics, not mainly on the EPA. 
     Certain direct historical, political or institutional studies on the EPA have also been 
carried out. They take three different forms: a combination of history and policy studies; pure 
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institutional studies; and functional research and program evaluations. Landy, Roberts, and 
Thomas examine the EPA‘s origin and development, its five accomplishments: the 
establishment and subsequent revising of the ozone standard; the Resource Conservation; 
Recovery Act regulations; the passing of Superfund; and the effect the Reagan 
Administration had on the EPA. He mainly focuses on the EPA development until the 
Reagan Administration. He argues, firstly, that the EPA ―senior officials of executive branch 
agencies are responsible for more than the programs they administer‖ (Landy, Roberts, and 
Thomas 3); secondly, that environmental laws written by Congress define the EPA‘s duty 
framework as either too vague or too specific and have largely been unsuccessful; and thirdly, 
that the EPA relies on pluralistic bargaining among industry, environmentalists and 
regulators to shape policy for regulating the steel industry, rather than finding ways to assess, 
or create, through public airing of the issues, public consensus (Williams 112-113). Collin 
carries out institutional research on the EPA, which separately describes the EPA‘s 
organization, programs, controversies, key events, notable people, and impact on society. 
EPA functional research and program evaluations are mostly conducted by the GAO and the 
NRC under Congress order by organizations sponsored by interest groups. The studies 
combining historical and political factors partly reveal the strategy and idea development of 
the EPA, and bring to light many characteristics of accomplishments made by the agency. 
They do not, however, form a complete systematic view. Pure institutional studies 
comprehensively show EPA institutional functions and their development, but bring limited 
strategy and idea analyses in protecting the environment, and thus can merely be considered 
information sources. Functional research and program evaluations mostly depend on party 
interest, and criticize the EPA or propose rational suggestions (normally neutral and not 
specifying preference for a specific interest) to the EPA. Since the EPA is the end product of 
balancing science, law, economics, politics, and social needs, these rational suggestions 
merely bring more trouble to the EPA, and in fact, do not really help the agency. 
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     Few systematic EPA studies have been done on the agency‘s role in protecting the 
environment, which combine a detailed analysis of historical, political, and institutional 
factors, especially the agency‘s roles under different administrations and under different 
administrators. This study analyses the variance of the EPA in five administrations and under 
the tenure of seven EPA administrators between 1970 and 2000 through observing the EPA‘s 
institutional design, political involvement and historical development, and defines three 
typical EPA roles in protecting the environment and two transition periods. This study also 
emphasizes different aspects of the EPA, such as its founding concepts and dominant 
philosophies, its disciplines and principles, legal framework, developing strategies, economic 
incentives, reforms and even the conflicts within the agency. The purpose of this study is to 
offer a detailed view of the EPA‘s roles, its organizational approaches, strategies and tactics 
and how they have evolved with federal intervention in environmental regulations that unfold 
from the Nixon to the Clinton Administration. It also aims to explore the ideas and wisdom 
present within these EPA roles, thus raising consciousness of environmental protection, and 
encouraging people to bring more ideas and incentives to this arena. 
     Based on the Research Methods for Public Administrators
2
, this study adheres to the 
principle of knowing the changes and finding out the reasons, and makes use of data analysis, 
case studies and systematic, objective, qualitative and quantitative analysis, and comparison 
and contrast methodology in a simple and transparent manner. It takes many materials from 
the official websites of the EPA, Congress and its Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the national archives DocumentsOnline. The 
official EPA website offers a timetable of environmental laws as well as the record of 
regulatory actions and environmental programs. However, it does not contain comments on 
EPA history and only shows the achievements of federal environmental regulations. 
                                                 
2 
See O‘Sullivan, Rassel and Berner.  
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Researches from the GAO on the EPA are based on the position of Congress. They are 
normally to criticize the EPA, when controlled by its counterparty, for overstating program 
success while acknowledging the achievement made by the agency. This study also makes 
use of many valuable historical memoranda and works from former administrators William 
Ruckelshaus and Russell Train, from John C. Whitaker, the former Deputy Assistant to the 
President for Domestic Affairs (1969-1972) and who also served under the Secretary of the 
Interior (1973-1975); and from Jim Tozzi, who was the former deputy director of the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget (1981-1983). 
These memoranda and works explore the EPA‘s essence, show its internal development and 
offer this study clues regarding the agency‘s development and evidence of its environmental 
decision making. 
     This study argues that the EPA‘s role in protecting the federal environment from the 
Nixon to the Clinton Administration was the end product of balancing science, law, 
economics, politics, and social needs. The thesis is defended in three steps. Firstly, this study 
explains the EPA context, and how political factors could influence its role in protecting the 
environment. Secondly, this study defines three typical roles and two transitions of the EPA 
from the Nixon to the Clinton Administration and discovers why and how the EPA‘s roles 
and both transitions came into being. Thirdly, a short case study is offered to further prove 
the roles the played by the EPA. It revolves around the following major questions: 
1. What is the EPA, and what are its founding concepts and dominant philosophies, the 
disciplines and principles, the legal frameworks and responsibilities? 
2. Who is responsible for EPA decisions and how can EPA decisions be influenced? 
3. What were the changing roles of the EPA on federal environmental protection from 1970 
to 2000? 
4. What were the approaches and interventions from Congress and administrations to federal 
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environmental protection? 
5. What were regulatory reforms and why and how had regulatory reforms been developing 
and influencing the EPA? 
6. What were the strategies and tactics used by the EPA used to prevent and reduce pollution, 
and how had these strategies and tactics been developing? 
7. What were the economic incentives used by the EPA, and why and how did the EPA 
employ them? 
8. What were the conflicts the EPA faced and how had the EPA been dealing with them? 
     Chapter two answers the first two questions by introducing the EPA‘s developing goals, 
responsibilities, principles, founding philosophy and structure change, and explains the ways 
in which these key political factors influence EPA environmental decisions. It lays a 
foundation for chapter three and enables chapter three to be easily understood. 
     Chapter three answers the remaining forementioned questions. It reviews the EPA‘s 
development, analyzes the variance of the agency‘s roles in its thirty-year history and how 
different factors have been influencing the EPA‘s role in detail. It also defines the EPA‘s 
three typical roles and two transitions in between. These roles were: a single minded 
advocate with little regard to cost (from 1970 to the end of 1973) under the Nixon 
Administration; a deregulator (from 1980 to 1983) under the Reagan Administration and a 
rational advocate (from 1994 to 2000) under the Clinton Administration. One of these two 
transitions transition was during the Carter Administration; the other was during the Bush Sr. 
Administration. From 1970 to 2000, the EPA‘s roles in some periods could not be defined. 
This was either because it is undergoing change or because of conflicts in the EPA‘s political 
climate which led to a lack of consensus among Congress, the President, and EPA 
administrators on environmental decision-making. Besides analyzing the EPA‘s roles, this 
chapter presents the factors supporting and forming these roles, for instance, strong 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 19  
regulatory reforms causing the EPA to be a deregulator; and economic incentives like 
emission trading and taxes, enabling the EPA to be a rational advocate. This chapter also 
shows how the EPA‘s roles are being formed by the conflicts it faces, such as cost-versus-
health. 
     Chapter four is a short case study on automobile pollution, which puts the EPA‘s 
automobile pollution control in a single, consistent line. Finally, Chapter five draws a 
conclusion on the EPA‘s strategies and economic incentives and presents the remaining 
problems facing the agency. It further analyses the relation between the EPA and science to 
strengthen the argument that the agency is primarily a regulatory and enforcement agency, 
and that it is the end product of balancing science, law, economic, politics and social needs. 
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2 
The EPA Context:  
Origins, Principles and Legacies 
2.1. The Context of the EPA’s Organization 
     When the EPA was formed forty years ago, the United States had just awakened to the 
seriousness of its environmental pollution problems. Because the use of throw-away 
packaging, including cans, bottles, plastics, and paper products increased greatly in the U.S. 
after World War II, thousands of new synthetic organic chemicals, a deluge of raw sewage, 
industrial and feedlot wastes were discharged into rivers and lakes without regard for the 
cumulative effect (Wisman). As early as 1963 the Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that, 
―Also, marine fishes from different oceans of the world have been found to contain DDT‖ 
(U.S. DOI 1). Therefore, many waterways became unfit for drinking, swimming and sailing. 
In addition, severe air pollution was being caused by smokestack emissions. The land was 
also being polluted by the indiscriminate dumping of municipal and industrial wastes and by 
the use of very toxic chemicals (Ibid.). Due to Rachel Carson‘s Silent Spring, people from 
different social strata were expressing their anxieties about and understanding of 
environmental problems. Most notably over 14,000 scientists, lawyers, managers, and other 
employees across the country fought for ―environmental protection‖ and tried to reach 
solutions (Lewis). It was time to take action to correct this imbalance and to prevent future 
occurrences (Wisman). In 1969, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA). Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis) called it ―the most important piece of 
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environmental legislation in our history‖ (Lewis). NEPA stated Congressional intent to 
―declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment; promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the 
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man and enrich our 
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation‖ 
(Ibid.), and to ―assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, aesthetically and 
culturally pleasing surroundings‖ (―Environmental‖). NEPA urged President Nixon to set up 
the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in May 1969, which was led by Russell Train 
with the mandate to assist the President by preparing an annual Environmental Quality 
Report for Congress, gather data, and advise on policy. In December 1969, President Nixon 
appointed a White House committee to consider whether it would be necessary to have a 
separate environmental agency. After signing NEPA on New Year‘s Day 1970, President 
Nixon said that he had ―become further convinced that the 1970s absolutely must be the 
years when America pays its debt to the past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its waters, 
and our living environment. It is literally now or never‖ (Ibid.). On July 9th, President Nixon 
submitted to Congress Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 to establish an Environmental 
Protection Agency in order to ―promote the better execution of the laws, the more effective 
management of the executive branch and of its agencies and functions and the expeditious 
administration of the public business;‖ and to ―increase the efficiency of the operations of the 
Government to the fullest extent practicable‖ (Stillman 58). By December 1970, 
Reorganization Plan No. 3 had been approved by Congress, and the Environment Protection 
Agency (EPA) was founded on December 2nd 1970. It was charged with protecting public 
health and safeguarding the natural environment regarding air, water, and land. The creation 
of the EPA was part of the response to growing public concern and a grass-roots movement 
to stop the deterioration of water, air, and land conditions (Wisman). Since it merged key 
anti-pollution programs that had belonged to three federal departments, three bureaus, three 
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administrations, two councils, one commission, one service, and many diverse offices, and 
took health and regulatory responsibilities across the federal government, the EPA was ―not a 
single organism with a single will but a series of different organisms with different wills‖ 
(Marcus, Promise 201). William D. Ruckelshaus was appointed the first Administrator. 
2.1.1. The EPA’s Goals, Responsibilities and Functions 
     The EPA was established as an autonomous body with the power to implement 
environmental laws and regulate air, water and land conditions. Other objectives were to 
provide information to all Americans, to enhance environmental awareness, to build a clean 
and healthy environment for all Americans, and to promote environmental protection within 
private, industrial, and governmental sectors (Ruckelshaus, ―First‖). Unlike environmental 
agencies in many other countries, the EPA was not responsible for many issues with 
environmental effects, such as natural resources, energy, transportation and agriculture 
(Kurian 206). The EPA was mandated to protect public health through controlling and 
preventing pollution and, as stated by the National Environmental Policy Act, ―to assure for 
all Americans safe, healthful, productive, aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings‖ 
(U.S. Cong. HR 199). This purpose was to ensure that all Americans and the environment in 
which they live were safe from health hazards through organizing environmental programs 
dealing with clean air, clean and safe water, and safe food, preventing pollution and reducing 
risks in the environment. Later, the EPA‘s environmental goal was extended to ―protecting 
and enhancing the American environment today and for future generations to the fullest 
extent possible under the laws enacted by Congress‖ (Weiland, Caldwell, and O‘Leary 103). 
In 1992, it was written in the U.S. national report to UNCED that ―We must manage the 
Earth‘s natural resources in ways that protect the potential for growth and opportunity for 
present and future generations‖ (Butts 113). Based on this, the EPA developed ten concrete 
goals: clean air; clean and safe water; safe food; preventing pollution and reducing risk in 
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communities, homes, workplaces, and ecosystems; better waste management, restoration of 
contaminated waste sites, and emergency response; reduction of global and cross-border 
environmental risks; quality environmental information; sound science, improved 
understanding of environmental risk, and greater innovation to address environmental 
problems; a credible deterrent to pollution and greater compliance with the law; and effective 
management (―EPA‘s Goals‖). 
     The EPA was created through the reorganization. It merged fifteen function units from 
different departments and organizations: air quality with the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration and the Air Quality Advisory Board; solid waste with the Bureau of Solid 
Waste Management; radiological Health with the Bureau of Radiological Health; drinking 
water with the Bureau of Water Hygiene; pesticide tolerance functions under the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA); personnel from the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare; water quality with the Federal Water Quality Administration and the 
Water Pollution Control Advisory Board; pesticide research from the Interior Department; 
radiation protection standards from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal 
Radiation Council; pesticide regulation and registration from the Department of Agriculture; 
and ecological research from the Council on Environmental Quality (―Duties‖). President 
Nixon also set principal roles and functions for the EPA. Firstly, to establish and enforce 
environmental protection standards; secondly, to conduct environmental research and to 
provide assistance to others combating environmental pollution; and thirdly, to assist the 
CEQ in developing and recommending to the President new policies for environmental 
protection (Lewis). 
2.1.2. Organizational Structure 
     The EPA‘s efficiency partly relied on its organizational structure, which concentrated on 
how to meld the various bureaus that the EPA had inherited from different departments into a  
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Figure 2. Functions Transferred to the EPA from other Agencies 
 
 
 
Source: United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. Studies Addressing 
EPA’s Organizational Structure (Report No. 2006-P-00029). Washington: GPO, 2006. 2. Print. 
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coherent organization (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 35). The EPA‘s organizational structure 
in 1970 came out as a combination of function and media programs (see figure 3). It 
contained five commissioners with a media program orientation focusing on five major 
environmental programs: water quality, air pollution, solid waste, pesticides, and radiation, 
and three assistant administrators organized along functional lines focusing on planning and 
management, standards and enforcement, and research and monitoring. The Administrator 
had an Office of the Administrator working for him, which contained four principal directors 
(Director of Public Affairs, Director of Legislative Liaison, Director of Equal Opportunity, 
and Director of International Affairs). These four directors reported to the Administrator and 
were also responsible to the Administrator (―EPA Order‖). Together with the Administrator 
and three assistant administrators, a Deputy Administrator and a General Counsel were 
formally responsible for setting the policy direction of the agency, and were publicly 
accountable for the EPA‘s decisions. The Deputy Administrator assisted the Administrator in 
the discharge of his duties and responsibilities and served as Acting Administrator in the 
absence of the Administrator (Ibid.). 
     Since the beginning of 1971, the EPA had been improving its effectiveness through 
changing its structure. Douglas Costle (EPA Administrator under President Carter) proposed 
the structure with a three-stage approach in 1970. Firstly, each of the program areas would be 
left (inherited from other administrative bodies) intact; secondly, new functional divisions 
would be added; and thirdly, the program offices would be abolished and merged into the 
new function units (Marcus, Promise 103-104). In April 1971, Administrator Ruckelshaus 
developed a revised organizational chart that corresponded closely to Costle‘s proposals. The 
EPA was divided into four levels: Administrator and Deputy Administrator, four offices, five 
assistant administrators and ten regional offices. Its four offices and three of its five assistant 
administrators (Assistant Administrator for Planning, and Management, Assistant 
Administrator Enforcement and General Counsel, and Assistant Administrator Research and 
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Monitoring) were organized along functional lines, while the other two (Assistant 
Administrator for Media Programs, and Assistant Administrator for Categorical Programs) 
remained a media program orientation (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 35) (see figure 4). 
Administrator Ruckelshaus kept the inherited programs from other organizations to maintain 
continuity (Marcus, ―EPA‘s‖ 7), and he tried to foster a ―systems approach to pollution 
problems by grouping both air and water programs‖ under a single Assistant Administrator 
for Media Programs (Lewis). A separate Assistant Administrator for Categorical Programs 
was to monitor three ―categories‖ of man-made pollutants: pesticides, radiation, and solid 
waste (Ibid.). New functional offices like the Office of Audit and the Office of Planning and 
Evaluation were created to improve efficiency and effectiveness through better controlling of 
media programs. The new structure also enriched the EPA with better handling, planning and 
management, establishing standards, enforcement of environmental statutes and regulations, 
providing legal counsel, and conducting research and monitoring for pollutants (Krech, 
McNeill, and Merchant 467). The EPA‘s organizational chart in 1970 and 1971 only went 
through stages one and two of Costle‘s plan. The EPA‘s current organizational chart (see 
figure 5) realized all three stages of Costle‘s plan.  
     Moreover, the EPA‘s ten regional administrators head ten regional offices covering the 
entire nation. The boundaries and headquarter locations of these regional offices are decided 
by the Administrator. They are responsible to the Administrator within the boundaries of the 
region for the execution of the regional programs of the EPA. Each of these ten offices is 
responsible for working with State and local officials and private organizations in its region 
to insure maximum participation in environmental programs and to implement and enforce 
the EPA‘s regulations (―First Administrator‖). 
These ten regional offices were (see figure 6): 
- Region 1: Boston – serving Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont and 10 Tribal Nations 
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Figure 3. The EPA‘s Organizational Structure in 1970 
 
 
Source: United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. Studies Addressing 
EPA’s Organizational Structure (Report No. 2006-P-00029). Washington: GPO, 2006. 33. Print. 
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Figure 4. The EPA‘s Organizational Chart in 1971 
 
 
Source: United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. Studies Addressing 
EPA’s Organizational Structure (Report No. 2006-P-00029). Washington: GPO, 2006. 34. Print. 
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Figure 5. The EPA‘s Current Organizational Chart 
 
Source: United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. Studies Addressing 
EPA’s Organizational Structure (Report No. 2006-P-00029). Washington: GPO, 2006. 35. Print. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 30  
- - Region 2: New York – serving New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, US Virgin 
Islands and 7 Tribal Nations  
- - Region 3:Philadelphia – serving Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia  
- - Region 4: Atlanta – serving Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and 6 Tribes 
- - Region 5: Chicago – Serving Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Wisconsin and 35 Tribes 
- - Region 6: Dallas – serving Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Texas and 
65 Tribes  
- - Region 7: Kansas City – serving Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and 9 Tribal 
Nations  
- - Region 8: Denver – serving Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, 
Wyoming and 27 Tribal Nations  
- - Region 9: San Francisco – serving Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, the Pacific 
Islands, and over 140 Tribal Nations  
- - Region 10: Seattle – serving Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Washington and Native Tribes 
(―Regional Offices‖) 
     Like other cabinet-level secretaries, the Administrator of the EPA is appointed by the 
President and confirmed in the position by the U.S. Senate. He carries full responsibility for 
the activities of the agency under supervision and direction. Like the Administrator, all of the 
regional officials are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They are 
always replaced following the election of a new President. A limited number of staff positions 
are allowed to be filled from outside the civil service, while the rest of the EPA staff are 
career officials. As the organization is part of federal civil service, career staff is protected 
from changes in political administrations and may spend their entire career with the EPA  
                                                                                                                                          Liu 31  
Figure 6. Geographic Areas Serviced by the EPA‘s Ten Regional Offices 
 
Source: ―Regional Offices.‖ EPA.gov. EPA. Web. 25 June 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 32  
(Kurian 205).  
     The EPA‘s current organizational structure has an Office of the Administrator, four media 
offices, eight functional offices (see table 2), and ten regional offices. The responsibilities of 
the EPA‘s ten regional offices also now specifically focus on inspecting and monitoring 
certain industrial and other facilities that are regulated under federal environmental statutes, 
taking enforcement actions against those who have violated environmental statutes and 
regulations, helping industries comply with environmental regulations, and overseeing 
enforcement activities that the EPA had delegated to States (U.S. Cong. GAO, Human 
Capital 6). 
Table 2 
Media and Functional Offices 
Media Offices  Functional Offices  
Air and Radiation  Administration and Resource Management  
Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic 
Substances  
Chief Financial Officer  
Solid Waste and Emergency Response  Enforcement and Compliance Assurance  
Water  Environmental Information  
 General Counsel 
 Inspector General  
 International Affairs  
 Research and Development  
 
Source: United States. Dept. of Health and Human Services. Office of Inspector General. Studies Addressing 
EPA’s Organizational Structure (Report No. 2006-P-00029). Washington: GPO, 2006. 4. Print. 
2.1.3. Environmental Regulation Process 
     The process of environmental regulation ranges from issuing detailed and specific 
environmental regulations and standards based on available technologies, to inspecting 
environmental monitoring to ensure compliance, and penalising sources of pollution which 
have lead to the non-enforcement of environmental standards (Kurian 207). The EPA is a 
key player in this procedure. When the Agency proposes a new regulation, an advance notice 
may be published in the Federal Register to show intent. After assembling the necessary 
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scientific, economic, and other data, the EPA writes a draft of the regulation and publishes 
another notice in the Federal Register to invite public comment on the draft. The EPA then 
submits the draft to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review 
and clearance (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics: Toward 111). The OMB reviews it, 
sends proposed regulations out to the affected agencies, receives their comments, develops 
an administration position (Tozzi), and transmits this to the EPA (Ibid.). With the OMB‘s 
suggestion, public comments, data, studies, and other material submitted to the agency by 
interested parties in consideration, the EPA sets the final regulation and publishes it and its 
responses to the major issues raised during the public participation stage in the Federal 
register (Ibid.). 
     The State governments are mostly responsible for monitoring regulated parties and 
enforcing environmental regulations and standards from the EPA. The EPA supervises the 
monitoring and enforcement from the State government and sometimes directly gets 
involved. ―The EPA and the States rely heavily on self-monitoring by industry and other 
regulated parties, who then report their results to regulatory authorities,‖ and they inspect 
industrial facilities to assure the fulfillment of environmental monitoring (Kraft, 
Environmental Policy and Politics 136). The enforcement is based on self-compliance and 
negotiation. The EPA encourages compliance through informal means, using meetings, 
telephone conversations, letters and other exchanges (Ibid.). Only when such efforts fail, 
does the EPA take formal enforcement actions (Ibid.). These actions can comprise Notices of 
Violation, Administrative Orders, or the formal listing of companies as ineligible for federal 
contracts, grants, and loans (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 137). Should these 
measures fail to assure compliance, civil and criminal prosecution can be initiated, assisted 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ)‘s Environment and Natural Resources Division. 
However, most cases are settled out of court most cases are settled out of court (Ibid.). 
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2.2. Political Involvement in the EPA’s Decision-making and Development 
     Besides Congress and the President, the EPA‘s environmental regulations are further 
affected by courts and even by interest groups. The federal courts also review the EPA‘s 
decisions on a regular basis, and they have the authority to reverse or remand decisions when 
they are inconsistent with the authorizing law or are not adequately grounded in the available 
evidence (Kurian 204). Individuals or groups are entitled by law to take part in 
environmental decision making, for instance, through litigation. In addition, environmental 
regulation by its nature inevitably pits the advocates of economic growth against the 
defenders of environmental preservation. It also pits those who believe the market should 
operate free of restraint against those who want government intervention to protect the 
interests of society as a whole, within the administration, Congress, courts and interest 
groups (Kurian 206). The EPA lies at the center of such conflicts, and is essentially the result 
of balancing power or consensus making. This causes environmental protection led by the 
EPA to be inconsistent.  
2.2.1. The President, his Administration, and the EPA 
     The President leads the Executive Branch of the federal government as the Chief 
Executive of the United States. His responsibility is to ―take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed‖ (Henkin 50), and to fulfill the power to appoint various executive branches. In 
order to influence national politics, and to achieve a more efficient domestic government, 
reorganization of the federal government has been of vital concern to several presidents. 
Through reorganization, President Eisenhower formed the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HED); President Kennedy gave the chairman of the Civil Service Commission 
the lead role in establishing government-wide personnel policies; President Johnson built the 
Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO); and President Nixon reorganized 
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the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) into the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970 
(Waterman 46), and created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) through 
reorganizing environmental duties from different organizations (Whitaker 43). 
     The President plays a dominant role in environmental protection. He regulates the EPA by 
appointing the EPA Administrator. The President‘s understanding of environmental 
protection determines this appointment. Normally, he supports individuals who agree with 
his policy positions and share his political philosophy, or have the same interests as he does, 
and even someone who is loyal to him (Waterman 23). The EPA Administrator can help the 
President enlarge public support through better environmental protection and helping the 
President to set environmental laws. Since the nature of the U.S. government is that of ―rule 
by the people,‖ Americans view the U.S. presidency as a popular office capable of making 
the government responsive to democratic needs. Because environmental quality concerns all 
Americans, the public expects to have strong environmental leadership from the White 
House and the President normally shows a special interest in environmental issues to 
strengthen his public support. Therefore, the President sometimes appoints leaders from 
environmental organizations as EPA officials. 
     The President can influence the EPA and environmental protection in different ways. He 
can set a new environmental agenda through writing executive orders, bringing different 
issues to public attention, defining the terms of public debate and rallying public opinion and 
constituency support with major speeches, press conferences, and media events. For instance, 
President Clinton put environmental justice on his environmental agenda by writing an 
executive order. The President can also conduct a Presidential Legislative Initiative, or 
vetoes by supporting legislation in Congress and brokering compromises or he can formulate 
regulations through devoting presidential staff and other resources to particular issues, 
mobilizing expertise inside and outside of the government, and consulting widely with 
interest groups and members of Congress in designing and proposing legislation. Finally, the 
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President can use his powers to oversee and control the bureaucracy of the regulatory process 
in various ways to influence the implementation of environmental laws (Vig 104). For 
instance, the President can control what the EPA wants to do through budgetary approval 
from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and regulatory reforms. Regulatory 
reforms also direct the OMB to review the proposal of environmental regulations from the 
EPA and set methods like Cost-Benefit-Analysis to evaluate regulations. The President relies 
on Congress to approve his nomination of federal officers, to enact legislation and to provide 
funding to carry out all activities of the federal government. The President can generally 
remove EPA officials at his discretion, while Congress could curtail and constrain the 
President‘s authority over the EPA officers by statute. The influence of the President can be 
strengthened when the President‘s party has a majority in both the Senate and the House. 
     Additionally, environmental issues in the EPA interact with other agencies or departments 
in the federal government, such as the Executive Branch Agencies with Environmental 
Responsibilities (figure 7). Cooperation and sharing responsibilities lie between the EPA and 
other federal agencies. The EPA and other agencies share regulatory or research roles and 
therefore cooperate in dealing with lots of problems. For instance, The Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) all 
regulate chemicals or products that pose risks through a variety of exposures. In reacting to 
evidence of dioxin risks from paper products and manufacturing, the EPA and the FDA have 
shared responsibilities. The FDA investigates consumer risks from paper products, and the 
EPA regulates discharges from the pulp and paper industry. Agencies also work jointly to 
respond to emerging issues. An example is global warming. Since concerns over the effects 
of greenhouse gases grew rapidly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several agencies within 
the U.S. government had to work closely together to increase research on global warming, to 
explore policies for stabilizing emissions, to anticipate the effects of global  
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Figure 7. Executive Branch Agencies with Environmental Responsibilities 
 
 
 
Sources: United States. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: Sixteenth Annual Report of 
the Council on Environmental Quality. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987. Print. 
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warming, to evaluate strategies for adapting to them, and to join in international research 
(Nitze 11). Agencies like the Department of Agriculture or the Department of the Interior 
also manage programs that affect environmental quality. The Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) of the Interior Department manages one-third of the nation‘s land, on which it 
oversees such activities as mining, cattle grazing, and water resource management (Fiorino, 
Making 78). Finally, such agencies as the Department of Defense or the Department of 
Energy (DOE) both deal with problems concerning the EPA‘s regulatory authority, for 
instance, hazardous waste clean-ups at nuclear weapons sites (Fiorino, Making 77). 
2.2.2. Congress and the EPA 
     As we know, Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives, each of 
which has a collection of specialized committees and subcommittees. These committees and 
subcommittees share authority over the EPA programs. Some of them have jurisdiction 
based on a specific subject area and others have the authority of overseeing and investigating, 
therefore providing invaluable informational services to Congress (Fiorino, Making 63). As 
shown in table 3, in the Senate, the Committee on the Environment and Public Works is the 
key committee involved in environmental issues, having authority for all programs except 
pesticides, while other committees oversee specific issues. In the House, no single 
committee‘s jurisdiction is as broad as that of Environment and Public Works in the Senate. 
Five House committees principally oversee the EPA programs. They are the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee with Subcommittees on Health and the Environment and in 
Transportation and Hazardous Materials, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
Committee with Subcommittees on Environment and Natural Resources, the House Public 
Works and Transportation Committee with a Subcommittee on Water Resources and 
Environment, the House Agriculture Committee, and the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology. In addition, in both the House and the Senate, the Subcommittee on Veterans‘ 
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Affairs (VA), Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and Independent Agencies from 
Appropriations has budgetary authority over the EPA, and its environmental programs 
(Fiorino, Making 65). Sometimes duties overlap between these committees. For instance, 
three committees share authority over groundwater in the House and the Appropriations 
committees in both the House and the Senate have budgetary authority over the EPA and 
environmental programs. The agriculture committees in both the House and the Senate 
oversee the pesticides policy. They tend to be more heavily oriented toward farmer and 
grower interests than the environmental effects of pesticide use. Besides the major 
overseeing committees, many others also have an impact on specific issues. For example, the 
Senate Governmental Affairs and House Governmental Operations committees have broad 
jurisdiction over all issues, including the environment (Ibid.). 
      Congress has the constitutional responsibility both to pass and to oversee the 
implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations from the EPA. 
Through the setting up of nine major federal environmental statutes and four additional ones, 
Congress created for the EPA the legal framework to protect the environment, set federal 
environmental goals and defined both what should be done and under what kind of 
conditions. Congress also oversees the EPA as it implements and enforces environmental 
laws and regulations mainly through budget setting, hearings, reports to Congress, letters 
from members of Congress asking for information or answers to questions, the 
appropriations process, Senate confirmation of presidential appointees and audits by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) (Fiorino, Making 63). Each year, Congress approves 
budgets submitted by the administration in January or February, including the EPA‘s budget. 
It uses the General Accounting Office to study issues and offer recommendations and takes 
hearings as an oversight tool, through which EPA officials often have to testify before 
congressional committees. Congress even writes letters to answer routine requests from 
constituents, to chastise the agency for decisions it has made (or failed to make), and to stress  
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Table 3 
Principal Congressional Oversight Committee and Subcommittees (1993) 
 
 
Sources: Fiorino, Daniel J. Making Environmental Policy. Los Angeles: U of California P, 1995. 66. Print. 
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its members‘ preferences on pending issues (Florino, Making 67). For example, about 200 
different issues were testified by EPA officials from 1984 to 1986 and about half of them 
dealt with specific issues such as asbestos and acid rain (Wegman 19-24). Furthermore, 
Congress members can even use their positions to set agendas for or draw attention to their 
own issues. They can point to a tendency by Congress to dramatize problems, call for 
solutions from the EPA, impose strict (usually unachievable) requirements for action on the 
EPA, and even criticize the EPA for failing to eliminate the problem (Fiorino, Making 69). 
2.2.3. Courts  
     The American judicial system is supported by administrative law and judicial review. 
Administrative law is generally concentrated on the control of the Government. Wade and 
Forsyth have indicated that: 
The primary purpose of administrative law […] is to keep the powers of 
government within their legal bounds, so as to protect the citizen against their 
abuse. The powerful engines of authority must be prevented from running 
amok (5). 
Judicial review provides legal controls on administrative actions. It is a legal procedure, 
allowing individuals or groups to challenge in court the way that Ministers, government 
departments and agencies like the EPA delegate legislation and make decisions. Because 
administrative decision-making bodies are often controlled by larger governmental units, 
their decisions can be reviewed by a court of general jurisdiction under some principle of 
judicial review based upon due process in the United States. Since 1971, administrative 
agencies and reviewing courts have collaborated in the area of environmental decision-
making (Mahood 142). Thus, litigation is a vehicle to fight for self-interests, and can 
influence environmental decisions from the EPA through a series of lawsuits before courts 
(Ibid.). Courts have become permanent players in the EPA decision-making (O‘Leary, 
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―Environmental‖ 170), especially for groups lacking access to the legislative or the executive 
branch. The judicial precedent is set when a case is decided. Therefore, courts become both 
the last device for solving conflicts, and a preferred forum for many interest groups and 
citizens. As a preferred forum, courts also receive congressional support. The Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), signed by President Johnson in 1966, allowed for the full or partial 
disclosure of previously unreleased information and documents controlled by the United 
States Government to the public, thus bestowing upon Americans the right of knowing 
environmental facts (Ulbert 101). The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act (EPCRA) in 1986 further required that federal, State and local governments, Tribes, and 
industry should provide the public and local communities with information about potential 
toxic and hazardous chemicals present in their communities. Both Acts have helped to 
increase the public‘s knowledge and access to information on the use and release of 
chemicals into the environment at individual facilities. Thus, individuals or interest groups 
from regulated companies, trade associations, non-profit environmental organizations or 
citizen‘s groups are enabled to participate in making environmental decisions through 
applying the rights to appeal environmental cases to courts (Kurian 204). Many of the major 
environmental statutes like the CWA also give citizens, businesses, and interest groups the 
right to sue federal, State, or local public agencies and polluters. In addition, some interest 
groups believe that informal modes of environmental decision-making weaken their 
organization‘s position and stature and diminish the importance of environmental issues 
(O‘Leary, ―Environmental‖ 154). Courts are recognized as being the deciding body. By 
dealing with environmental conflicts, courts can order a small fine for polluters or probation 
and overturn certain environmental standards. It is estimated that 80 percent of major EPA 
regulations have been contested in court over the past several decades (Kraft, Environmental 
Policy and Politics 135). 
     There are three levels of federal courts: the Supreme Court at the top, followed by a dual 
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court of State courts and Federal system (see figure 8). When legal disputes go to court, most 
are resolved in State courts. They usually start in trial courts, and then can appeal to an 
intermediate court and further appeal to the State Supreme Court if a party involved is not 
satisfied with the outcome at the intermediate level (O‘Leary, ―Environmental‖ 154). 
Because many environmental cases concern interpretations of federal statutes or the 
Constitution or violations of standards and administrative rules, they usually begin in the 
federal district courts and can appeal to Circuit courts of appeal. However, some statutes 
provide for the appeal of decisions of federal regulatory agencies directly to the federal 
courts of appeal, instead of through district courts (Vig and Kraft 155). An unsatisfactory 
outcome in a circuit court may be appealed in the Supreme Court, but normally, less than ten 
percent of the requests for Supreme Court review are granted (O‘Leary, ―Environmental‖ 
155). When environmental issues reach the Supreme Court, the Court can have a sweeping 
effect on environmental decision-making (Fiorino, Making 80). Territories outside of the 
United States, such as the District of Columbia or American Samoa, often have courts 
established under federal or territorial law which substitute for a State court system. State 
court judges are elected to four or six-year terms in nonpartisan, countywide elections, while 
federal court judges are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and enjoy 
lifetime appointments. The institutional organization of the federal courts differs from that of 
the President or Congress. There are 179 judges in thirteen federal circuit courts of appeals 
and 649 judges in federal district courts. They can greatly influence the EPA‘s policies and 
regulation through the appeals process. They can make decisions on issues only when 
litigants bring cases to them for decisions (Fiorino, Making 80). 
     There are three typical court cases involving the enforcement of environmental laws. The 
first is the case of the State or federal government suing an industry for not complying with 
the law. For instance, the EPA could prosecute a steel plant for violating the terms of its 
permit to discharge pollutants into a waterway. The remedy in such cases can be either 
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Figure 8. The Dual Court System 
 
Source: O‘Leary, Rosemary. ―Environmental Policy in Court.‖ Environmental Policy: New Directions for the 
Twenty-First Century. Ed. Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft. Washington: CQ, 2003. 155. Print. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 45  
administrative or criminal fines, and in extraordinary cases, criminal prison terms. In these 
cases the government assumes an environmentally protective position in court and the 
industry usually defends itself by basing its arguments on the economic situation of its 
community, and the need for local employment (Paehlke, Conservation 133). The second 
case is when an industry sues government, arguing that the enforcement agency has exceeded 
its authority in making regulations to enforce environmental laws. Many of the regulations 
that the EPA and other agencies set could be directly appealed to the federal courts of appeal 
rather than to the district trial courts. Therefore, many cases initiated by industry begin at the 
appellate level because of the manner in which the law is written (Ibid.). The third case is 
when an environmental organization sues a government agency, because the group believes 
that the government is not taking its responsibility to enforce the laws seriously or is itself 
doing something that is against one or more of the laws designed to protect the environment 
or conserve natural resources (Ibid.). In such cases, the government agency will represent the 
economic interest in making developmental arguments against the environmental 
organization that is arguing in favor of conservation or environmental protection. In addition, 
it is also possible for environmental organizations to directly sue an industry that is in 
violation of a pollution control law. These cases were common during the 1980s, when 
various environmental organizations came to believe that the federal government was not 
interested in actively enforcing many of the pollution control laws. There are also examples 
of inter-governmental environmental cases. The EPA has prosecuted municipal governments 
for not conforming to the requirements of their sewage discharge permits. Reversing roles, 
States have been known to sue federal agencies. There have even been some incidents of two 
agencies in the federal government becoming involved in litigation with each other, as when 
the EPA sued the Tennessee Valley Administration for polluting the air with its numerous 
coal-fired electric generating plants (Alexander and Fairbridge 213). 
     Courts can shape the EPA in many ways. The first way is through setting or reshaping the 
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EPA‘s priorities. Courts decide which issues will get attention, and ―Compliance with court 
orders has become the EPA‘s top priority‖ (O‘Leary, ―Impact‖ 561). For instance, a 1984 
decision ordered the EPA to set effluent guidelines (technology-based discharge standards) 
for toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act (CWA) (Fiorino, Making 83). This ruling 
committed the ―EPA to a ten-year effort to establish effluent guidelines for many categories 
of dischargers‖ (Ibid.). The second way in which courts can shape the EPA is through 
redefining the relations between the EPA and other agencies (Ibid.). In 1984, for instance, a 
federal district court ordered the DOE to apply for EPA permits, when the CWA and the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) applied to operations at the Department 
of Energy (DOE)‘s facilities (Ibid.). Another court ruling changed the delicate relations 
between the EPA and the OMB under E.O. 12291 when the judge held that the OMB review 
could not legally cause the EPA to miss a court-ordered deadline in EDF v. Thomas in 1986. 
Since this ruling, the OMB has been more careful about holding up rules (Ibid.). Court 
deadlines give the EPA leverage in negotiations with the OMB. The third way is through 
defining the analytical basis for the EPA (N. Miller, Environmental Politics: Stakeholders 
167). For instance, a court remanded of an EPA regulation banning most uses of asbestos in 
the United States (Weisskopf, ―Court‖ A19). In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit found that the EPA had failed to meet the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA)‘s ―unreasonable risk‖ standard in issuing the asbestos ban, partly because the EPA 
had not sufficiently evaluated the risks posed by possible substitutes for asbestos (Ibid.). The 
court did not attach importance to the EPA‘s arguments regarding the ban‘s qualitative 
benefits and concluded that the EPA had failed to show that a near-total ban on asbestos was 
the least burdensome way to protect the public against unreasonable risk (Ibid.). The EPA 
was required by the court to base its regulation almost entirely on evidence of the 
quantitative risks of asbestos (Ibid.). Moreover, courts can subjectively shape the EPA by 
determining who does or does not have standing, or the right to sue; by deciding which cases 
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are ripe for review; by their choice of standard or review; by interpreting environmental 
statutes and the Constitution; by the remedies they choose (a punitive fine for polluters or 
probation) and by resolving environmental conflicts (O‘Leary, ―Impact‖ 561-562). The 
Supreme Court also can influence the EPA through the cases it chooses to hear; the limits the 
EPA decisions play in other branches of government; and the restriction the EPA decisions 
place on the States (Kamieniecki 137). However, environmental decisions from courts are 
decided by the state of the law, by the courts‘ environment, by justices‘ values, as well as by 
group interaction on the bench (O‘Leary, ―Environmental‖ 171). The precedent and rules for 
interpreting statutes can determine the state of law. Mass public opinion, litigants and interest 
groups, congressional expansion or narrowing of jurisdiction and presidential appointments 
can create different environments for courts. Justices may have different leanings towards 
liberal, moderate or conservative values or fall somewhere in between. Even individual 
justices can, at times, influence others (Ibid.). Thus, EPA environmental decisions that are 
developed, expanded, narrowed, and clarified in courts affect the air Americans breathe, the 
water they drink, and the food they eat (Ibid.). 
2.2.4. Interest Groups 
     Interest groups are private organizations that seek to influence political decisions. As 
Jeffrey Berry writes, ―They empower people by organizing those citizens with similar 
interests and expressing those interests to policymakers‖ (Berry 15). They protect their 
members‘ interests and offer some benefits to their members. Toward environmental issues, 
they are mainly represented by two parties: one is business interest groups, which include 
industry groups and trade associations including professional associations like the coal-
industry, and the American Medical Association; the other is environmental organizations. 
Different interest groups have different interests and engage in different environmental issues. 
They may both have well-defined political agendas, and the financial resources necessary to 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 48  
exert broad influence on the political and regulatory process. Interest groups work as a bridge 
for connecting citizens to government. They represent some people‘s opinions, and influence 
other people‘s. They play an important role on environmental decisions of agenda-setting, 
policy formation, federal budgeting, and the implementation process. 
     Interest groups play an important role in making environmental decisions in the American 
two-party system. The American political system closely links them to both the Democratic 
and the Republican parties. The United States moved from an agrarian economy 
characterized by trading and small firms to an economy dominated financially by huge, 
diversified, multi-national firms that possess significant wealth and political influence. 
American government also shifted from promoting economic growth by laissez-faire 
(government should intervene as little as possible in the direction of economic affairs) to 
enhancing selected industries, for instance, the railroads, oil companies, defense, and nuclear 
power (Kamieniecki 17-18). During this economic development, business was granted a 
privileged position in American economy and society. Due to the importance of big business 
in the economy, the government has grown accustomed to protecting and promoting business 
interests with the excuse of promoting efficiency, economic growth, job expansion, and 
reliance on domestic energy supplies or other equally positive social goals (Kraft and 
Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 5). Since economic growth is the focus of each election for both 
the Democratic and the Republican Parties, presidential candidates and their political 
advisers understand the importance of party-affiliated interest groups in constructing 
successful electoral coalitions (Tichenor 201-204). Through connecting interest groups, 
presidents can also build supportive coalitions for their policies, because organized interests 
can effectively expand support for the President‘s agenda in Congress and other areas along 
with political parties (Ibid.). In addition, both Democrats and Republicans are linked to 
interest groups, and they nurture interest group coalitions that will help their candidates win 
an office or election. It is true, ―Whether observed in the electoral or lobbying arenas, a 
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significant portion of the interest group community reflects ideological positions, takes 
stands on the issues of the day, or represents constituencies whose orientations are at least 
compatible with one of the two major parties‖ (Peterson, ―Interest‖). Interest group 
relationships with congressional members and federal bureaucrats are likely to be longer-
lasting and more reliable than those with White House officials. The reason may be that 
White House officials are not as stable as Congress members due to the easier changing of 
administrations, and that gaining access to Congress and federal agencies is easier than 
gaining access to the White House for a lobbyist (Tichenor 200). As Paul C. Light put it, 
―There are 535 opportunities in Congress and only one in the White House. Where would 
you put your effort‖ (Ibid.)? Therefore, interest groups generally prefer to do more lobbying 
in Congress. 
     There is a strong conflict between business interest groups and environmental 
organizations regarding increased concern about environmental degradation. Business 
interest groups think that environmentalists exaggerate problems to alarm Americans to raise 
money for their cause, and to shape public policy to advance their own interests; while 
environmentalists ―challenge these indicators of progress as both misleading and insufficient 
to address the problems‖ (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 5). Environmental protection 
has made significant progress since the 1970s in improving air and water quality, conserving 
energy, preserving natural resources, and encouraging the safe transportation and disposal of 
chemical waste (Ibid.). Many companies have ―spent billions of dollars to retool their plants 
and manufacturing processes in order to control emissions, save energy, and safely dispose 
of toxic waste‖ (Ibid.). Business interest groups think many environmental laws and 
regulations actually undermine public welfare because of their economic inefficiency, and 
they have been lobbying intensively at both national and State levels for policy reforms to 
reduce regulatory burdens and costs and to improve efficiency (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 
―Analyzing‖ 4), while environmental organizations mobilize the pubic by encouraging them 
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to take care of their lives and the environment. Business interest groups have more access to 
government and influence in policy making due to the financial resources at their disposal 
and the ideas of economic rationality, while environmental organizations rarely have the 
same access and resources necessary to organize an effective opposition to such business 
efforts (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 21). 
Environmental Organizations  
     Preservation, conservationism and environmentalism shape the priorities of environmental 
organizations. Early conservationists led by Gifford Pinchot with support from Theodore 
Roosevelt emphasized the wise management of natural resources for continued human use; 
while preservationists like John Muir argued for the preservation of nature for its own sake 
(Dunlap and Mertig, ―Evolution‖ 2-5). Despite the conflict between conservation and 
preservation, their joint efforts led to legislation establishing early national parks and the 
creation of the U.S. Forest Service. They also led to conservation organizations like the 
Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society (Ibid.). Later, the Franklin Roosevelt 
Administration emphasized the mitigation of resource problems, especially flood control and 
soil conservation, and the development of resources such as hydro-energy through the 
Tennessee Valley Authority which erected nine dams and a string of massive electricity-
generating stations (Ibid.). Roosevelt‘s New Deal enacted a number of natural resource 
measures. The Soil Conservation Service, founded in 1935, applied scientific practices to 
reduce the erosion of agricultural land. The 1937 Pittman-Robertson Act recognized the 
depletion of animal life, and established a fund for State fish and wildlife programs from the 
proceeds of federal taxes on hunting and fishing equipment (―Predecessor‖). During the 
1950s, more emphasis was placed on the preservation of areas of natural beauty and 
wilderness for public enjoyment, and it was strongly supported by older environmental 
organizations such as Sierra Club (Dunlap and Mertig, ―Evolution‖ 2). Affluent life in the 
1960s enabled more well-educated young Americans born in the Baby Boom generation to 
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generate concerns about public health. They advocated protecting the environment and 
joined environmental organizations. Environmentalism reached its peak in 1970 with the first 
national celebration of Earth Day and has been of major concern to Americans ever since 
(Dunlap and Mertig, ―Evolution‖ 8). Today, for instance, reform environmentalism defines 
its discourse: 
- natural systems are the basis of all organic existence, including that of 
humans; 
- humankind is an element within natural ecosystems, and hence human 
survival is linked to ecosystem survival; 
- ethical human actions (actions that promote the good life for humankind) by 
default promote action toward all life on Earth in an ecologically responsible 
manner; 
- proper use of natural science can guide the relationship between humanity 
and its natural environment (Brulle 173-174). 
     In the early 1970s, many new environmental organizations, both lobbying and non-
lobbying, were founded with widespread public support (see table 4). Since then the 
influence of American environmental organizations has evolved significantly as the larger 
scientific, economic, institutional, and political contexts of environmental policy have 
changed (Kraft, ―Influence‖ 141). Different local, State, regional, national, and international 
environmental organizations have different agendas, different interests and different goals for 
environmental protection. For instance, the EDF tried to stop the ecological damage caused 
by toxic substances like DDT through spraying in 1967, while the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service has launched major species and habitat preservation programs that have reduced the 
rate at which extinction and other environmental losses would otherwise have occurred 
(Graff 14). However, these organizations have worked together to protect the environment  
through scientific research, lawsuits, lobbying, and expanding on their beliefs. 
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Table 4 
Membership Trends of Selected National Environmental Organizations  
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     Large national environmental organizations, such as the Sierra Club, the National 
Audubon Society, or the National Wildlife Federation, played a critical role in the 
development and evolution of the environmental movement, with several million dues-
paying members, multimillion-dollar budgets, corps of full-time lobbyists, lawyers, and 
scientists, and widespread public support (Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 12). Besides 
activities like education campaigns, research, and litigation, their main common 
characteristic is engaging in open lobbying for the development and implementation of 
environmental legislation (Ibid.). 
Sierra Club 
     The Sierra Club was founded by John Muir in 1892 and is the oldest organization 
preserving and expanding national parks, wildlife, and wilderness areas. It began with the 
idea that wilderness areas should be conserved and reserved for recreational purposes, and 
with the purposes: ―to explore, enjoy, and render accessible the mountain regions of the 
American Pacific Coast; to publish authentic information about their beauty and biodiversity; 
to enlist the support and cooperation of the people and the government in preserving the 
forests and other natural features of the Sierra Nevada Mountains‖ (Wulff). In 1951, the 
Sierra Club consequently extended the purpose to ―explore, enjoy and preserve the Sierra 
Nevada and other scenic resources of the United States‖ (Ibid.). Today, it has become an 
international organization whose goal has been enlarged: ―to explore, enjoy, and protect the 
wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth‘s 
ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of 
the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these 
objectives‖ (Ibid.). 
     The Sierra Club was behind the creation of the National Park Service and the National 
Forest Service, as well as the formation of individual recreation areas, such as Yosemite, 
Sequoia, Mount Rainer, Olympic, Redwood, and Glacier National Parks (Ibid.). It opposes 
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strip mining, the use of DDT, offshore oil drilling, hazardous wastes, and most other forms 
of chemical or aesthetic pollution (Ibid.). It has sponsored a series of nature outings and 
publishes a monthly bulletin, as well as numerous books about ecology and the environment. 
Today, it has also broadened its program to deal with problems in the urban environment, 
such as sprawl and runaway growth; to preserve America‘s wild lands and tropical forests; to 
curb commercial logging on public lands; to protect water from factory farms; to end the 
toxic threat; overpopulation; energy and global warming, and Human Rights and the 
environment (Ibid.). The Sierra Club believes a healthy environment will support a healthy 
economy (Ibid.). 
     The Sierra Club pursues its goals through public education, lobbying to influence elected 
and appointed officials, litigation of government agencies and private companies, 
publications and participating in elections by endorsing candidates with strong environmental 
records (Ibid.). The Sierra Club has enjoyed long-established close relations with the 
governing class. From the early days when the Club consisted of mainly upper and middle-
class mountaineers and conservationists, it has built a network of supporters in Washington 
as well as at local levels (Ibid.). Lobbying through outings with politicians has been an 
integral part of the Club‘s work. By taking politicians to endangered wild lands, the Sierra 
Club has shown them the issues and convinced them to take action (Ibid.). The creation of 
Yosemite, Sequoia, Mount Rainer, and Glacier National Parks and the enlargement of Grand 
Teton National Monument were all achievements of this type of lobbying. Like other 
environmental organizations, the Sierra Club also chooses to unite or work together with 
others, because each has only limited resources to confront an enormous range of issues 
(Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 24).  
     There are also some non-lobbying or radical environmental organizations in the United 
States. They do not pursue access to or alliances with the White House, and thus refuse 
governmental funding. Greenpeace is one of them, but certain organizations, like Earth First!, 
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even conducts violent actions.  
Greenpeace USA 
     Greenpeace is actually the name of the boat which the Don‘t Make a Wave Committee 
used to protest against nuclear testing in 1971. The Don‘t Make a Wave Committee was 
formed in 1969, both by a number of peace activists who were motivated by their vision of a 
green and peaceful world, and by former Sierra Club members who were against nuclear 
testing (―Our‖).  
     Greenpeace has the goal ―to end the nuclear lifecycle once and for all‖ (Ibid.). It wants to 
bring an end to nuclear production and use, to all nuclear weapon production, modernization 
and deployment (Ibid.). Although Greenpeace members still make up the minority of 
environmental activists who have the same opinion, they believe that a few individuals can 
make a difference (Ibid.). Greenpeace also engages itself in oceans, forests, global warming, 
genetic engineering, and toxics (Ibid.). It tries to protect whales all over the world, and to 
create a ban on factory trawlers, to preserve the remaining ancient forests around the world. 
They also advocate the elimination of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastic (one of the largest 
sources of persistent organic pollutants in the environment today), support clean energy 
solutions and fight global warming (Ibid.).  
     Greenpeace‘s core values are to bear witness to environmental destruction in a peaceful, 
non-violent manner (Ibid.). Its members try to influence the public on how they see their 
world through showing pictures or live videos they have taken on major news channels like 
CBS, ABC, and NBC. They also adopt radical, immediate, uncompromising, and urgent 
action towards activities damaging the environment and environmental change (Ibid.). The 
scene of Greenpeace members working in the open sea against casting for whales can easily 
be seen on the internet, TV and in newspapers. Since Greenpeace does not pursue access to 
or alliances with the White House and does not accept donations from governments or 
corporations, it has become ―an independent campaign organization, which uses non-violent 
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creative confrontation to expose global environmental problems and to force solutions that 
are essential to a green and peaceful future‖ (―Internships‖). 
Main Tactics Influencing Environmental Decision-making from Interest Groups 
     Since the EPA is charged with the implementation of congressional statutes, there are lots 
of opportunities to influence policy. For instance, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990s 
required the EPA to develop hundreds of rules and regulations. The formulation of these 
rules and regulations was subject to extensive lobbying by diverse interest groups (Furlong, 
―Business‖ 157). In addition, different interest groups with different strategies are involved 
in the EPA‘s decisions (Ibid.). 
     Interest groups mainly use direct lobbying in terms of resources, campaign contributions 
by providing money and organizational support and voter turnout (Wayne, ―Interest‖ 70). 
They also support research centers and ―Think Tanks,‖ organize protests, seek litigation in 
Court, and conduct public education (Ibid.). In addition, both business interest groups and 
environmental organizations heavily rely on scientific credibility, which plays a vital role in 
persuading the public and policymakers to take action (Kraft, ―Influence‖ 143). To get access 
to scientific information, many interest groups have very capable technical members of staff 
(Ibid.). People from these interest groups have often served on technical advisory bodies for 
the EPA and other agencies (Fiorino, Making 93). Their advice and analysis are often 
―sought by Congress, especially by members with an environmental agenda‖ (Ibid.). 
Environmental organizations try to keep in close contact with scientists and environmental 
research institutions, and some members work in research institutions. They use the scientific 
data in court trials and support these research institutions in showing scientific evidence of 
environmental hazards and keeping watch over the state of the environment for lobbying or 
educational purposes. Moreover, some leading environmentalists have served inside 
government. For instance, EPA Administrator, Russell Train, was the founder of both the 
Wildlife Leadership Foundation which established effective wildlife parks and reserves, and 
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the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) which aided Africans in developing the capacity to 
manage their own wildlife resources. The Assistant Administrator for air under President 
Carter was a senior Nature Resource Defense Council (NRDC) official, and the Assistant 
Administrator for policy under President Clinton was the legislative director for the Sierra 
Club before coming to the EPA (Ibid.). 
     Table 5 shows all of the registrants by the type of interest groups reporting that lobby in 
both the legislative and executive branches. It indicates a large discrepancy in lobbying by 
business interests and other groups. Business interests, which include the categories 
―business‖ and ―Trade Association,‖ represent over 94 percent of all the organization 
registrants on environmental issues, while only about three percent of registrants are public 
interest groups, which include environmental organizations. Table 6 shows the client 
distribution, which also has a similar outcome. 
     Interest groups mostly employ the same tactics. Because not all interests represent or 
enjoy equal resources as they seek to influence environmental decision-making, many interest 
groups have a dominant role in American politics (Kamieniecki 13). Therefore, as weak 
parties, environmental organizations mostly rely on the media and protests to mobilize public 
opinion, and thus influence environmental decision-making. Protesting is an effective 
measure, because environmental legislations typically depend on the level of protests. This 
was proved by the first Earth Day Celebration in 1970, and the campaign that the Nature 
Resource Defend Council (NRDC) mounted in 1989, that led to the EPA outlawing the use of 
the pesticide Alar. Alar was used on apples to extend their storage life. Possible cancer risks 
from residues of Alar on apples had previously been demonstrated, but the EPA thought that 
the evidence was not insufficient to stop its use. The NRDC found higher risks than the EPA 
had done through commissioning an analysis of the health risks of Alar. It was publicized and 
thus caused a big public opinion protest. In the end, the use of Alar was stopped (Fiorino, 
Making 94). As the Washington Post observed, NRDC ―achieved more in a few days than all 
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Table 5 
Registrants for Environmental Issues by Organizational Type 
 
 
Source: Furlong, Scott R. ―Business and the Environment: Influencing Agency Policymaking.‖ Business and 
Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American Political System. Ed. Michael E. Kraft and 
Sheldon Kamieniecki. Cambridge: MIT P, 2007. 175. Print. 
 
Table 6 
Client for Environmental Issues by Organizational Type 
 
 
Source: Furlong, Scott R. ―Business and the Environment: Influencing Agency Policymaking.‖ Business and 
Environmental Policy: Corporate Interests in the American Political System. Ed. Michael E. Kraft and 
Sheldon Kamieniecki. Cambridge: MIT P, 2007. 176. Print. 
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of the lobbying and litigating since Alar was found to cause cancer in laboratory animals in 
1985‖ (Weisskopf, ―From‖ A1). Figure 9 also shows that environmental laws passed are 
often accompanied by protect activities. 
     However, the prevailing interest group system can be changed by the President 
―Presidents have the institutional means, and have demonstrated the willingness, to influence 
interest groups to their own advantage‖ (Peterson 237). With this power, presidents could use 
their considerable resources to punish opponents and reward allies in the interest group 
community (Ibid.). They could encourage the creation of new organized interests and long-
standing allies by offering more funding and support to them (Ginsburg and Shefter, 
―Presidency‖ 336). 
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Figure 9. Environmental Laws Passed, Protest Activity and Public Opinion, 1960-1998 
 
 
 
Source: Agnone, Jon. ―Amplifying Public Opinion: The Policy Impact of the U.S. Environmental Movement.‖ 
Policyagendas.org. Policy Agendas Project: University of Texas at Austin Department of Government, June 
2007. Web. 6 June 2008.  
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3 
The Historical Context:  
Shaping the EPA, and its Changing Roles  
     The Environmental Protection Agency is primarily a regulatory and enforcement agency. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
and the U.S. Constitution, the EPA has delegated authority from Congress and mainly 
administers nine major federal environmental statutes. They are the Clean Air Act (CAA), 
the Clean Water Act (CWA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (Superfund); the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act; the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide; the Toxic Substances Control Act; the Noise Control Act, and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (Collin 59). It serves the administration and is overseen by multiple 
committees and subcommittees from Congress; it has a mostly open door for appeals to the 
courts; and it is influenced by interest groups.  
     Like most regulatory agencies, the EPA was created to remedy the negative effects of 
industry. Focusing on the effects of industrial pollution such as inadequate sanitation, 
polluted drinking water, and toxic fumes, it was founded to protect the environment. 
However, the Agency became the end product of a long process of balancing law, economics, 
politics and social needs by the President, Congress, courts and interest groups from the 
Nixon to the Clinton Administration. This resulted in inconsistency in protecting the federal 
environment and in its three typical roles: as a single-minded advocate of protecting human 
health (from 1970 to 1973) during the Nixon-Ford Administration, a deregulator of 
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environmental regulation (from 1981 to 1983) during the Reagan Administration, and a 
rational advocate of protecting human health and environment (from 1994 to 2000) during 
the Clinton Administration. 
3.1. The EPA under the Nixon-Ford Administration 
     Following a decade of growing public concern about pollution, the EPA was created 
through the reorganization of several administrative functions in December 1970. Due to 
strong public support on environmental protection in early 1970s, environmental statutes set 
the legal framework for the EPA in protecting the environment, and thus defined the EPA as 
a single-minded advocate. The EPA itself also performed as a single-minded advocate of 
protecting public health and the environment with little regard to cost. This role was 
characterized by its strong enforcement of environmental laws and its high regard to public 
interests under Administrator Ruckelshaus and its independence of regulatory decision-
making under Administrator Train. In this way, the EPA established its credibility and won 
public support. The strong environmental protection at the beginning of the 1970s was also 
enabled by President Nixon and the consensus among the President, Congress and courts to 
protect the environment. However, President Nixon abandoned this cause in 1974 due to the 
energy crisis. 
3.1.1. Environmental Understanding from President Nixon  
     Richard Nixon came to the White House in 1969, and resigned on August 8th 1974 due to 
the Watergate scandal. During his tenure, he established a broad environmental program. 
However, President Nixon was opposed to environmental laws at the beginning of his 
presidency. He became President in 1969, and it was not until 1970 that his Administration 
approved a single State implementation plan of the Air Quality Act (AQA) of 1967 (Esposito 
298).  
     Due to a dramatic increase in the number of television networks and local news air time 
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during the 1960s and the 1970s, more and more environmental catastrophes were shown on 
television and reported on the radio. One example was the Union crude oil explosion in 
January 1969 near Santa Barbara (California) that spread black gunk, dead birds and fish 
along two hundred miles of beach (Reeves 163). Another was when the Cuyahoga River in 
Ohio was so severely polluted, it caught fire (Anastas and Warner 5). The news about 
environmental catastrophes warned Americans that such dangers could threaten their homes, 
livelihood or families. This encouraged the public to come together to eradicate this threat. It 
became a ―historic opportunity to dramatize the nation‘s need for a better and more livable 
environment‖ (Flippen, Nixon 25). On April 22nd 1970, the first Earth Day was celebrated 
on campuses and elsewhere throughout the country. It was one of the most remarkable 
protests against poor environmental protection, and showed the Nixon Administration the 
strong public support for this cause. As the environmental movement flourished at the end of 
the 1960s, President Nixon became ever-more aware of the rapidly rising concern for the 
environment (Train 79), understood the strength of this environmental movement, and 
realized that environmentalism was becoming a political force (Flippen, Nixon 67). He even 
felt the public had demanded very strong leadership on the environment, and recognized this 
as a way to cultivate a new constituency (Ibid.). 
     Despite Nixon‘s opposition, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act with 
bipartisan support in 1969 (Hogan A6). After this, President Nixon clearly knew that the 
Republican Party and his Administration could not afford to be seen as anti-
environmentalists (Reeves 261). He paid special attention to two characteristics of 
environmental issues at that time: one was that environmental protection appeared to be the 
perfect issue to unite Americans (Flippen, Conservative 67). The other was that public 
opinion and public support would be easily gained through leading this environmental 
movement and it would help him to compete for the presidency in 1972. Therefore, he 
decided to use and lead with environmental issues in national politics. President Nixon was 
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the first President to include environmental protection in his inaugural address. He declared, 
―In rebuilding our cities and improving our rural areas; in protecting our environment and 
enhancing the quality of life; in all these and more, we will and must press urgently forward‖ 
(Inaugural 135). As he signed the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on the first 
day of 1970, he declared the 1970s as the ―Environmental Decade,‖ by saying ―it is 
particularly fitting that my first official act of the new decade is to approve the National 
Environmental Policy Act — the 1970‘s absolutely must be the years when America pays its 
debt to the past by rec1aiming the purity of the air, its waters and our living environment. It 
is literally now or never‖ (Whitaker 50). The purpose of NEPA is ―to…encourage productive 
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and 
welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources 
important to the nation...‖ (Jensen, Christensen, Jr. and Bourgeron 15) It required that federal 
agencies prepare environmental impact statements before taking major action (Conlan 88). It 
also established a Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the President, 
which provided essential policy analysis and advice on a broad range of environmental 
problems, developed many environmental initiatives and offered guidance in the execution of 
the National Environmental Policy Act (Ibid.). On January 22nd 1970, President Nixon 
devoted one-third of his State of the Union Address to environmental concerns and 
mentioned both air and water pollution problems and broad issues of quality of life brought 
about by population growth and demographic shifts. He addressed something more than 
normal American values — freedom, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, stating that ―clean 
air, clean water, open spaces should once again be the birthright of every American‖ (Cahn 
30). On February 10th 1970, he emphasized the importance of strengthening federal 
programs of water and air pollution through launching a 37-point environmental action 
program (Lewis). From 1970 to 1972, President Nixon and Democratic-controlled Congress 
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created the Environmental Protection Agency, and set up environmental statutes including 
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act. President 
Nixon also called for stronger wildlife protection in his State of the Union speech in 1973, 
and signed the species legislation into law in December 1973. 
     Although President Nixon tried to lead with environmental issues in national politics, he 
favored economic growth over environmental protection. In private, with his assistant John 
Ehrlichman, who considered himself an environmentalist, the President remarked: ―In a flat 
choice between smoke and jobs, we‘re for jobs... But just keep me out of trouble on 
environmental issues‖ (Reeves 163). The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974 was opposed by 
the Nixon Administration as unwarranted instructions on State prerogatives (Conlan 88). To 
win conservative support, a federal control system designed to regulate the EPA was initiated 
in 1971. 
     In March 1970, President Nixon dictated a memo about organizing his own time, which 
he clearly recognized as a valuable commodity. He listed various domestic issues in which 
he wanted to be kept directly involved, such as crime, school integration, and the economy, 
but he consciously excluded the environment from that group (Reeves 172-173). He said, ―I 
consider this [the environment] to be important, [but] I don‘t want to be bothered with the 
details. Just see that the job is done‖ (Ibid.). His attitude toward environmental issues 
enabled the EPA to be independent.  
3.1.2. Environmental Understanding from Administrator Ruckelshaus and 
Administrator Train 
     William Doyle Ruckelshaus was the first EPA Agency Administrator, serving from 
December 1970 to April 1973. He graduated from Harvard Law School in 1960, and became 
Deputy Attorney General of Indiana. He was a member of the Indiana House of 
Representatives and its majority leader from 1967 to 1969. Before he came to the EPA, he 
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was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Civil Division for the U.S. Department of 
Justice. Due to his experience in law, Ruckelshaus believed that pollution was caused 
primarily by ―callous and unthinking businesses whose behavior could be changed only 
through federal regulation and laws‖ (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 11), and the 
federal regulation relied on strong enforcement. He asked each American to take 
responsibility for and the action in protecting the environment. In his first speech to the 
National Press Club, Ruckelshaus said that ―An environmental ethic is needed. Each of us 
must begin to realize our own relationship to the environment. Each of us must begin to 
measure the impact of our own decisions and actions on the quality of air, water, and soil of 
this nation‖ (Wisman). 
     Russell Errol Train was the second EPA Administrator serving from September 1973 to 
January 1977. He graduated from Columbia University Law School in 1948, and founded the 
African Wildlife Leadership Foundation in 1961. From 1965 to 1969, he was the President of 
the Conservation Foundation. Before he came to the EPA, he was the Chairman of the 
Council on Environmental Quality. In 1991, he won the presidential Medal of Freedom from 
President George H. Bush as one of most influential environmentalists. For Train, conserving 
the environment means, ―the ‗rational‘ use of the earth‘s resources to produce the highest 
quality of living for mankind‖ (Train 56). Environmental protection ―would be to do a better 
job of development while increasingly taking environmental factors into account in our 
planning. This does not mean you won‘t build a dam, but it means when you build a dam you 
carefully select the site, and you build multiple-use factors into your plan and design‖ (U.S. 
Cong. S, Hearings before 6-7). In his mind, environmental quality is a far more complex and 
subtle objective (Train 81), involving the development of new attitudes and new values. He 
believes that Americans must make the investments and achieve the technological 
breakthroughs necessary to clean up their environment, and develop a new perception of 
man‘s relationship to nature (Ibid.). They must learn to control their numbers, develop 
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effective land-use policies, and find new measures of public and private success which 
emphasize quality rather than mere quantity (Ibid.). As EPA Administrator, Train tried to 
keep the EPA independent.  
3.1.3. Presidential Election of 1972 
     During the Presidential election of 1972, President Nixon had a potential competitor from 
Democratic Party. He was Edmund Muskie, a Senator from Maine, who was nominated 
Vice-President with the Democratic Presidential candidate Hubert Humphrey in 1968. 
Senator Muskie was an environmentalist, and a leading campaigner for new and stronger 
measures to curb pollution and provide a cleaner environment. His environmental stance was 
characterized by the following four points: firstly, nationally uniform ambient standards; 
secondly, no balancing between health risks and economic costs; thirdly, rigid deadlines to 
be adhered to regardless of economic and technological obstacles; and fourthly, uniform 
emissions limits for new sources, even in areas without current pollution problems (Landy, 
Roberts, and Thomas 30). Senator Muskie pushed through air pollution legislation in 1963. 
He also introduced an air quality bill in 1967. The bill authorized the Secretary of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to establish enforceable, uniform 
control levels for specific pollutants in various industries, and required the States to establish 
air quality standards on the basis of scientific studies to be carried out by the federal 
government (C. Bailey 130). The bill also required the federal government to set emission 
standards for automobiles, and required the registration of all fuel additives used in interstate 
commerce with HEW (Ibid.). The bill even asked the federal government to review and 
approve both the standards and enforcement plans (Esposito 270-271). During hearings in 
March and early April of 1970, Senator Muskie defended the 1967 Act, and blamed the 
Nixon Administration for failing to implement it adequately (Jones 202). He further 
characterized the EPA as ―quasi-independent,‖ and set laws giving EPA administrators the 
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power to make key decisions (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 30). The competition on 
environmental protection between Republican President Nixon and Democratic Senator 
Muskie was clear. As President Nixon tried to strengthen his environmental credentials, 
Senator Muskie responded by advocating strongly pro-environmental positions that he had 
opposed just months before (Lippman and Hansen 228). The situation at that time was 
written in the report in Ralph Nader‘s Vanishing Air, 
In 1970, for the first time, Americans rallied around the cause of preserving 
the environment. But their enormous enthusiasm has yet to find direction or 
true leadership. The two men with the greatest obligation to chart new 
passages—Richard Nixon and Edmund Muskie—instead dusted off old maps, 
and are now attempting, each in his own way, to steer the same course which 
has brought us to our present peril (Johns 204). 
     As early as March 1972, the White House was focusing on the coming presidential 
election. The Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, Russell Train, received a 
memo from President Nixon‘s Cabinet Secretary Whitaker. In this memo, Whitaker urged 
Train ―to devote substantial portions of [his] calendar to increasing public awareness of what 
the administration has accomplished in the environmental area,‖ and ―to reach a wider 
audience‖ through ―utilizing the media, both national and regional‖ (Train 110-111). 
Whitaker also asked Train to pick the areas where he wanted to go and build a media-
oriented trip around it with his name and reputation (Ibid.). The 1972 election motivated 
President Nixon to keep leading with environmental issues in national politics. 
3.1.4. The EPA under Administrator William Ruckelshaus 
     During Ruckelshaus‘ tenure, he made the EPA a single-minded advocate through 
accomplishing strong enforcement actions and emphasizing public interests on 
environmental regulation. Following the approval of the reorganization plans, the EPA 
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became the focal point for the implementation and enforcement of environmental laws (Train 
101). Administrator Ruckelshaus revised the EPA‘s structure of 1970, and created programs 
that enacted NEPA, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment (FWPCA) of 1970, 
the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 and the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 
1972. Federal Command-and-Control was set as a basic model for environmental regulations. 
It was mainly employed through the implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1970, and the Clean Water Act of 1972. To enlarge public support and establish the EPA‘s 
credibility, Administrator Ruckelshaus banned the general use of the pesticide DDT, and 
created strong enforcement actions against industrial polluters. 
Implementing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 
     The CAA amendment of 1970 established the Command-and-Control environmental 
regulation, set ambitious target dates for emission control, and required pollution to be 
reduced to a given level regardless of economic cost or technological limitations (Opie 455). 
Since 1971, the EPA has defined how to enforce the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 
effectively. It introduced both the concepts of ―thresholds,‖ above which exposure to 
pollution would not be permitted, and ―margins of safety‖ to compensate for long-term, low-
level exposure or where effects were suspected of being not scientifically established (Reitze, 
Air 163). During the implementation of the CAA, the EPA focused on designating more Air 
Quality Control Regions and establishing National Air Quality Standards in 1971. 
     In order to implement the CAA, more Air Quality Control Regions (AQCRs) needed to be 
designated. An AQCR is a basic geographic area for air quality planning and can be within a 
single State or can include portions of two more States (Reitze, Stationary 43). Rules 
regarding an AQCR were created by the Air Quality Act (AQA) of 1967. Under the act, the 
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) had 18 months to 
designate AQCRs after consulting with the appropriate State and local authorities. In June 
1968, the National Air Pollution Control Administration within the HEW named 32 of the 
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most severely polluted areas of the country as the initial regions. Most of them were major 
cities, except for Steubenville, Ohio, a rural area that was highly polluted by industrial 
sources and had a topography that led to poor atmospheric dispersion (Ibid.). Under the CAA 
of 1970, the EPA started to designate more AQCRs. One of them was the Four Corners 
Interstate Air Quality Control Region designated on February 9th 1971. As described in the 
Federal Register: 
 
The Four Corners Interstate Air Quality Control Region includes Apache, 
Coconino, Navajo, Yavapai Counties in Arizona; Archuleta, Dolores, La Plata, 
Montezuma, and San Juan Counties in Colorado; San Juan County, in its 
entirety; portion of Rio Arriba County lying west (Pacific slope) of the 
Continental Divide; all portions of the Jicarilla Apache Indian Reservation 
lying east (Atlantic slope) of the Continental Divide; portion of Sandoval 
County lying west (Pacific slope) of the Continental Divide; portion of 
McKinley County lying west (Pacific slope) of the Continental Divide; portion 
of Valencia County lying within the Zuni and Ramah Navajo Indian 
Reservations, in the State of New Mexico; and Emery, Garfield, Grand, Iron, 
Kane, San Juan, Washington, and Wayne Counties in the State of Utah (―EPA 
Designates‖). 
By the 1970s, an additional 25 control regions were designated, thus creating 57 AQCRs in 
total (Reitze, Stationary 43).
 
 In 1998, the number increased to 247 (Ibid.). 
     The second step in implementing the CAA was to set National Air Quality Standards via 
the Air Quality Act. The AQA was signed into law by President Johnson on November 21st 
1967 (Reitze, Air 15). At that time, the AQA directed that ambient air quality standards be 
established throughout the nation, but did not require uniform national standards (Ibid.). The 
CAA amendments of 1970 established a dual set of primary and secondary standards, and 
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authorized the EPA to promulgate national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) (Hays 
223). Both primary and secondary standards set pollution limits at levels that protect public 
health and provide an adequate margin of safety. Primary air quality standards were to 
protect public health, while secondary standards were to be set at levels that would protect a 
variety of social conditions outlined as effects on materials, agricultural production, 
ecosystems, and aesthetics such as visibility (Ibid.). In establishing programs, the EPA 
confined the application of the 1970 Act to six ―criteria pollutants.‖ That means national air 
quality standards focused on six common classes of pollutants, sulfur oxides, particulate 
matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons. 
Severely hazardous air pollutants, such as benzene and asbestos, were separately regulated 
(Opie 455). On April 30th 1971, the EPA set both primary and secondary National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for these ―criteria pollutants.‖ Administrator Ruckelshaus 
commented, ―These are tough standards, they are based on investigations conducted at the 
outer limits of our capability to measure connections between levels of pollution and effects 
on man‖ (―EPA Sets National‖). In addition, each State had to adopt a State Implementation 
Plan (SIP) providing for the ―implementation, maintenance, and enforcement‖ of the primary 
standard in each AQCR (Reitze, Air 16). States were also required to plan to meet the 
standards by 1975. For stationary sources (a fixed-site producer of pollution, mainly power 
plants, refineries, and other facilities using industrial combustion processes), the States were 
expected to set emission limits to be enforced by civil and criminal sanctions (Reitze, 
Stationary 11).  
The EPA Banning of DDT in 1972 
     DDT was developed as the first synthetic pesticide in early World War II. It was initially 
used with great effect to combat malaria, typhus, and the other insect-borne human diseases 
among both military and civilian populations. It came into wide agricultural and commercial 
usage in the United States in the late 1940s (Collin 300-301). Until 1970, approximately 
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675,000 tons had been applied domestically (Ibid.). The peak year for use in the United 
States was 1959, when nearly 80 million pounds were applied. DDT not only killed the target 
pests but often killed beneficial organisms as well (Ibid.). In 1962, Rachel Carson painted a 
scenario in which birds had all been poisoned by insecticides in her book Silent Spring (R. 
Bailey, ―Silent‖). The government set restrictions on the use of DDT in 1969, and DDT 
usage steadily declined to about 13 million pounds in 1971 due to other factors, including 
increased insect resistance and development of more effective alternative pesticides (―DDT‖).  
     After seven months of agency hearings, the EPA‘s administrative law judge Edmund 
Sweeney concluded that ―DDT is not a carcinogenic hazard to man... DDT is not a 
mutagenic or teratogenic hazard to man... the use of DDT under the regulations involved 
here does not have a deleterious effect on freshwater fish, estuarine organisms, wild birds or 
other wildlife‖ (Milloy, ―DDT‖). However, Administrator Ruckelshaus said he was 
convinced that the continued massive use of DDT posed unacceptable risks to the 
environment and potential harm to human health (―DDT‖). On June 14th 1972, 
Administrator Ruckelshaus cancelled nearly all of the remaining Federal registrations of 
DDT products, except public health, quarantine, and a few minor crop uses and export of the 
material (Ibid.). The effective date was delayed until December 1972 to permit an orderly 
transition to substitute pesticides, including the joint development with the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture of a special program to instruct farmers on safe use of substitutes (Ibid.). 
Administrator Ruckelshaus banned DDT because he wanted to win public support for the 
Nixon Administration. 
Ruckelshaus’ Strong Enforcement  
     Administrator Ruckelshaus believed that swift and strong enforcement action against 
massive pollution sources like big cities and big companies would demonstrate the EPA‘s 
willingness ―to take on the large institutions in society which hadn‘t been paying attention to 
the environment‖ (―Drawing‖). He tried to build a partnership with State and local 
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governments, through making the EPA a ―work in concert — in a relationship of mutual 
concern and responsibility‖ with regard to State and local pollution control initiatives (Ibid.), 
taking enforcement initiatives only when municipal and State governments found themselves 
stuck in ―the logjam of inertia‖ (Ibid.). But when he took enforcement actions, they were to 
have major effects. He knew that the EPA‘s effectiveness depended on forcing the most 
intransigent businesses to take responsibility for the waste they produced (Ibid.), and that the 
bigger the targets, the more credibility he could amass. ―During its first sixty days (from late 
1970 to early 1971), the EPA brought five times as many enforcement actions as the agencies 
it inherited had brought during any similar period‖ (Hoffman, From Heresy 65). 
     He announced his enforcement decision through a speech in a meeting attended by U.S. 
big city mayors before the annual Congress of Cities, stressing that the EPA was at that 
moment serving the cities of Atlanta, Detroit, and Cleveland with formal ―180 day notices‖ 
that directed them to stop violating federally sponsored State water quality standards (Ibid.). 
To frighten polluters into submission, he relied on public support and chose to use the court‘s 
―big stick‖ as a last resort. As his General Counsel, John Quarles, later wrote: 
Ruckelshaus believed in the strength of public opinion and public support...He 
did not seek support for his actions in the established structures of political 
power. He turned instead directly to the press and to the public opinion…The 
results were impressive, especially during the period of public clamor for 
environmental reform (Quarles, Cleaning up 36). 
      Since the 1970s were a special era for environment protection, Administrator 
Ruckelshaus followed the trend and led public opinion to deal with problems he met. With 
the help of the public, the EPA urged and supervised the States to take greater responsibility 
to develop and enforce plans and bring firms into compliance with those standards. The EPA 
also became directly involved in the enforcement process. For instance, one of Union 
Carbide‘s plants seemed to be primarily responsible for blackening the skies in nearby 
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Parkersburg, West Virginia, and Marietta, Ohio. For years, State and federal officials had 
failed to make the company begin a clean-up. Administrator Ruckelshaus had the EPA send 
Union Carbide a lengthy letter detailing the history of the case. The EPA threatened Union 
Carbide with legal action within ten days unless the company agreed to comply with the 
recommendations of a previous interstate conference that had considered the problem. To 
frighten Union Carbide into submission, Administrator Ruckelshaus immediately released the 
letter to the press. On the day of the deadline, the company announced its willingness to 
comply (Quarles, Cleaning up 37-57).  
     Administrator Ruckelshaus frequently used the Court as a ―big stick‖. In its first year, the 
EPA referred 152 pollution cases (most of them water related) to the Department of Justice 
for prosecution (―Drawing‖), including: the Reserve Mining Corporation sued for dumping 
taconite filings into Lake Superior; the cities of Atlanta, Detroit, and Cleveland for illegal 
sewage discharges; the U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers for polluting the Ohio River; and the 
ITT Rayonier for dumping pulp waste products into Puget Sound (Sansom 24-25, 43). In 
March 1972, five companies, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, International Harvester, and 
Volvo, asked for a one-year suspension of the 1975 hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide 
standards based on law. On May 12th, Administrator William Ruckelshaus denied the 
application (Whitaker 97). 
     The EPA won fame and public support through its strong enforcement, because 
Administrator Ruckelshaus sometimes made environmental decisions through political 
involvement instead of establishing legitimate procedures based on science. In the case of 
banning DDT, EPA hearing Judge Edmund Sweeney concluded that DDT should not be 
banned, pointing out that ―DDT is not a carcinogenic, mutagenic, or teratogenic hazard to 
man. The uses of DDT under the regulations involved here do not have a deleterious effect 
on freshwater fish, estuarine organisms, wild birds, or other wildlife. The evidence in this 
proceeding supports the conclusion that there is a present need for the essential uses of 
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DDT.‖ (J. Lehr and K. Lehr 6-24) In order to protect public interests and win their support, 
Administrator Ruckelshaus disregarded the hearings and banned DDT by himself without 
reading the hearing transcript (J. Edwards 208-209). Seven years later, he wrote to Allan 
Grant (American Farm Bureau Federation president) on April 26th 1979, stating: ―Decisions 
by the government involving the uses of toxic substances are political with a small ‗p.‘ The 
ultimate judgment remains political‖ (J. Lehr and K. Lehr 6-24). He refused to release EPA 
data to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, under the Federal Freedom of Information Act. 
He also refused to file Environmental Impact Statements regarding the anticipated 
environmental effects of the DDT ban (Ibid.).  
      Administrator Ruckelshaus sensed that agency credibility was essential to the EPA, 
which seeks to determine how much health or environmental protection the public should 
buy and at what price (Ruckelshaus, ―Remarks‖). He convinced the public that the Nixon 
Administration was serious about environmental protection (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 
35), thus establishing the credibility of the EPA and building strong public support for 
President Nixon. Administrator Ruckelshaus might have frightened the White House through 
his strong enforcement, President Nixon, however, supported him. Because he was facing 
Democratic Senator Muskie and the coming presidency election, he needed to win over the 
public through a positive image of the EPA that was created by hauling polluters into court. 
Because of Musikie‘s unexpected failure to capture the Democratic nomination, President 
Nixon was the only reliable candidate to lead environmental protection. Unsurprisingly, 
President Nixon triumphed in the 1972 election, which was one of the most one-sided in 
American history. 
3.1.5. Energy Crisis and the Fading of Environmental Protection 
     Because the consumption of oil had been increasing since 1970 at an annual rate of more 
than a million barrels per day, the demand for oil surged. Between August 1972 and August 
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1973, the United States increased its crude oil imports direct from Arab nations from 0.38 
million barrels per day to 1.1 million barrels per day (―EPA‘s‖). In addition, it increased its 
imports of refined products which originated from Arab crude by about half a million barrels 
per day (Ibid.).  
     On October 17th 1973, the Organization of Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
announced its embargo of oil exports to countries supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. 
The United States imported thirty percent of its oil from such countries, and the embargo 
applied to this percentage (A. Miller, ―Energy‖), sending the United Sates into an energy 
crisis. Within months, crude oil prices nearly quadrupled; gas prices jumped some forty 
percent, and lines of queuing motorists appeared in some parts of the U.S. (Conley). 
Although the embargo ended in March 1974, it proved to be the end of the era of cheap oil. 
The energy crisis ended the postwar economic boom and sent the economy into deep 
recession with higher and higher oil prices. Between 1973 and 1975, Gross National Product 
(GNP) fell six percent, and unemployment doubled to nine percent (Yergin 635). At that time, 
many opponents of environmental regulation appeared, and they typically argued that the 
cost of compliance with a given regulation far exceeded the benefits to be achieved and that 
the risks addressed by a regulation were overstated and did not justify the cost of compliance 
(Train 161). They even constantly charged environmental programs with costing jobs and 
causing inflation (Train 188). The petroleum industry immediately described the energy 
crisis as partly a result of restrictive environmental regulations and ―pressure by 
environmental organizations‖ (Stern A1). Power-plant operators also blamed 
environmentalists for slowing the development of the nation‘s abundant domestic energy 
sources, particularly coal (Jones C12). The National Association of Manufacturers further 
demanded the ―removal of arbitrary restrictions on the development of energy resources‖ 
(Hill 80). In addition, ―Spokespeople for a wide range of business interests joined the debate 
with a chorus of requests to relax various environmental regulations in order to save energy. 
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To them, the energy crisis was an opportunity to beat back environmental advances‖ (Smith 
26). By late 1973, the environment beat reporter for The New York Times, Gladwin Hill, 
observed, ―From the industrial sector particularly has come a drumfire of suggestions that the 
energy shortage necessitates broad-gauge repudiation of environmental controls‖ (Ibid.).  
     The EPA budget was slashed from almost $2.38 billion in 1973 to $518 million in 1974, 
and it was kept at a similar level by President Ford in FY 1975 and FY 1976 (see figure 1). 
President Nixon further effectively subsidized higher cost imported oil, established the 
national speed limit to conserve energy, and advocated ―Project Independence‖ to make the 
U.S. independent from imported oil by accelerating the development of domestic fuels 
(Yergin 615-617). He even created the Federal Energy Office (FEO) by writing Executive 
Order 11980, and appointed William Simon and John Sawhill to lead the FEO to effectively 
allocate scarce fuel supplies, to encourage consumer conservation, and to initiate a new look 
at American energy demands in the future. He further directed the Federal Energy Agency 
(FEA) to work with other Government agencies to prepare a comprehensive plan to achieve 
the goals of Project Independence, the capacity for energy self-sufficiency by 1980 (U.S. 
Cong. S, Hearings, Reports 149).  
3.1.6. The EPA under Administrator Russell Train 
     In September 1973, Russell Train began to serve as the second EPA Administrator. Due 
to the energy crisis, the environmental honeymoon had come to an end. EPA programs were 
severely constrained by the budget shortage from the EPA in the remaining years of the Ford 
Administration. The conflict between environmental and energy objectives characterized the 
years ahead at the EPA, and environmental programs became the whipping boy for inflation 
and job losses even as the economy soured during the Ford Administration (Train 156). The 
EPA was constantly put on the defensive within the administration. Administrator Train tried 
to keep the EPA independent and uphold environmental standards.  
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Balancing the Demands of the Energy Crisis with Environmental Issues 
     The EPA faced environmental controversies caused by energy needs from coal, oil, 
natural gas, electricity, and nuclear sources, and their interface with the environment, 
especially the years after the oil crisis. Compliance dates for meeting environmental 
standards mandated by statute, particularly the CAA, were hit by the energy crisis, inflation, 
and the threatening economic downturn. Congress responded with an extensive set of laws 
and regulations (Yergin 615-617). As the nation failed to meet the 1975 deadline for 
attaining air quality standards, Congress extended the deadline and even began revising the 
CAA. For instance, the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 
provided an extension until 1977 of the 1975 auto emission standards, and also gave the auto 
industry the right to petition for a one-year suspension of the 1977 hydrocarbon and carbon 
monoxide standards (Train 169). President Nixon took three actions to deal with the oil crisis: 
firstly, reducing the impact of environmental regulations on energy; secondly, reducing 
energy consumption; and thirdly, increasing energy production (―EPA‘s‖). To reduce the 
impact of environmental regulations on energy, President Nixon switched energy 
consumption from oil to coal and thus the EPA had to make temporary adjustments on 
regulations, and worked on meeting energy needs for both President Nixon and President 
Ford (Train 163). To reduce energy consumption, the EPA organized various programs to 
save energy. These programs included increasing the number of small cars and aircraft 
passenger load factor, applying improved insulation and glass standards to new commercial 
buildings, and supporting construction of mass transit systems (―EPA‘s‖). These programs 
also included reuse and recycling instead of extracting, such as recycling steel, aluminum, 
and paper, and publishing fuel economy data for most vehicle models sold in the U.S. (Ibid.). 
These programs further included designing systems where less automotive transport was 
necessary and where mass transit was convenient in order to attain energy savings in 
transportation, encouraging development of more efficient automotive power systems 
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through research funding (Ibid.), and especially subsidizing oil and the creation of a national 
speed limit at fifty-five miles per hour (Conlan 91). In addition, the EPA supported 
regulation of coal mining (enforcing strict mining and reducing damage) and legislation on 
natural gas deregulation (deregulate new natural gas prices, because under-pricing created 
incentives for excessive consumption and discouraged exploration for and production of 
natural gas) (―EPA‘s‖). The EPA also supported legislation on deepwater ports (continually 
importing crude oil from some nations by ship and thus necessitating deepwater ports), and 
power plant sitting (providing a systematic method of certifying new power plants with a 
preconstruction review of all costs and benefits) to increase energy production (Ibid.). 
Moreover, the EPA made agreements on nationwide studies of electric power, steel, non-
ferrous metals, oil refineries, chemicals, and paper and pulp in order to get up-to-date data on 
the cost of pollution control equipment and the effects of those costs on Gross National 
Product, inflation, the balance of payments, and employment (Train 161). 
     In July 1974, Administrator Train addressed the energy-environment nexus, through 
saying: ―We should seize upon the energy crisis as a good excuse and a great opportunity for 
making some very fundamental changes that we ought to be making anyway for other 
reasons‖ (Train, ―Quality‖ 1051), he declared that the energy crisis was in fact an 
opportunity to reduce waste and inefficiency, and to cut the annual energy growth rate from 5 
to 2.5 percent, or lower by 1985 (Train 178). He stressed the EPA‘s actions on the average 
vehicle weight reduction with corresponding reductions in fuel use, standards setting for 
space heating, restrictions on commercial lighting (Ibid.). He also emphasized the 
development of more mass transit, recycling, and energy conversion from wastes (Ibid.). 
However, at that time, President Nixon tried to cut the control of pollution in order to achieve 
short term cost savings in energy (Ibid.). In a meeting with Energy Policy Office director, 
John Love, and EPA Administrator Train, President Nixon declared that it was necessary to 
―lower the emission limits‖ because the shortage of oil required greater use of sulfur oxide-
                                                                                                                                          Liu 80  
producing coal. However, Administrator Train objected (Flippen, Conservative 144). 
Administrator Train made the point that the standards were health standards. He 
demonstrated their relevance to such issues as emphysema, bronchial disorders, respiratory 
disease gene rally, cardiac conditions, and lung cancer, and pointed out that these adverse 
health effects would increase as emissions standards were lowered (Train 162). President 
Nixon commented that when he was young there were more cases of tuberculosis from cold 
houses than from most other causes (Ibid.). President Nixon proposed a package of thirteen 
amendments to the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, inc1uding the freezing of the auto 
emission interim 1975 standards through 1976 and 1977. At that time, there was no longer a 
consensus between President Nixon and Administrator Train. In June, Congress understood 
the situation and changed the auto emission laws (Whitaker 102). When Gerald Ford came to 
the White House, he took a different view on the conflict of environment protection against 
economic growth. He attacked the economy-versus-environment view in his prepared 
remarks in Portland with these words:  
I assure the people of the Northwest that I do not accept the dismal proposition 
that pollution is the inevitable price of prosperity nor that we must 
compromise the environment to gain economic growth. We cannot enrich our 
lives by impoverishing our land. We can raise both standard of living and the 
quality of life (Train 189). 
     Administrator Train emphasized that environmental expenditures were a relatively small 
factor in inflation at that time, and that their effect would remain small for the foreseeable 
future (Ibid.). He also stressed that environmental expenditures were no more inherently 
inflationary or non-productive than expenditures for national defense, law enforcement, 
health, or education (Ibid.). As he cited examples of the EPA‘s careful analytical work, he 
indicated that the pollution control expenditures were worth the expense and the resultant 
improved efficiency could simultaneously cut costs, conserve energy, and curb pollution, 
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thus helping America to reduce inflation as well as pollution (Ibid.). However, the reality 
was grim. Taxing energy met with enormous political resistance, and the head of the Federal 
Energy Administration was forced to resign following the backlash to his support for a five-
cent-per-gallon gasoline tax (A. Miller, ―Energy‖). 
     Under the Ford Administration, several major energy laws were passed. These included 
the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and minimum efficiency regulations 
for automobiles (aiming for 20 miles per gallon in 1980 and 28 in 1985) and appliances 
(labeling of electrical appliances enabled consumers to make better choices) (Ibid.). On 
behalf of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, President Ford also initiated several efforts 
aimed at fostering international cooperation among consumers, such as the creation of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) to promote oil production and alternative energy sources 
(Ibid.). However, there was no quality change on environmental protection: the EPA budget 
remained low in 1975 and 1976, and the EPA workforce also decreased in 1976.  
     The EPA led by Administrator Train, further identified noise levels affecting health and 
welfare and proposed quieting jets. It also supported both the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(TSCA) and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which were 
passed by Congress and signed by President Ford at the end of 1976. Administrator Train 
declared the TSCA to be ―one of the most important pieces of ‗preventive medicine‘ 
legislation…Its basic aim is to give public health far more of the weight that it deserves in 
the decisions by which chemicals are commercially made and marketed, by which they enter 
and spread throughout the human environment‖ (Monosson).  
The EPA’s Independent Decision-making 
     As a native of Washington D. C., Administrator Train had close personal relations with 
many members of Congress, and the career civil service. He had served as a staff member on 
two congressional committees, joined the Treasury Department and had then been appointed 
a U.S. Tax Court Judge. He became the President of the Conservation Foundation in 1965 
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and was appointed Under Secretary of the Interior in 1969. A year later, he was made 
Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (Quarles, Cleaning up 199). His personal 
mandate and relationships gave him significant independence from the rest of the executive 
branch. Since the White House gave the EPA Administrator final authority over the 
substance of all EPA regulations (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 38), Administrator Train 
believed the agency fully lived up to its responsibilities to the public as an independent 
agency in the executive branch charged with protecting the nation‘s environment (Train, 
―E.P.-Eh?‖). He said, ―In my time at the EPA, I don‘t recall any regulatory decision that was 
driven by political considerations. More to the present point, never once, to my best 
recollection, did either the Nixon or Ford White House was ever try to tell me how to make a 
decision‖ (Ibid.). Although the White House was interested in helping him make decisions, 
he kept his ideas. On one occasion, when the EPA was about to issue regulations concerning 
lead in gasoline, Administrator Train received a call from Melvin Laird, later Secretary of 
Defense under President Ford, who told him the White House was receiving a lot of 
complaints from the oil and auto industries over the EPA‘s proposed action. Laird asked 
whether those industries had had a full opportunity to express their views to the EPA and he 
said they had. Laird then asked whether the EPA had taken those views fully into account. 
He said he had. And with that, Laird said that was all he needed to know. Later 
Administrator Train issued the planned regulations without any change (Ibid.). On another 
occasion, President Ford asked Administrator Train to meet with him and several members 
of the cabinet along with Alan Greenspan (then chair of the Council of Economic Advisers) 
to explain the substance of a decision covering auto-emission controls that Train planned to 
announce the next day. The country was in an economic recession at the time, and there was 
understandable concern over the economic impact of the proposed EPA actions. They had a 
full discussion, but that was all. Administrator Train proceeded to issue the regulation as 
planned (Train 168). Moreover, when President Nixon declared it necessary to ―lower the 
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emission limits,‖ Administrator Train objected (Flippen, Conservative 144). Administrator 
Train stated that he certainly never thought of himself as being disloyal to Nixon; he was 
simply doing the job he had been given. John Whitaker commented that he was ―for the 
environment first, Nixon second‖ (Flippen, Nixon 52).  
     As Congress interfered in the case of Armco Steel, a crucial question arose: who 
controlled the EPA? Representative Henry Reuss (chairman of the Subcommittee on 
Conservation and Natural Resources) called Peter Flanagan (EPA representative, and Justice 
Department official) before his Subcommittee to explain the administration‘s actions and 
suggested that the EPA should enforce congressional requirements regardless of the 
administration‘s position on the matter. John Quarles (EPA spokesman) found himself 
caught in the long-standing struggle between presidential and congressional power (U.S. 
Cong. HR 226). As a regulator and enforcer of the law, the EPA was bound by congressional 
mandates. But as part of the executive branch, the agency also had responsibility to the 
President. Thus, Administrators Ruckelshaus and Train would determine whether Congress 
or the President was decisive on any particular issue. As President Nixon was shaken first by 
the Vietnam War and then by the Watergate Scandal, Congress became ascendant in 
environmental matters (―Drawing‖). Congress‘ dominance in the environmental issue, 
together with Administrator Train‘s close ties with Congress enabled the EPA to remain 
independent. As a former senior EPA official explained: 
Train survived because Richard Nixon did not. He drew his support from the 
Air and Water Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate Public Works Committee 
in resisting the Nixon White House‘s campaign to dismantle environmental 
legislation. What had been to Ruckelshaus a voice of encouragement was to 
Train a lifeline (Sansom 25). 
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3.1.7. “Quality of Life” Review  
     Since technology limitation caused the uncertainty or incompleteness of scientific data, 
and the business community complained that the EPA was nothing more than an 
environmental advocate with unfair government muscle behind it (Opie 448), the Nixon 
Administration conducted the first of many efforts to find ways to control and manage the 
EPA. President Nixon instituted the first White House review of environmental and other 
regulations near the end of his first term. Under the idea of centralization, President Nixon 
reorganized the Bureau of the Budget from Executive Office of the President (EOP) into the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970 and centralized administrative control 
through the OMB. The essence of the OMB was supported both by the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, and by the Data Quality Act (Tozzi). The Paperwork Reduction Act controls the 
information that the government collects; while the Data Quality Act controls the 
information that the government releases (Ibid.). The OMB administers these two statutes. 
Thus, the flow of scientific and technical information into the EPA to support science policy 
efforts and the release of risk assessments would be impacted by the OMB (Ibid.). On May 
21st 1971, President Nixon established the ―Quality of Life‖ review regulations program, led 
by OMB Director George Schultz, to examine how environmental regulations could be 
designed with minimal adverse impact on industrial activity (Frankel and Orszag 986 note 
19). This program focused solely on environmental regulations to minimize burdens on 
business (U.S. OMB, Report 2). On July 31st 1972, Nixon further strengthened his control 
over regulatory policy through Circular A-19, in which the OMB required agencies to submit 
all proposed testimonies, reports, and legislation for OMB approval prior to their 
transmission to Congress (Marcus, Promise 125). All proposed EPA regulations, thirty days 
before draft publication, along with an analysis of the rule‘s objectives, alternatives, and 
expected costs and benefits were to be submitted for scrutiny by other relevant agencies, with 
the review process to be coordinated by the OMB (Ibid.). Following review, the OMB would 
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send proposed regulations out to the affected agencies, receive their comments, and then 
develop an administration position (Tozzi). Although this program was nominally extended 
to all federal policy proposals involving consumer protection, public health and safety, and 
occupational health and safety, in practice the EPA remained the only agency routinely 
required to submit its proposals to the OMB (Bruff, ―Presidential‖). This program was 
expected to have a significant impact on the policies of other agencies, impose significant 
costs on non-federal sectors, or create additional demands on the federal budget, thus 
ensuring that economic development and fiscal concerns received due consideration in the 
process of writing regulations (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 37). However, activities from 
this program were not particularly significant. In many cases, this review process delayed the 
promulgation of regulations for several months (Ibid.). Administrator Ruckelshaus also 
maintained that while he paid close attention to the recommendations of other agencies, the 
final decision in all cases was his alone (U.S. Cong. S, Implementation 243). In fact, the 
―Quality of Life‖ review program did pave the way for later and more substantial White 
House participation in the regulatory process (Frankel and Orszag 986 note 19). Since the 
creation of the OMB, each administration has set out its own requirements for OMB 
regulatory analysis and review in a series of executive orders (Fiorino, Making 71). In an 
address to Congress in October 1974, President Ford called for eliminating unnecessary rules 
and regulations in light of public concern on consumer costs and inflation (Anderson 482). In 
order to better reduce consumer costs and combat inflation, he also recommended the 
creation of a National Commission on Regulatory Reform to study the independent 
regulatory commissions, and stated that his administration would appraise the inflationary 
effects of rules emanating from executive branch agencies (Anderson 483). The Ford 
Administration retained the Quality of Life Review process with extending the scope of 
regulatory review by requiring all executive branch agencies to prepare ―Inflationary Impact 
Statements‖ for major proposals in a process overseen by a new Council on Wage and Price 
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Stability (―CWPS‖) (Conley). Since the CWPS mainly scrutinized regulations by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission with the goal of combating 
inflation, this process had little impact on the EPA (Percival 139-144). The Quality of Life 
Review continued through the Ford Administration (Quarles, ―Termination‖).  
3.1.8. Congress, Courts and the EPA 
     The pro-environment momentum of the 1960s resulted in the National Environmental 
Protection Act (NEPA) at the end of 1969, which was largely the work of Sen. Henry 
Jackson (D-Wash.) and Lynton Caldwell (R. Andrews 285). There was little debate in 
Congress, little input from pro-environment lobbyists among the NGOs, and few immediate 
complaints from the polluters (Opie 447). This pro-environment momentum represented by 
Earth Day continued into the early 1970s. At that time, protecting the environment became a 
trend in the United States. To be against environmental protection was to be against 
improving public health, and against the rights of pursuing a better life. Protecting the 
environment also became a double-edged sword, with Republican President Richard Nixon 
on one side and a bipartisan coalition led by Senator Edmund Muskie, Chairman of the 
Senate Public Works Committee, on the other. With this bipartisan coalition, Congress 
enacted, and the President signed, a wide body of environmental legislation. For instance, in 
1970, under the leadership of Senator Musikie and Rep. Paul Rogers, major revisions of the 
CAA were enacted. The House version was passed by a vote of 375 to one in June and the 
Senate passed a more stringent bill in September by a vote of 73 to zero (Reitze, Air 16). 
Because Democrats dominated both the House and the Senate, Congress retained the 
initiative in formulating most environmental legislation in the 1970s (Vig and Kraft, 
―Environmental‖ 14). 
      Throughout American history, Congress has chosen to carry out its will by delegating 
authority to administrative agencies, since agencies were seen as the logical way to extend 
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the capacities of Congress and carry out its wishes in a non-political and expert manner 
(Fiorino, Making 36). The EPA is one of these administrative agencies. During the Nixon 
and Ford Presidencies, Democrat-controlled Congress set up environmental statutes and 
added important amendments to them to respond to the immediate environmental problems 
at hand. These environmental statutes included the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, the Clean 
Water Act of 1972 (CWA), the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). They established a framework for 
preventing and controlling pollution of air, water and chemicals and defined the basic 
parameters of the EPA‘s regulatory powers. The CAA of 1970 gave the EPA significant 
powers to establish and enforce national air quality standards and to regulate air pollution 
emitters from smokestacks to automobiles. It required ―that air quality standards should be 
set based on medical science alone, rather than on the balancing of health against compliance 
costs‖ (R. Andrews 234). The CWA of 1972 bestowed the EPA the authority to establish and 
enforce national clean water standards, introduced technology-based effluent limitations, and 
required advanced technology on water pollution. The FIFRA of 1972 authorized the EPA to 
regulate a variety of chemicals found in pesticides. The SDWA in 1974 supplemented the 
CWA of 1972 by granting the EPA the power to regulate the quality of public drinking water. 
The RCRA in 1976 authorized the EPA to promulgate regulations for generators and 
transporters of solid waste, as well as owners and operators of solid waste treatment, storage, 
and disposal facilities to ―establish such standards…as may be necessary to protect human 
health and the environment‖ (Pendergrass 173). The TSCA of 1976 authorized the EPA to 
regulate the use of toxic substances. These statutes and amendments also required the EPA to 
identify any substance found in air, water, drinking water, pesticides, buildings, and waste, 
which might be harmful to human health or the environment. The EPA could then take the 
responsibility of identifying how these substances are harmful and in what doses. Congress 
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also enacted citizen suit provisions in six of the EPA‘s seven major statutes and gave ―citizen 
groups‖ the rights to sue in certain circumstances (Weiland, Caldwell, and O‘Leary, 106). 
     Since courts were permitted by law to challenge EPA environmental decisions (Kraft and 
Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 11), five main types of law suits appeared: the State or federal 
government sued an industry for not complying with the law; environmental organizations 
directly sued an industry for breaking a pollution control law; industry sued the EPA, 
environmental interest groups sued the EPA or the federal government and even States sued 
the EPA. During the early 1970s, the most common kind of environmental law suit was that 
in which an environmental organization sued the federal government under NEPA, arguing 
that ―a federal agency should write an environmental impact statement (EIS) before building 
an environmentally destructive project‖ (Paehlke, Conservation 234). The environmental 
impact included not only the natural environment of wilderness areas, rivers, shorelines, and 
other unique geographical features, but also impacts on public health, and to assure ―safe, 
healthful, productive, and aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings‖ for all 
Americans (Opie 452). Several federal courts, especially the D.C. Circuit Court, agreed with 
the environmental organizations, and ordered federal agencies to consider more 
environmental factors in their statements (Paehlke, Conservation 234). In turn, the EPA took 
courts as the vehicle to enforce its environmental standards. But courts were not always for 
EPA enforcement. The collective wisdom of courts often provided a confusing answer 
(Reitze, Air 63). In the case Brown v. EPA, an extensive EPA transportation control plan for 
California was attacked by at least 208 public and private parties, including California State 
University and California‘s then-Governor (Ibid.). The court found that the ―plan specifically 
directed the State of California to undertake those tasks assigned to it‖ (Reitze, Stationary 
119). But the court then held that ―the CAA did not authorize legal measures against the 
State of California if the State failed to comply‖ (Reitze, Air 63). In order to avoid 
constitutional questions, the court construed the CAA as not authorizing the EPA 
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Administrator to require State enforcement, essentially upholding §113 of the Act, ―which 
deals with federal enforcement powers against ‗any person,‘ is not applicable to actions 
against s State, because a State is not ‗any person‘‖ (Ibid.). ―A similar opinion was rendered 
in the case Arizona v. EPA‖ (Ibid.).  
     Sometimes the courts‘ decisions on environmental issues were redefined by government 
intervention. In the case of Armco Steel, Ruckelshaus sued for dumping over half a ton of 
toxic chemicals (mostly cyanides and phenols) and between three and six tons of ammonia 
into the Houston Ship Channel daily. This had been continuing for several decades and it 
resulted in numerous fish kills and the closure of shell fish beds in Galveston Bay. In 
September 1971, a federal district court judge found Armco guilty. The court ordered Armco 
to halt all toxic releases into the channel. The company faced closing its Houston furnaces to 
comply. Armco‘s president, William Verity, sent a letter to President Nixon complaining that 
the EPA‘s enforcement of the Federal Water Quality Act had violated a tenet of the 
President‘s pro-business policy, ―industry would not be a whipping boy in solving our 
environmental problems‖ (Quarles, Cleaning up 63-64). He also told President Nixon that 
Armco had planned to lay off 300 workers prior to the EPA‘s action. Because of the 
increasing unemployment and Armco‘s contribution to the Nixon campaign, the White 
House pressed for a compromise settlement. Nixon aide Peter Flanagan called in EPA 
Enforcement Chief John Quarles, and strongly suggested that the EPA propose a sixty-day 
stay of the court order to provide Armco and the EPA time to negotiate an amicable solution 
(U.S. Cong. HR 225). But EPA officials continued to oppose concessions. In the end, the 
Nixon Administration and Armco negotiated a squeaky-clean settlement and Armco agreed 
to follow EPA guidelines for installing proven waste treatment technology at its Houston 
facility (―Drawing‖). 
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3.1.9. Interests Groups and the EPA 
     Since the founding of the EPA, relations between the EPA and industry have often been 
adversarial. In the early 1970s, ―business groups were unable to prevent EPA legislative 
enactments at either the federal or the State level‖ (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 11). 
In addition, their scattershot lobbying proved ineffective (Cohen 18). Facing stricter air-
pollution controls, industries failed to establish a unified political front or to effectively 
advance common policy positions (Conley). Without coordination, dozens of trade 
associations and major corporations each advanced their own narrow proposals at the 
congressional hearings of 1969-70 (Ibid.). A jumble of their often conflicting plans, proposed 
revisions, and their scattershot lobbying that solely relied on the Republican Party made 
businesses fail to influence Congress to make compliance costs a major consideration in the 
statute (Ibid.). Because of the strong public environmental support and Democrats‘ control of 
Congress, President Nixon and President Ford watched concern for the environment explode 
as a public issue (Train 5). Although President Nixon wanted to stress economic growth and 
help business groups, he had to cooperate with Congress to pass the environmental statutes. 
This was all he could do, as his veto was easily overridden by Congress, and its non-
compliance could damage his leading role on environmental issues in national politics. The 
EPA consolidated the environmental programs and Administrator Ruckelshaus defined his 
regulatory initiatives with the method ―Command-and-Control.‖ The EPA would enforce 
command and control pollution. Big industries and automakers were forced to take the best 
existing technologies for controlling pollution at the ―end of the pipe,‖ instead of 
encouraging them to rethink their production processes, materials, and energy inputs in any 
fundamental way (R. Andrews 234). A lot of firms claimed that the environmental statutes 
made them lose money. For instance, in the early 1970s, the chemical industry argued that 
the proposed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards for vinyl 
chloride exposure in the workplace would cost between $65 billion and $90 billion and as 
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many as two million jobs (Green C1). Its trade association stated: ―The standard is simply 
beyond the compliance capability of the industry‖ (Ibid.). Dow Chemicals from Monsanto 
estimated that it spent $147 million in 1975, including $63 million on environmental controls 
and $22 million on health and safety (American 435). They had no choice but to simply obey 
the law through regulatory compliance in terms of taking their environmental responsibility, 
especially in the early 1970s. However, they fought for their interests as well. They found 
themselves negotiating with State pollution control agencies and even sued them. They tried 
to influence public opinion through organizing public debate, advocacy advertising and 
public relations, and through lobbying the media by emphasizing environmental regulation as 
―overregulation‖ or ―overkill,‖ which contributed to the nation‘s economic problems 
including energy shortages, soaring capital costs and inflation, and high unemployment 
(Hays 243). Businesses learned about the importance of being united. They began 
increasingly to work together in political opposition, forging common policy positions 
through advisory councils and inter-industry business lobbies (Conley). During the energy 
crisis era, oil, gas, and electric power companies blamed rising fuel prices and the following 
result of the deeper post-1973 economic strains on unreasonable environmental restrictions 
(Ibid.). Companies such as Mobil Oil and American Electric Power charged that 
environmental rules were stoking rising energy prices, job losses, and inflation (Ibid.). W. 
Donaham Crawford, president of the Edison Electric Institute, blamed a ―rapid imposition of 
severe environmental restrictions‖ for the energy shortages and urged the government to 
strike a ―reasonable and cautious balance between the need for energy and the need for a 
wholesome environment‖ (―Edison‖). Steelmakers stressed job losses; chemical firms 
including Dow, Monsanto, and American Cyanamid conducted extensive regulatory-cost 
surveys, called salvos, against the rising tide of environmental regulation and they warned of 
stifled innovation and flagging international competitiveness (Ibid.). Additionally, out-of-
control bureaucracies, unreasonable paperwork, red tape and inflation, ―which had averaged 
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4.8 percent between 1966 and 1973, increased at an average annual rate of 9.3 percent 
between 1974 and 1981‖ enabled major corporations to woo small businesses, employees, 
and investors to support the complaints of ―overregulation‖ (Vogel, Fluctuating 113). 
Moreover, shared commitments and concrete policy proposals forged to inject cost 
considerations into environmental regulation, and lobbyists vigorously campaigned for 
statutes and administrative procedures (Rodgers 726-729). Thus, President Nixon was urged 
to build the OMB and initiate the Quality of Life Review process on environmental 
regulation. Congress was asked to include provisions in new environmental statutes requiring 
the EPA to balance the economic costs of regulation against the health and environmental 
benefits (Conley). As President Ford extended the scope of regulatory review in the Quality 
of Life Review process, Lester Brown, a staffer on the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, charged that the OMB ―interfered‖ with the statutory responsibilities and 
regulatory functions of the EPA, and wrote in 1976 that the OMB had ―provided industry 
with an opportunity to review, comment on, delay, and change EPA actions behind closed 
doors. The public has not been afforded this opportunity and consequently faces industry-
influenced and weakened guidelines, regulations, and standards difficult to modify‖ 
(―Office‖). The manager of the Quality of Life Review, Jim Tozzi, also recalled ―We made a 
lot of changes… When a regulation went out of the OMB, it was lean and mean‖ (Twohey 
12). Congress made changes which limited the impact of environmental statutes through 
provisions that required agencies to completely justify their environmental quality standards 
and regulations (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 11), and thus constrained the EPA‘s 
activities. As Richard Andrews wrote: ―Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the EPA had to weigh the environmental and health risks against 
the economic benefits of agricultural production‖ (243). Similar problems occurred with the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) of 1976. The EPA was required by the TSCA to use 
the ―least burdensome requirements‖ to protect against an unreasonable risk. The TSCA also 
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directed the EPA, when determining whether a substance posed an ―unreasonable risk,‖ to 
consider other factors, including the substance‘s benefits and ―the reasonably ascertainable 
economic consequences‖ of regulation (Conley).  
Environmental Organizations 
     In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, environmental organizations became 
institutionalized. They shared a wide range of different concerns and focuses. Larger 
environmental organizations such as the National Wildlife Federation, the Audubon Society 
and the Sierra Club, which were traditionally concerned with the protection of land and 
wildlife, added toxic issues to their agendas in the 1960s and 1970s (Freudenberg and 
Steinsapir 32). Newer environmental organizations founded in the 1960s and 1970s, like the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), 
mainly focused on air pollution, water pollution and other toxic chemical problems, and 
emphasized more general environmental quality than human health (Ibid.). Both these older 
and larger environmental organizations and the newer ones formed the mainstream 
environmental organizations. They had many scientists and lawyers on staff, which had 
considerable experience working in courts, Congress or scientific meetings. These experts 
interacted regularly with industry and government experts, with whom they shared 
professional training and an understanding of the ―rule of the game‖ (Ibid.). These 
mainstream environmental organizations primarily focused on building public opinion 
through education and forming environmental policy through national legislation or litigation 
(Mitchell, Mertig and Dunlap 12). They engaged in electoral campaigns, congressional and 
administrative lobbying, overseeing administrative decision making, even suing for 
environmental protection in courts (Ibid.). In 1969, only two full-time environmental 
lobbyists served in the environmental movement, but by 1975 it had expanded to forty 
lobbyists in the twelve mainstream organizations (Mitchell, ―From‖ 93). To influence 
environmental outcomes, environmental organizations often used the rights to sue (Vig 105), 
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and 1,900 lawsuits were filed by environmental organizations in the federal courts in the 
1970s (Schreurs 66). Such organizations as the NRDC, the EDF, the Sierra Club, the Legal 
Defense Fund, and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) were particularly active on the 
legal front (Mitchell, ―From‖ 109). Many of their challenges were based on NEPA 
requirements that environmental impact assessments be conducted for all federally funded 
projects. They also sued the government when it failed to enforce environmental regulations 
or standards (Schreurs 66). The thirteen-year battle between the Sierra Club and Walt Disney 
provides a good example. The Sierra Club fought Walt Disney‘s plan for a massive ski resort 
in the Mineral King area of the Sierra Nevada range and defeated the proposed development 
after the lawsuit went to the U.S. Supreme Court (Turner and Clifton 5-9). 
     Together with mainstream environmental organizations, grassroots environmental 
organizations fought for environmental protection by emphasizing the effects on human 
health (Freudenberg and Steinsapir 33). They had lawyers and scientists who had a stake in 
preserving their credibility with government decision-makers and other experts. They often 
took direct action like blocking the construction of hazardous waste facilities and new 
garbage incinerators, thus forcing industry and government to look for ways to reduce waste 
generation at the source (Ibid.). From the late 1960s to the early 1970s, efforts from both 
mainstream and grassroots environmental organizations complemented one another, resulting 
in the founding of environmental statutes (Ibid.). The concerns pushed by environmental 
organizations reached a peak in 1970, followed by a steady downturn throughout the decade. 
In 1965, 17 percent of respondents in a Gallup survey in 1972 said they wanted the 
government to devote most of its attention to reducing air and water pollution. However, by 
1970, 53 percent of respondents wanted the government to devote most of its time to these 
issues (D. Taylor, 37-39). In Louis Haris, in 1970, 41 percent of the respondents said 
pollution and ecology posed one of ―the two or three biggest problems facing people like 
yourself‖, while 13 percent of respondents said the same in 1972, and 6 percent in 1975 
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(Mitchell and Davies 6). The declining public awareness and concern continued into the mid-
1970s. However, environmental organizations had a strong membership growth rate, which 
continued throughout the 1970s (Kraft, ―Influence‖ 145).  
     The CAA developed the principle that protecting public health was paramount, and that 
the polluters should pay for the costs of pollution (R. Andrews 234). Environmental statutes 
defined the EPA‘s role as a single-minded advocate. Administrator Ruckelshaus‘ strong 
environmental enforcement and high regard for public opinion made this a reality. Since the 
Nixon-Ford Administration, environmental protection had become part of the fabric of 
American society. Environmental programs reached all levels of government. Industry 
considered environmental safeguards a necessary part of doing business. Environmental 
education spread in American schools. Protecting the environment became an integral and 
important part of American way of life (―Russell‖). 
3.2. The EPA under the Carter Administration 
     Under President Carter, the EPA reached the high point in its history prior to the year 
2000. Because the U.S. was under a single Democratic government (see table 1), 
environmental statutes were easily strengthened by other major laws including the CAA 
Amendments of 1977, the CWA of 1977, the Federal Pesticide Act, the Endangered 
American Wildness Act, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund). During this time, the EPA also had the largest budget 
(real purchasing power) in its history prior to the year 2000 to organize its environmental 
programs. The EPA‘s budget suddenly increased from almost $.77 billion in 1976 to about 
$5.5 billion in 1978 and its workforce from 9,481 in 1976 to 13,078 in 1980 (See chart 1). 
The EPA strengthened environmental enforcement with civil litigation. It convinced 
Congress to enact Superfund, and introduced economic incentives to its regulations, thereby 
strengthening environmental protection. For instance, restoration of strip-mined lands was 
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required, more than 100 million acres of Alaskan wilderness was set aside for varying 
degrees of national protection and the toxic clean-up began with the $1.6 billion Superfund 
(Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 14).  
     However, large federal expenses and inflation resulted in regulatory reforms to control the 
expenses, including the EPA‘ budget. Regulatory reforms were taken to enhance the internal 
management of the regulatory agencies by comparing the economic costs with benefits of 
policy alternatives (Eisner 170). President Carter signed Executive Order 12044, and 
introduced economic and cost-benefit analysis with the regulatory reform to strengthen the 
control of the EPA and to reduce regulatory burdens on business and government (Opie 448). 
He established the first OMB-wide office on regulatory review called the Office of 
Regulatory and Information Policy, and created the cabinet-level body Regulatory Analysis 
Review Groups (RARG). For the first time the Carter Administration set up a review process 
of the most important regulations proposed, and established principles for the development 
of federal regulations (Tozzi). Regulatory reforms slowed down the speed of environmental 
regulation to some degree and made the EPA begin to emphasize balance and compromise to 
achieve long-term goals (Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 16). Regulatory reforms continued 
throughout the 1980s, and were taken to extremes to constrain EPA regulations in the early 
Regan Administration. The EPA under the Carter Administration was entering its first era of 
transition. 
     Since Carter was part of the Democratic Party, he had committed himself to a strong 
federal role in environmental protection during his election campaign (Mintz 28). In his 1976 
Presidential campaign brochure, ―Leaders for a Change,‖ he stated: ―to maintain strong 
environmental protection laws,‖ and ―to protect against relaxation of our current standards 
for air quality, water quality or automotive emissions,‖ and ―to preserve the natural heritage 
of America and to turn over to future generations a country that is environmentally sound‖ as 
being important (Carter 2). After taking office in 1977, President Carter kept his promise and 
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chose people with environmentalist backgrounds and perspectives as top managers for the 
EPA (Mintz 28). He appointed two environmental lobbyists, Barbara Blum, and David 
Hawkins, as the EPA Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrator for Air and Waste 
Management (Berry 30). He also appointed Marvin Durning, the particularly ardent 
environmentalist from the State of Washington, as Assistant Administrator for enforcement 
(Mintz 28). These environmentalist EPA officials kept the door wide open for 
environmentalists (Berry 30). Additionally, EPA Administrator, Douglas Costle, was also a 
member of the Democratic Party with an environmentalist background and perspectives 
(Mintz 28). Administrator Costle held a bachelor‘s degree from Harvard University and 
received a law degree from the University of Chicago. He was the former director of 
Connecticut‘s Pollution Control Agency (Ibid.). When he served as Senior Staff Associate 
for Environmental and Natural Resources for the President‘s Advisory Council on Executive 
Organization, he headed the study which recommended the creation of the EPA in 1970 
(Ibid.). These individuals enabled EPA programs and enforcement activities to receive 
relatively generous funding in the late 1970s (Ibid.), and released the EPA from the hard 
fiscal stringency during the late Nixon-Ford Administration. In 1977, Administrator Costle 
sharpened the focus on hazardous waste. He wanted to change the EPA from a ―guardian of 
birds and bunnies‖ to a ―preventive health agency‖ that would move against suspected 
carcinogens in toxic substances, pesticides, and drinking water (Opie 517). He showed this 
determination by telling the American Chemical Society in late 1978, that the EPA ―cannot 
wait for [scientific] proof positive in the form of dead bodies‖ (Ibid.).  
3.2.1. Strengthening Environmental Enforcement with Civil Litigation 
     The EPA under Administrator Costle made a change to undertake environmental 
enforcement. He introduced civil litigation to environmental enforcement. It was helped by 
his Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, Marvin Durning. Marvin Durning decided to 
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redirect EPA enforcement. He created a major source enforcement effort with the slogan 
―file first and negotiate later‖ (Mintz 28)  
     During 1977 and 1978, the EPA identified major violators of the Clean Air Act State 
Implementation Plans (SIPs) and of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)‘s 
July 1st 1977 deadline for the achievement of effluent limitations based upon best practicable 
technology. Then, the EPA referred each of these violators to the DOJ by recommending a 
civil action against them in an appropriate federal district court for injunctive relief and civil 
penalties. To avoid any of these suits being resolved subsequent to their being filed, EPA 
enforcement officials were discouraged from entering into negotiations with any parties 
subject to enforcement action until after litigation had commenced (Ibid.). This was 
administered by the newly introduced Civil Penalty Policy and National Penalty Panel. The 
Civil Penalty Policy not only forbade State and federal enforcement officials from 
negotiating settlement of the civil penalty aspects of any major air or water enforcement case 
for less than the amount of money which the defendant had saved by delaying compliance 
with applicable requirements, but also required additional penalties to apply to alleged 
violators that exhibited lack of good faith (Mintz 28-29). In addition, EPA headquarters 
strictly required each of its regional offices to produce a quota of litigation referrals within a 
given time period (Mintz 28). Thus, the EPA enhanced its influence and the effect of its 
enforcement with direct involvement of its headquarters staff in reviewing, and in some cases 
vetoing, regional recommendations on specific cases (Mintz 30). The EPA further eliminated 
the delays that had characterized some of the organization‘s prior administrative enforcement 
negotiations, and reinforced the EPA‘s image on enforcing environmental statutes, 
compelling compliance and deterring intentional violations (Mintz 32). 
3.2.2. The EPA pursuing Superfund Legislation on Hazardous Waste 
     In 1977 and 1978, several incidents awakened the American public to the dangers posed 
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by the past disposal of hazardous wastes (Mintz 33). The ―Valley of the Drums,‖ a landfill 
strewn with more than 17,000 corroding drums of toxic and hazardous wastes in Brooks, 
Kentucky, contaminated a stream that flowed into the drinking source of a highly populated 
area (Ibid.). Another example was the degradation of the James River near Hopewell, 
Virginia with a highly toxic and non-degradable industrial waste — ketone. Further 
examples were the discovery of nearly 22,000 tons of toxic pollution from a former industrial 
waste disposal site buried beneath the residential neighborhood of Love Canal, NY and a 
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island on March 28th 1979. These incidents all drew the 
public‘s attention to the problem of hazardous and toxic wastes across the country. Public 
awareness of hazardous waste resulted not only in investigations into hazardous waste 
dumping from several congressional committees, but also EPA actions (Mintz 34). Since the 
EPA had not yet proposed any of the hazardous waste regulations, EPA officials felt an 
urgent need to solve the problem of hazardous and toxic wastes (Ibid.). They thought it was 
necessary to ask Congress for a new statute specifically aimed at correcting contamination 
from inactive dumps (Ibid.). However, the nation was working on trimming the costs of 
government operations at this time, and there was ―considerable resistance within the 
administration‖ to proposing any legislative initiatives in this field (Mintz 34 note 44). Under 
this circumstance, EPA officials decided to increase and to orchestrate growing public and 
congressional concern about haphazard waste dumping (Mintz 34). In October 1978, EPA 
regional offices were required by the Assistant Administrator for Water and Waste 
Management to submit their ―best professional estimate‖ of the total number of abandoned 
hazardous waste sites existing within their regions, and report on the number of sites that 
might contain ―significant quantities‖ of hazardous wastes (Ibid.). In November 1978, the 
EPA publically released the results of its ―preliminary inventory,‖ and stated that they 
believed 32,254 sites might contain hazardous wastes and of those, 838 sites contained 
significant quantities thereof (Ibid.). EPA officials planned to propose a new abandoned 
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waste site statute, which they began to refer to as Superfund. To further prove its argument 
that this Superfund was urgently needed, the EPA began to compel known owners and 
operators of abandoned hazardous waste sites with the cooperation of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) (Mintz 34-35). Besides promising to seek additional budgetary resources for 
hazardous waste enforcement and to divert existing agency resources to implement the 
program, EPA Deputy Administrator, Barbara Blum, established a Hazardous Waste 
Enforcement Task Force (HWETF) at the agency‘s headquarters to develop a hazardous 
waste site reporting and tracking system (Mintz 35). The HWETF also established hazardous 
waste enforcement policies, and increased participation from headquarters staff and the DOJ 
in developing hazardous waste cases (Mintz 35-36). EPA headquarters managers supported 
the HWETF by putting enormous pressure on regional officials to produce a steady stream of 
new enforcement referrals. Deputy Administrator, Barbara Blum, even asked her 
headquarters staff for a series of ―regional report cards‖ to evaluate regional enforcement 
(Mintz 36). With the support from the DOJ and the Deputy Administrator, the HWETF 
achieved significant results. The EPA and the DOJ had filed fifty-four judicial enforcement 
actions to force cleaning up of abandoned dumps. The HWETF got rid of some red tape 
burdens that the administration‘s litigation referral system had generally imposed on EPA 
regional enforcement officials, and laid solid groundwork for the establishment of the 
Superfund Program in establishing a national site tracking system and a set of preliminary 
site assessment procedures (Mintz 38). In the end, Congress enacted the $1.6 billion 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(Superfund) on December 11th 1980, which provided broad Federal authority to respond 
directly to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger public 
health or the environment (―CERCLA‖). 
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3.2.3. Establishing the Bubble Policy 
     The CAA Amendment of 1977 authorized emissions trading with ―offset‖ or ―credit‖ in 
―non-attainment areas,‖ which were highly-polluted urban areas and did not meet national air 
quality standards (NAAQS). The Carter Administration, which was concentrating on 
trimming the cost of government operations (Mintz 34), also required the EPA to consider 
the economic consequences of their new regulations (Campagna 191). Thus, the EPA 
introduced economic incentives to its regulation. The Bubble Concept was one of them. It 
was introduced in December 1979, to ―provide greater flexibility to sources to effectively 
manage their emissions‖ (American Chemical Society 277). It enabled private decision-
makers to decide how to meet EPA requirements by treating multiple emission points within 
a facility. Administrator Costle said, in providing guidance to the States on the Bubble 
Concept: ―If a company can, with equivalent environmental impact, get SO2 out of one 
process for 50 cents a pound and out of another for $1.00, we should permit the company‘s 
engineers to control more of the first process and less of the second…with this new policy 
we will draw an imaginary bubble around the whole plant and tell the company that it can 
find the most efficient way of controlling the plant‘s emissions as whole…Under the current 
Command-and-Control approach, a company has no incentive to remove one ounce more 
pollution from any process than the regulations require, it consequently has little reason to 
innovate. With the bubble, however, a firm will actively look for new ways to push control 
further and at a lower cost. In the long run, the bubble will advance the frontier of pollution 
control technology…‖ (Scott 37). The term ―bubble‖ referred to an imaginary bubble around 
a major pollution stationary source defined by the EPA as the entire plant (Ibid.), such as a 
refinery or a steel mill. Each source had its own emission limit to the ―bubbled‖ portions and 
had several emissions credits (―Trading‖). Therefore, within the bubble, a facility might 
increase the amount of its emissions if another facility decreased its emissions by the 
matching amount. Thus, certain ―progress stifling‖ regulations could be avoided if ―no net 
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increase‖ in air emissions or water effluents occurred at the source (Deland 277). A further 
step of the bubble applied to emissions trading, which was an approach to use marketable 
permits through trading emission rights. Since the EPA determined the allowable emissions, 
the rights to emit the allotted portion of the pollutants characterized by emission credits could 
be bought and sold among firms (Campagna 191). Firms that emitted less than they were 
permitted could sell these emission points to others (Ibid.). The emission credits were in the 
form of prospective, permanent reductions in annual emissions and were collected by plant 
closure or permanent and enforceable modifications or the proposed new facility to reduce 
emissions. Pollution reduction would be reached because ten to fifty percent of purchased 
credits must be retired depending on the non-attainment category (OECD, Implementing 54). 
On the one hand, firms could be awarded through lower emissions acquired through the 
improvement of technology and efficiency; on the other hand, firms that bought emission 
points could enhance their production and earn more money. 
3.2.4. Regulatory Reform from the Carter Administration 
     Lou Cannon has noted that the 1970s began with twelve federal regulatory agencies and 
ended with eighteen, and the budgets of these agencies increased from $1.4 billion to $7.5 
billion (Knott and Chidester 60). The Carter Administration experienced a fairly rapid 
expansion in the number and extent of regulatory programs with high cost of federal 
regulations, large governmental administration and heavy financial burden and a multitude of 
business complaints about regulation and its costs (Anderson 484). In addition, the cost of 
compliance with environmental regulations was steadily rising, with firms in the United 
States spending more than two percent of GNP on pollution control in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Hart 79). Together with big federal expenses and enormous costs from firms, escalating 
inflation and the experience with the passage and implementation of the Clean Air Act made 
costs a central criterion in the federal campaign to clean up pollution (Conley). Both 
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President Carter and Congress were convinced of the need to put regulatory reforms on the 
agenda. The Carter Administration conducted regulatory reforms through strengthening 
presidential supervision of the agency rule-making process, regulatory procedure reform 
legislation and deregulation (Anderson 484).  
     In March 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12044,  Improving Government 
Regulations. It introduced more rational analysis and decision-making in federal regulations 
through establishing general principles for agencies to follow (U.S. OMB, Report 5). It 
directed agencies to assess policy alternatives, and to estimate the economic consequences of 
their decisions. It also required agencies to complete a regulatory analysis for all major rules, 
to write rules in plain English, to minimize paperwork burdens, and to prepare plans to 
evaluate rules once they were in place (Carter, ―Executive‖ 12661). Thus, the Regulatory 
Analysis Review Group (RARG) was created. It was a source of economic expertise that 
could second-guess agencies, and thus advise the President (Fiorino, Making 72). It was 
composed of representatives of the OMB, the economic and regulatory agencies, and was 
required to review up to ten of the most important regulations each year (U.S. OMB, Report 
6). Furthermore, in the middle of 1978, the Carter Administration began formulating a serial 
regulatory procedure reform bill (see table7) by working with key legislators and others to 
design its own proposal (Anderson 485). One example was the ―Regulatory Reform Act‖ 
which was sent to Congress in March 1979 (see table 8). In this bill, not only were new rules 
emphasized such as: economic analysis, selection of the least burdensome alternative, and 
regular review and elimination of outmoded rules, streamlined procedures to reduce 
regulatory delay, and more opportunity for public participation in rule-making (Anderson 
486); but also some economic incentives were included like a cost-benefit analysis of each 
proposal for changes in regulations, a calendar of upcoming rules, reducing paperwork 
requirements and a sunset provision to examine the effectiveness of regulations in practice 
(Campagna 172). President Carter sent his message with this bill to Congress. He stressed  
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Table 7 
Regulatory Reform Bills, 1979-1980 
S7SS and HR3263. Carter Administration 
required agencies to conduct economic analyses, streamlined proceedings, mandated periodic 
review of rules, funded public interveners, and more. 
HR6768, Carter Administration  
evaluated administrative law judges. 
S262. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
called for general procedural reform, similar to Carter bills. 
S44S. Percy-Byrd 
called for sunset review over eight years of thirty-two regulatory agencies. 
S51, S52, S53, S54. Bentsen 
provided for regulatory budget, economic analyses, OMB coordination of agencies. 
S299. Culver 
Required agencies to tailor regulations to small business (regulatory flexibility). 
S2. Muskie 
Called for sunset review of regulatory programs. 
S93. Eagleton 
Called for sunset review of regulation with an economic impact of more than $100 
million. 
HR1776. Levitas 
Called for one-house legislative veto of rules. 
S1291. Kennedy 
Required agencies to assess competitive impact of regulations. 
S2147. Senate Judiciary Committee 
Provided for comprehensive regulatory reform and Regulatory Policy Board. 
HR4660. House Small Business Committee 
Lightened regulatory burden for small businesses. 
HR6410. House Government Operations Committee 
Provided for paperwork reduction. 
 
Source: Anderson, James E. ―The Struggle to Reform Regulatory Procedures, 1978-1998.‖ Policy Studies 
Journal 26.3 (1998): 485. Print. 
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Table 8 
The Regulation Reform Act 
Regulatory Analysis. Agencies were required to prepare preliminary 
and final analyses for each major rule. The least-cost alternative for handling a 
problem was to be selected; if another alternative was chosen, an agency 
explanation was required. 
Regulatory Agenda. Agencies were directed to publish at least 
semiannually in the Federal Register an agenda of major rules they expected to 
propose or issue during the coming year. 
Regulatory Structure. Each agency was to create a single office with 
primary responsibility and management of the agencies‘ regulatory activities. It 
would apply statutory standards in supervising the insurance of significant rules 
(more numerous and less costly than major rules). 
Improved Procedures. Agencies were to set deadlines for the 
completion of rulemaking procedures and explain failure to meet deadlines. 
Formal or trial-type hearings were to put less reliance on cross-examination. 
Rehearing conferences, discovery, and other means could be uscd to quicken 
decisions. 
Review of Existing Rules. Under the supervision of OMB, agencies 
were to review all major rules every ten years. 
Judicial Review. Initial review of all rules was assigned to courts of 
appeals rather than district courts, as usually was the case. Regulatory analyses 
were not subject to review. 
Public Participation. Agencies were authorized to provide financial 
assistance to participants who would add to the fairness of the hearings or who 
personally could not afford to participate. 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). More flexibility was provided 
for the selection and evaluation of AWs, who would serve seven-year terms. They 
would be under the jurisdiction of a reconstructed Administrative Conference of the 
United States. 
 
Source: Anderson, James E. ―The Struggle to Reform Regulatory Procedures, 1978-1998.‖ Policy Studies 
Journal 26.3 (1998): 487. Print. 
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that the overall regulatory system had become ―burdensome and unwieldy,‖ and that his 
administration had already taken to improve the regulatory system (Anderson 488). He 
recommended Congress procedural reform, paperwork reduction, and the revision of 
individual regulatory statutes (Ibid.). 
     Congress also coupled with the Carter Administration on regulatory reform. The 
Regulatory Flexibility Act won strong bipartisan support and passed in the Senate and the 
House by voice votes on August 6th and September 9th 1979, and was then signed into law 
by the President (Anderson 491). This act was a comprehensive effort by the Carter 
Administration and Congress to balance the social goals of federal regulations with the needs 
and capabilities of small businesses and other small entities in American society. Under this 
act, rule-making actions that likely had a significant economic effect on a substantial number 
of small entities were required to provide an analysis of those impacts (Ibid.). This analysis 
must include a statement of significant alternatives designed to minimize the economic 
impact on small entities (Ibid.). But some members of Congress criticized the act as weak 
and ineffectual, and as an attempt by the administration to derail more comprehensive reform 
legislation (Murray 2725). In the 96th Congress, a more specialized piece of legislation, the 
Paperwork Reduction Act that was tied to regulatory reform was adopted. It was signed into 
law by President Carter despite the opposition of several executive departments. It set as a 
goal a 25 percent reduction over the next three years of the paperwork burden imposed on the 
public by federal agencies. An Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs was established 
in the OMB to review all information requests made by the public (Anderson 492). 
     In addition, deregulation for economic regulatory programs included the Airline 
Deregulation Act, the Natural Gas Policy Act, the Staggers Rail Act, the Motor Carrier 
Reform Act, and the Depository Institution Deregulation. Since the late 1970s, regulatory 
reforms became a major trend and certainly had a strong influence on the EPA. Besides a 
planed 12 percent EPA budget cut in 1982, from President Carter (Brownstein and Easton 
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209), various checks on the EPA were established within the administration and these checks 
surely forced the EPA to pay more attention to trade-offs and alternative instruments (Nelson 
and Winter 375), and thus influenced more environmental programs. President Carter also 
delayed imposing certain new auto standards, allowed the construction of a nuclear power 
plant, and compromised with U.S. Steel on pollution reduction (―Douglas‖). 
3.2.5. Interest Groups and Court 
     After suffering a string of policy defeats in the first half of the 1970s, business groups 
changed their strategy. Instead of only being allied with the Republican Party, business 
groups started to support both Republican and Democrat candidates for public office. It had 
become a Democratic ―political life insurance‖ policy (Hrebenar 296). They were also 
revitalized by increasing cooperation among key business lobbyists, modern technology like 
computers, satellite communications, and new methods of media appeals (Wilson 224; 
Hrebenar and Scott 265). In the late 1970s, money came to play a more significant role in 
congressional campaigns, because most campaigns were forced to go ―high-tech,‖ and ―high-
tech‖ cost money (Hrebenar 296). Business groups took advantage of their financial situation 
and funded some alternative conservative think tanks, such as the American Enterprise 
Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Center of the Study of American Business and the 
American Council for Capital Formation. Although Congress outlawed large political 
contributions from individual donors, the legal funding Political Action Committees (PACs) 
sponsored mainly by business groups had been growing rapidly since the mid-1970s. Only 
eighty-nine PACs existed in 1974, but by 1979, there were thirteen hundred. These PACs 
influenced a large part of the congressional agenda (―The 1970s‖). An example was the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber operated its own television studios to assist grassroots 
lobbying programs and beamed daily business programs through satellites across the nation 
to television stations or corporate offices (Hrebenar 296). The Chamber had further taken the 
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lead in targeting pro-business congressional candidates for many other smaller business 
PACs. By sending out periodic newsletters to other business PACs, the Chamber could 
arrange hundreds of thousands of dollars for the candidates who really need the money in the 
final days of a campaign (Ibid.). By 1980, even before the Reagan Administration, 
businesses had achieved virtual domination over Congress (Fisk 1140). 
     By the mid-1970s, the mainstream environmental movement was experiencing a natural 
decline (Albrecht 156). These trends accelerated during the Cater Administration. 
Mainstream environmental organizations increasingly became willing to accept compromises 
(Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 16). However, grassroots environmental organizations were 
flowering all over the country due to incidents like the toxic contamination of Love Canal in 
1978. Many of these groups became more proactive. They organized to halt the development 
of noxious or nuisance facilities as well as other locally unwanted land use (Taylor, 
―American‖). These direct actions had made it difficult for congressional opponents to pass 
the proposed legislation designed to repeal or significantly weaken major environmental 
programs (Kamieniecki 81). 
     During the latter part of the 1970s, the most common environmental lawsuits in the early 
1970s had fallen, and water and air pollution cases dominated federal environmental cases 
(Paehlke, Conservation 134). Although courts lost their environmental passion on its 
judgments (Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 16), it was still the first forum to accept 
arguments from environmental organizations, which challenged the EPA‘s administrative 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act (Ibid.). Major corporations also increased their legal 
expertise in environmental law, and the number of cases business initiated against the federal 
government regulations escalated (Alexander and Fairbridge 213). In these cases, industry 
argued that regulations were too severe (Paehlke, Conservation 134); and viewed the EPA‘s 
―file first‖ approach as unnecessarily harsh and unduly rigid. Thus, industry resentment of 
the EPA‘s enforcement techniques gradually increased. The jobs-versus-environment issue, 
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which had first surfaced in the mid-1970s, continued to receive attention in the media in the 
early Carter years (Mintz 30). Since the beginning of the 1980s, Court interpretation of the 
Superfund centered around those who among ―multiple contributors were responsible for 
cleaning up numerous abandoned leaking hazardous waste dumps‖ (Paehlke, Conservation 
234). The courts faced a new kind of environmental case in which one industry or property 
owner sued another and/or both their insurance companies to determine liability for multi-
million dollar cleanups (Ibid.). President Carter‘s regulatory review and the utility of cost-
benefit analysis for regulatory decision makers was also strengthened by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Sierra Club v. Costle, which found that a part of the 
President‘s administrative overseeing responsibilities was to review regulations issued by his 
subordinates (U.S. OMB, Report 6). 
     The EPA under the Carter Administration moved away from single-minded advocacy, 
and began to conduct ―matured‖ implementation with growing proficiency and flexibility 
(Ingram and Mann 138) and balance interests through introducing economic incentives to 
environmental regulations and programs (Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 16). The EPA 
entered a transition era, in which it was pulled out of the reluctance of protecting the 
environment from the late Nixon-Ford Administration by the suddenly increasing budget 
from about $.77 billion in 1976 to about $5.5 billion in 1978, and the strengthened laws like 
the CAA Amendments of 1977, the CWA of 1977, the Federal Pesticide Act, the Endangered 
American Wildness Act and the CERCLA (Superfund), and then its regulations were put 
under the control of regulatory reforms. By 1980, the EPA had nearly 13,000 full-time 
employees with two-thirds of them in the agency‘s ten regional offices and other facilities 
outside of Washington, D.C. (Kraft, ―U.S.‖ 25). The EPA budget dropped to about $4.67 
billion by 1980, but the cost of environmental protection was still considerable. This big 
federal expense made the President and Congress conduct regulatory reforms and lead the 
EPA to take economic incentives and measures in its programs. The increasing presidential 
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supervision of the agency rule-making process with economic and cost-benefit analysis, and 
the policy review from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Regulatory 
Analysis Review Groups (RARG) and regulatory procedure reform legislation constrained 
the EPA, empowered the anti-environmental force, and offered stepping-stones toward the 
extreme regulations from the Reagan Administration. Additionally, because much of the 
initial legislation overestimated the speed with which new technologies could be developed 
and applied, and underestimated the compliance costs and the difficulties of writing 
standards for hundreds of major industries, the regulation implementation lagged 
considerably behind schedule in the Carter Administration (Ibid.). Since Congress even later 
became unwilling to enforce strict deadlines (Melnick 21), most of the original compliance 
deadlines were missed or postponed, and some of the required regulations fell years behind 
schedule (Vig and Kraft 377). By the end of the 1970s, more than 90 percent of industrial 
firms were on air and water pollution abatement schedules (Vig and Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 
16). Moreover, federal regulations, including new requirements for occupational health and 
safety, consumer product safety, and energy conservation, placed multiple burdens on the 
same industries, as did the different environmental laws (Ibid.). More conflicts emerged with 
regulated industries seeking to block implementation, and they were accelerated by 
environmental organizations (Wenner 192). These burdens and conflicts paved the way for 
the deregulation of the beginning of the Reagan Administration. 
3.3. The EPA under the Reagan Administration 
     Due to the President‘s unwillingness to protect the environment, the EPA took on a 
different role under the Reagan Administration. Administrator Burford‘s two-year tenure 
marked a turning point in the fortunes of the EPA, and redirected the EPA‘s priorities from 
advocacy to a ―neutral broker‖ position (Opie 448). Administrator Burford diminished the 
EPA‘s authority, cut its budget, pared back its regulations, and delegated more authority to 
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State and local governments (Kurian 206). Thus, she turned the EPA into a deregulator. 
Although Administrator Ruckelshaus‘ two-year tenure put the EPA on the road to recovery, 
and positioned the EPA as an advocate of public interests, open and candid regulation, and 
science-based risk management, and the four-year tenure of Administrator Lee Thomas 
continued Ruckelshaus‘ will, the EPA could still not emerge from President Reagan‘s 
shadow. 
     President Reagan favored reducing the scope of the government and promoting economic 
growth in terms of cost efficiency and administrative ease, at the expense of the environment. 
He emphasized the notion of limited government by ―getting government off the backs of the 
people‖ in his first inaugural address: 
It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows signs of 
having grown beyond the consent of the governed. It is my intention to curb 
the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to demand recognition 
of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal government and 
those reserved to the States or the people (Reagan, Inaugural 2). 
President Reagan set forth a sweeping agenda of budget reductions, tax cuts, personnel 
freezes, block grants, and deregulation, all intended to dramatically lower the fiscal and 
administrative profile of the federal government (Conlan 96). He supported the reform of the 
social regulatory agencies, especially the EPA (Waterman 106). Therefore, anti-
environmentalist rhetoric developed by both the Republicans and the Party‘s Christian right 
wing dominated the Reagan Administration. Reagan‘s Interior Secretary, James Watt, and 
EPA Administrator, Burford, were associated with corporate interests that had lobbied for 
reduced regulations. In 1981, Secretary James Watt stated: ―my responsibility is to follow the 
scriptures which call upon us to occupy the land until Jesus returns. I do not know how many 
generations we can count on before the Lord returns‖ (Helvarg 38). Therefore, the EPA 
budget was cut, environmental programs were strongly constrained, and industries were 
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allowed to play a much greater role in regulating themselves than was allowed in the 1970s. 
3.3.1. Environmental Stand from President Reagan 
     President Reagan was never friendly toward environmentalism. In 1980, he showed his 
anti-environmentalist position by saying both: ―Trees are the biggest source of air pollution,‖ 
and ―When you've seen one redwood, you‘ve seen them all‖ (Opie 448-449). He said that 
environmental protection must not be ―a cover for a ‗no-growth‘ policy and a shrinking 
economy.‖ Facing the economic distress of the 1970s, high inflation, declining productivity, 
and stubborn unemployment, he questioned the wisdom of protective health, safety, and 
environmental regulation. He believed the ―free market‖ would provide the level of 
protection that people were willing to support, and that the government should interfere with 
the market only in limited circumstances (Ackerman and Heinzerling 1555-1556). For 
President Reagan, government regulations strangled the American economy by stifling the 
ingenuity and creativity of the American people. Government was best when it governed 
least, and the best thing it could do was to get out of the way of the American people. He 
showed his position toward regulation by stating: ―government is not the solution to our 
problem, government is the problem.‖ He also said that he contended with the ―intervention 
and intrusion in our lives‖ from ―unnecessary and excessive growth of government‖ (Knott 
and Chidester 60). Instead of improving government efficiency by restructuring government 
and regulation, President Reagan reduced the federal power, and increased individual liberty. 
He cut taxes, and reduced government expenditures and federal regulations to stimulate 
economic growth. His goal was ―to have a government that regulates only where necessary 
and as efficiently and fairly as possible‖ (Reagan, ―Message‖). Due to his stance toward 
regulation, much of his agenda to reduce regulatory controls over private industry was 
directed at environmental regulations. He also advanced his pro-industry and anti-regulation 
policies by appointing industry-oriented individuals with the shared value of strong 
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development (Kenski and Ingram 290-291). Therefore, James Watt became Secretary of the 
Interior, Anne Burford EPA Administrator, and Robert Burford the head of the Bureau of 
Land Management (Opie 449). 
3.3.2. Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford 
      Anne Gorsuch Burford was the third Administrator of the EPA. She studied law and had 
legislative experience as a member of the Colorado State House of Representatives from 
1976 to 1980. Before she came to the EPA, she had been a lawyer for the Mountain Bell 
Corporate Law Department. She agreed with President Reagan regarding environmental 
protection, believed that the EPA was too restrictive on businesses and that it was too big and 
too wasteful (P. Sullivan B6). President Reagan made her share his deep concern for his New 
Federalism to bring economic discipline to environmental protection, and to give the States 
greater enforcement powers (Martin C13). She said that her assignment at the EPA was to 
turn the agency around to support ―industrial revitalization,‖ and to lighten the regulatory 
―overburden‖ that the EPA had placed on industry (Opie 449). During her 22-month tenure, 
she cut the EPA budget by 22 percent, and reduced the number of cases filed against 
polluters. She also relaxed the Clean Air Act regulations, and facilitated the spraying of 
restricted-use pesticides. She further reduced agency employees, and hired staff from the 
industries they were supposed to be regulating. As EPA Administrator, she had an unsuitable 
personality with ―wearing fur coats and smoking two packs of Marlboros a day, and her old 
four-door diesel car getting about 15 miles per gallon of gasoline‖ (Sullivan B6). As the 
EPA‘s policies were criticized for weakening federal environmental enforcement and 
pleasing polluting industries (Martin C13), she answered: ―When congressional criticism 
about the EPA began to touch the presidency, Mr. Reagan solved his problem by jettisoning 
me and my people, people whose only ‗crime‘ was loyal service, following orders‖ (Burford 
and Greenya 281). She had close ties to business groups. She earned $41,000 in 1980 as an 
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attorney for Mountain States Bell, took home another $14,350 for her seat in her Colorado 
General Assembly, and brought clients such as Amoco Production Co., Firestone, Plillips 
Petroleum, Rock Mountain Energy Co. Union Pacific Railroad and Western Crude Oil, Inc. 
to her husband‘s law firm (Brownstein and Easton 213). A congressional investigation also 
revealed her cronyism with industry, particularly in Colorado, illegal private meetings with 
representatives of regulated companies, and light penalties for violators (Opie 449). On 
March 9th 1983, she was forced to resign after she refused to turn over Superfund records 
(Sullivan B6).  
3.3.3. The Change from William Ruckelshaus  
     In 1983, President Reagan replaced Administrator Burford with former Administrator 
Ruckelshaus seeking to defuse the issue caused by Administrator Burford as the 1984 
election approached (Knott and Chidester 58). After Ruckelshaus‘ comeback to the EPA, he 
reinstated the strong and pervasive enforcement powers of the EPA and stressed science, 
saying: ―Science and the law are thus partners at the EPA‖ (Ruckelshaus, ―Science‖ 1026). 
However, he came to believe that the EPA should balance the desire to eliminate pollution 
against the cost of its control through risk assessment (Ruckelshaus, ―Science‖ 1026-1028). 
He thought ―This would entail some adjustment of the laws and it would happen by about 
1976‖ (Ruckelshaus, ―Science‖ 1027). Administrator Ruckelshaus ―moved the EPA away 
from the brink of disaster and put it back on the road to recovery‖ (D. Andrews 10243). 
Since he knew that the environment would be a minor issue for President Reagan after the 
presidential election victory, he quietly resigned in 1984 (Knott and Chidester 59). 
3.3.4. Administrator Lee M. Thomas  
     In February 1985, Lee Thomas succeeded Administrator Ruckelshaus. He was ―the first 
non-lawyer and the first governmental careerist to head the EPA‖ (Landy, Roberts, and 
Thomas 255). He began his career as an official of the State government of South Carolina in 
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the field of criminal justice. He had headed the EPA Times Beach Toxic Waste Task Force 
and worked as the agency‘s Assistant Administrator for solid waste and emergency response 
before being appointed EPA Administrator. He shared many values with Administrator 
Ruckelshaus, especially on enforcement. Ruckelshaus commented on his appointment: ―I 
couldn‘t be more pleased with the President‘s choice. Lee Thomas is one of the finest and 
most able public servants whom I have had the opportunity to work with and know‖ (―Lee‖). 
In his first major speech as Administrator, he promised that the EPA would pursue a rigorous 
enforcement effort that would place new emphasis on the pursuit of criminal cases. He stated, 
―There won‘t be any letup, as long as I‘m [EPA] administrator, in any time and attention you 
heard Bill Ruckelshaus give enforcement last year‖ (Mintz 67). He ensured ―a strong 
enforcement presence in all of agency programs‖ as one of his six management goals. At a 
February 1987 senior management forum for EPA executives, he repeated that: ―we will 
enforce environmental laws vigorously, consistently, and equitably, to achieve the greatest 
possible environmental result‖ (Ibid.). Like Administrator Ruckelshaus, he also emphasized 
science in the process of environmental decision making. 
3.3.5. The EPA under President Reagan and his administrators  
     One of Reagan‘s economic advisers, Murray Weidenbaum, suggested that federal 
regulations were costing American businesses nearly $100 billion each year (21). The need 
to reduce the burden that regulation imposed on the economy in 1980 assured Reagan‘s 
conservative, pro-business belief. Reagan proclaimed that: ―we must carefully remove the 
tentacles of excessive government regulation which are strangling our economy‖ (Florig 
196). As a result, President Reagan sought to free American corporations from an expanding 
regulatory apparatus. He restrained the EPA with the budget cut (Knott and Chidester 60). 
He also tried to alter environmental laws and regulations. He avoided confrontations in 
Congress and pursued an ―administrative strategy‖ by focusing on his appointment power, 
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use of executive orders, and other means to influence the EPA (Knott and Chidester 57). 
EPA Administrator Burford and Secretary of the Interior, James Watt, were loyal 
conservatives (Waterman 116), and could help President Reagan fulfil his wish. They took 
federal administrative offices, although they lacked what Carter‘s appointees had, extensive 
management and Washington experience in government, especially with Washington level 
politics (Waterman 119).  
3.3.5.1. The EPA under Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford 
     The EPA‘s independence from the president distinguished Administrator Burford from 
other EPA administrators throughout the Nixon, Ford and Carter presidencies. Administrator 
Burford showed her loyalty to President Reagan, and became an open and ardent advocate of 
the president‘s environmental program (Waterman 109). After taking the Administrator 
Office, Mrs. Burford sought to exclude environmentalists from positions of influence within 
the EPA through the appointment of pro-business candidates in different EPA positions. For 
instance, she appointed Rita Lavelle who was the former Public Relations Officer for 
Aerojet-General as the Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response 
(the office that oversaw the Superfund program) (Waterman 119). The Sierra Club criticized 
that Lavelle‘s ―only qualifications appear to be that she worked with President Reagan while 
he was Governor of California and as the Chief Spokesperson for a company with a dismal 
environmental record‖ (U.S. Cong. S, Nominations of Frederick 71). She also used different 
methods to limit environmental organizations‘ input. For instance, she denied environmental 
organizations the right of pre-notification of upcoming rule changes, while she was willing to 
grant this right to the regulated industry. She continued to limit private contact with 
environmental organizations, whilst meeting extensively with industrial and business 
representatives (Waterman 116).  
     Administrator Burford further massively cut the EPA‘s budget and personnel. Since 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 117  
President Reagan wanted to make his agencies more efficient and less burdensome on 
business, the EPA budget was reduced from almost $4.67 billion in 1980 to $3.03 billion in 
1981, and the workforce from 13,078 in 1980 to 10,832 in 1983. Since Administrator 
Burford came to the EPA, the agency had new enforcement strategies. Because the EPA had 
a less threatening, more flexible posture toward regulated industries, it reduced civil penalties 
assessed in the dollar amount and adopted new and more exclusive screening criteria for 
identifying potential violators (Eads and Fix 194). The EPA was also unwilling to test new 
legal or economic theories that might expand the existing classes of violators (Ibid.). It 
further reduced discretion for field personnel, and encouraged a reliance on State and local 
trade and professional associations as substitute federal enforcers (Ibid.). On the 
implementation of the Superfund, the EPA was criticized for a slowdown in enforcement of 
hazardous waste site clean-up, even by its own employees. Hugh Kaufmann had been a 
career professional with the EPA since 1971, and an assistant to the director of the 
Hazardous Waste Site Control Division, serving under Rita Lavelle. He appeared before 
several congressional committees, including a hearing on reauthorization of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976. In March 1982, he charged the EPA with 
jeopardizing public health by failing to enforce hazardous waste and toxic chemical laws, 
arranging ―sweetheart deals‖ with polluters, and allowing partisan politics to affect the 
program. Other EPA employees were making similar accusations to the press, and before 
congressional committees concerning EPA mismanagement and failure to enforce the law (R. 
Johnson 56-57). As a result, enforcement actions were sharply reduced (Brownstein and 
Easton 208). Cases averaged 150 to 200 per year during the Carter Administration, while 
only sixty-nine cases were sent to Justice in 1981 (Brownstein and Easton 214). Cases filed 
in court on environmental programs also dropped to their lowest levels with fifty-one in 1982 
(U.S. EPA, Environmental News 3). This meant a large number of cases remained pending, 
and many environmental violations were ignored (Opie 449). In her proposed 1983 budget, 
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Administrator Burford proposed a massive 20 percent budget cut and a reduction of up to 
3,200 staff, far more than the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had asked 
(Brownstein and Easton 214). In this proposed measure, almost 44 percent of the 
enforcement budget would be cut (Ibid.). Former EPA Assistant Administrator for Planning 
and Management, Drayton, calculated that the proposed 1983 budget cut would reduce EPA 
purchasing power by a crippling 60 percent when inflation was taken into account. It would 
especially affect research activities and programs to control toxic substances, as it would be 
enforced at a time when EPA statutory responsibilities (particularly to control toxic 
chemicals) were greatly expanding (Brownstein and Easton 209). In order to decrease 
regulatory enforcement action, Administrator Burford also abolished the Office of 
Enforcement, and dispersed its functions to the various program departments. The EPA‘s 
enforcement under Administrator Burford was viewed as confused, disorganized, and 
discontinuous. Thus, EPA staff was demoralized by the openly hostile administration and its 
irresponsibility (Mintz 60). The EPA‘s effectiveness declined significantly and the agency 
even often disagreed with and confronted Congress (Ibid.). An attorney with the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Jonathan Lash, commented: ―The danger is not simply that the 
environmental programs will be slowed, but that the entire legal and institutional framework 
for environmental protection will be destroyed, and human beings will suffer death and 
disease as a result‖ (Brownstein and Easton 214). 
     In April 1982, after being criticized by some conservative economists for not using the 
reauthorization process to increase reliance on ―market incentives,‖ Administrator Burford 
expanded the use of economic incentives, such as the ―bubble‖ concept in place of regulation 
(Brownstein and Easton 213). On June 26th 1984, the Supreme Court further affirmed the 
authority of the EPA to let facilities use a ―bubble concept‖ to meet Clean Air Act 
requirements more quickly and inexpensively (―Statement‖). By 1984, bubbles had been 
adopted in fewer than 200 instances (Viscusi 481).  
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3.3.5.2. The EPA under Administrator William Ruckelshaus 
     In 1983, former Administrator Ruckelshaus was asked to return to the EPA. In a meeting 
with President Reagan in the Oval Office before his appointment, Ruckelshaus made it clear 
that he wanted more flexibility and stature than Administrator Burford had, notably a free 
hand in personnel matters, policy review and direct access to the President (―William‖). 
Reagan readily agreed with Ruckelshaus, and later asked for the resignation of five EPA 
officials, four of whom were Burford‘s top-ranking assistants (Ibid.). Ruckelshaus was then 
appointed the fifth EPA Administrator. Ruckelshaus was the best choice of top White House 
officials, and ―more than anybody can pour cold water on the flames‖ (Ibid.). He was chosen 
to solve the problems that Administrator Burford left, and ―was expected to step up 
enforcement against corporate polluters, clean up toxic waste dumps, beef up the agency‘s 
management and budget, and repair its shattered relationship with Congress‖ (Ibid.). 
President Reagan commented that Ruckelshaus was a man who ―the EPA was fortunate to 
have as its first administrator, an extraordinary public servant who gave direction and 
momentum to the fledgling environmental agency. His assignment, not an easy one, was 
performed with dedication, integrity and a balanced understanding of the nation‘s needs. He 
soon became known — with good reason — as ‗Mr. Clean‘‖ (Reagan, ―Remarks‖). 
     Administrator Ruckelshaus assured the nation he would again represent the public interest. 
In his first interview with The Washington Post, he said: ―My job as EPA Administrator is 
the same today as it was when I held that job before and that is to represent the public 
interest to the best of my ability‖ (U.S. Cong. S, Nomination of William 228). But this time, 
he understood that effective enforcement of environmental regulations relied more on 
striking a balance between cost and benefit than single-minded Command-and-Control. He 
continued: ―One of the things that strikes me in coming back to the EPA again is how hard 
these decisions are, particularly the ones that get up here, and how difficult it is to decide 
how [to] strike this balance‖ (―The Return‖). In his speech ―Science, Risk and Public Policy‖ 
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on June 22nd 1983, he particularly emphasized the importance of science and the quality of 
effectively managing risk. He also stressed the need for constructive regulatory reforms, 
stating: ―Protecting human lives and our environment cannot be done in a vacuum, protection 
must be harmonized with other social goals, with goals involving our economy and the 
production of adequate energy...The issue today isn‘t whether we are going to clean up, but 
how‖ (Ruckelshaus, ―Science‖ 1027). 
     Administrator Ruckelshaus knew that the EPA‘s reputation laid on protecting public 
interest, effective enforcement with science and law, the EPA‘s candidacy and openness, and 
the morale of the EPA staff. Ruckelshaus began with improving employee morale and the 
EPA‘s candidacy and openness. In his speech to the employees, he claimed that: ―My real 
reason for asking you here today is to start to convince the American people what I know in 
my heart — there is no finer group of public servants in this country than the employees of 
the EPA. It was true at the beginning, and it‘s true now.‖ He continued: ―The trust of the 
public is sacred and must never be broken, it‘s time we stopped chewing on each other and 
started pulling together‖ (―William‖). The EPA started the ―Fishbowl Policy‖ in May 1983, 
which was a number of operating principles to raise employee morale and to improve the 
flow of agency information as openly as possible through communicating with everyone 
from the environmentalists to those regulated by the EPA. It contained four areas: general 
principles; appointment calendars; litigation and formal adjudication; and rule-making 
proceedings. To attain the largest possible public participation in decision-making, the 
general principles required both that EPA employees should remain open and accessible to 
those representing all viewpoints, and that EPA employees responsible for decisions should 
seek out the views of those who would be affected by the decisions. The EPA would neither 
give privileged status to any special interest group, nor would it accept any recommendation 
without careful critical examination. Administrator Ruckelshaus also stipulated that the 
guidelines would be released to the public for comment as a basic principle. He said: ―While 
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this is not a formal solicitation of views, we will have a thirty-day waiting period in which to 
receive the opinions of the public. We want to get feedback from the public because of the 
high and continuing degree of interest in how the agency deals with the regulated community 
and other affected parties‖ (―Ruckelshaus‖). Administrator Ruckelshaus placed a copy of his 
appointment calendar for each week in the Office of Public Affairs, and made it available to 
the public at the end of the week. He also required all other key EPA officials to make their 
appointment calendars available in a similar way. Openness and candour were also brought 
to litigation and formal adjudication, and rule-making proceedings (Ibid.) He further 
improved the morale of EPA staff through gradually allocating more money for enforcement 
training and showing more consideration for the EPA‘s career enforcement staff (the 
permanent staff). Keith Casto who was Staff Attorney for Harzardous Waste, Enforcement 
Division, Region IV, from August 1979 to June 1981 and Staff Attorney Office of Regional 
Counsel, Region IV, from June 1981 to May 1985, commented in an interview with Joel A. 
Mintz on May 6th 1986: ―The employees were once again viewed as being a valued part of 
the agency. This improved the situation immeasurably, it instilled new life‖ (Mintz 61). 
     Ruckelshaus then tried to recover the EPA‘s credibility, for example, by banning ethylene 
dibromide (EDB). EDB had been registered as a pesticide since 1948. Over 300 million 
pounds (150,000 tons) of EDB were being produced annually in the United States. Over 20 
million pounds of that were being used as a pesticide, and the rest as an additive in leaded 
gasoline (―EPA Acts‖). On September 30th 1983, the EPA ordered the immediate emergency 
suspension of EDB as a soil fumigant for agricultural crops, and announced the cancellation 
and phase-out of all other major pesticide uses of EDB, citing laboratory test results that 
showed that EDB causes reproductive disorders in test animals (Ibid.). 
     Administrator Ruckelshaus further enhanced EPA enforcement through improving 
relationships with the States and clarifying EPA policy regarding civil penalties. The EPA 
developed an oversight program which recognized that direct program administration and 
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enforcement were primarily State responsibilities, and that the EPA fostered more trust and 
mutual respect in the relationship between the EPA and States (U.S. Cong. GAO, 
Environmental Protection Agency 161). In June 1984, the framework for individual EPA or 
State enforcement agreements took effect, and set forth the EPA‘s methods for overseeing 
State enforcement programs. It established a set of criteria to be used for assessing good 
enforcement program performance, and called for semi-annual EPA reviews of State 
enforcement programs, quarterly State reporting on key performance measures, and regular 
EPA evaluations of State progress in addressing significant violations (Alm, 
―Implementing‖). This oversight program, including the framework for individual EPA or 
State enforcement agreements, improved intergovernmental communication, and better 
defined the expectations and roles of federal and State enforcement officials (Mintz 63). The 
EPA continually strengthened civil enforcement. It issued a Uniform Policy on Civil 
Penalties, which required EPA program policies and regional office enforcement actions to 
recover the economic benefit of non-compliance from violators of environmental standards 
(Ibid.). The EPA further strengthened federal enforcement of hazardous waste. Administrator 
Ruckelshaus urged President Reagan to sign H.R. 2867, Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments of 1984. 
     Because Administrator Ruckelshaus focused primarily on human health and did little to 
revive interest in ecological protection at the EPA (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499-500), he 
began to question the priorities of agency leaders, including himself at the end of his tenure: 
―What is the impact of all this chemical loading over the years on the ecological systems in 
which human culture is embedded? After decades of so-called pesticide control, we have not 
even begun to ask this question. Indeed, it is odd how little time is spent at the upper levels 
of the EPA thinking about such things and how much time is spent worrying about tiny 
increases in the risk of a single human disease [cancer]‖ (Ruckelshaus, ―Risk‖ 32). Before 
leaving the EPA, Administrator Ruckelshaus managed to promote risk assessment of 
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ecological issues as the EPA‘s regulatory approach (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499). 
3.3.5.3. The EPA under Administrator Lee Thomas 
     As Administrator Lee M. Thomas came on duty in February 1985, he announced his six 
management goals. The first one was to emphasize continued implementation of the basic 
programs for which the EPA was responsible; the second was to ensure a strong enforcement 
presence in all agency programs; the third was to decentralize programs and delegate 
additional responsibilities to regions and States; the fourth was to strengthen the EPA‘s 
scientific and technical base, to support program decisions, and to obtain measurable 
environmental results; the fifth was to improve community involvement, public education 
and the EPA‘s internal accountability system by continual operation of the fishbowl policy; 
and the sixth was to work hard to make the EPA the kind of agency that attracts and retains 
quality people (L. Thomas). While pursuing these goals, a number of changes were made, 
especially in the EPA‘s Superfund program. To curb the postponing of clean-up activities by 
lengthy enforcement negotiation and litigation, the EPA promptly shifted its emphasis to the 
clean-up of abandoned hazardous waste site problems. The agency also stressed the need to 
initiate more enforcement actions, including administrative orders, Consent Decrees, lawsuits 
and cost recovery actions, and even transformed the ―lawyers first, shovels later‖ approach 
into a ―shovels first, lawyers later‖ one (Mintz 64). The EPA renewed the enforcement 
technique of the early 1970s: the debarring of government contractors who are persistent 
violators of environmental standards by publicly listing them in the Federal Register. In 
1986, the EPA revised its regulations to facilitate contractor listing and established a separate 
staff in the Office of Enforcement and Compliance monitoring to work with regional 
personnel in carrying out this program. The number of facilities on the agency‘s Violating 
Facility List increased from three in January 1986, to seventeen by October 1988. This listing 
action improved the EPA‘s position in negotiating settlement of additional enforcement cases 
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(Mintz 69). Administrator Thomas further introduced criminal cases to the enforcement 
procedure. He promised a national conference of EPA and State enforcement officials, that 
the EPA would pursue a rigorous enforcement effort with renewed emphasis on the pursuit 
of criminal cases (―Thomas‖). He also stressed this goal at a February 1987 senior 
management forum for EPA executives by saying that ―[w]e will enforce environmental laws 
vigorously, consistently, and equitably, to achieve the greatest possible environmental result‖ 
(U.S. Cong. GAO, Environmental Protection Agency 37-39). Additionally, the EPA and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) streamlined referrals, filed procedures for similar civil judicial 
actions, and publicized these efforts as a way of enhancing their deterrent effects for the first 
time (Mintz 69). The Department of Justice filed eleven cases in the fiscal year 1985 (from 
October 1st 1984 to September 30th 1985) nationwide on behalf of the EPA, against 
violators of the Clean Air Act building demolition asbestos control requirements (Ibid.). In 
March 1986, the EPA not only filed another fifteen lawsuits against municipalities that were 
in violation of Clean Water Act requirements, but also initiated coordinated civil actions 
(together with the DOJ) against ten violators of Safe Drinking Water Act underground 
injection control regulations, eight metal-coating facilities in the Los Angeles basin, and 
twenty-seven electroplating plants located in the New York City metropolitan area (Ibid.). 
     Because the EPA implemented its agreement with States, federal-State cooperation on 
enforcement in a number of instances increased, intergovernmental consultation improved, 
and planning concerning certain enforcement cases advanced (Mintz 70). As the EPA 
expanded its enforcement activity, the agency‘s inefficient and counterproductive 
enforcement activities were caused by its strict segregation of environmental media, such as 
air, water, hazardous waste and toxic substances (Mintz 69). Career enforcement 
professionals in several sections of the EPA‘s organizational structure realized the need to 
integrate the agency‘s enforcement work at particular industrial facilities and in specific 
categories of industry and geographical regions. Administrator Thomas also announced his 
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intention of integrating all EPA environmental programs into a managed system with a 
multimedia perspective. Michael G. Smith, a branch chief in the Office of Regional Counsel 
of the EPA‘s Midwest regional office, recommended a cross-cutting multimedia enforcement 
strategy for a heavily industrialized portion of northwestern Indiana. This would provide 
greater clarity and consistency and increase the EPA‘s overall leverage in case-by-case 
enforcement negotiations. Smith‘s recommendation won the enthusiastic support of the 
Regional Administrator. At about the same time, Thomas Gallagher, the director of the 
EPA‘s Denver-based national enforcement investigations center, who had the responsibility 
for overseeing the agency‘s budding criminal enforcement program, lobbied other agency 
officials for the initiation of a coordinated approach to enforcement inspections and case 
development (Ibid.). 
     During Administrator Thomas‘ tenure, the EPA made a national strategy for toxic air 
pollutants to reduce the risks from toxic air pollutants. The EPA created a new Office of 
Wetlands Protection reporting directly to the Assistant Administrator for Water. The agency 
also mandated sanctions for States failing to meet air standards, and authorized the use of on-
site thermal destruction to clean up the dioxin-contaminated creek and sewer sediments at 
Love Canal (Collin 78). The EPA further set standards for underground storage tanks and 
approved incineration of dioxin at Times Beach which was the final Superfund clean-up 
decision for the Times Beach and Minker and Stout and Romaine Creek sites in Missouri 
(Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 113).  
Administrator Thomas‘ tenure was during the 99th and 100th Congress. Since Democrats 
took control of both the Senate and the House in the 100th Congress (1987-1988), the EPA 
budget increased to a relatively high level in 1987. The EPA also increased its Superfund 
enforcement staff in these two years from 765 to 1,027 full-time employees, including 103 
new attorneys in the agency‘s Offices of Regional Counsel (―Superfund‖). President Reagan 
was forced to accept expanded regulations from an assertive Congress in his second term of 
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presidency (Knott and Chidester 59). Congress passed the Hazardous chemical reporting rule 
in 1987, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Amendments, and the Ocean 
Dumping Ban Act in 1988 in order to strengthen the EPA. 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) 
     On October 17th 1986, President Reagan signed the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) into law, which amended the Superfund, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA). SARA, together with CERCLA, required the EPA to designate which 
substances were to be considered hazardous, and to set the minimum quantities for reporting 
releases according to whether such releases ―may present substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare or the environment‖ (Briggum et al. 64). The famous Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) was enacted as Title III, Sections 311 
and 312 of SARA. The Right-to-Know is defined as: ―Public availability of plans, data sheets, 
forms, and follow-up notices directs the EPA, governors, State Emergency Response 
Commissions (SERCs) and local emergency planning committees to make emergency 
response plans, material safety data sheets, lists of chemicals, inventory forms, toxic 
chemical release forms, and follow-up emergency notices available to the general public‖ 
(U.S. Cong. CRS, Emergency 3). It established State commissions and local committees to 
develop and implement procedures for coping with releases of hazardous chemicals, and 
mandated annual reporting to government officials on environmental releases of such 
chemicals by the facilities that manufacture or use them in significant amounts. The EPA 
was required to facilitate planning, to enforce compliance when necessary, and to provide 
public access to information about environmental releases of toxic chemicals (U.S. Cong. 
CRS, Emergency 5). It also increased community awareness of chemical hazards through 
providing the public, as well as local governments, with information concerning potential 
chemical hazards present in their communities (Ibid.). 
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      Although Lee Thomas kept the agency on the road to recovery, the EPA was still under 
the shadow of President Reagan, and was strictly constrained by the adoption of Executive 
Order 12498, which required the agency to submit a detailed plan to the OMB on all 
significant rules under development, indicating how their programs were consistent with the 
president‘s own agenda (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 129). This Order also 
asked the OMB to give the purposed regulations from the EPA-recommended modifications. 
In addition, EPA enforcement programs still had a number of significant problems during 
Lee Thomas‘s tenure. These problems were internal to the EPA administrative structure, 
caused by criticism of the EPA from outside, as a result of errors and inconsistencies in the 
approaches of the EPA‘s top managers or merely a continuation of troubles that had arisen at 
earlier phases of the EPA‘s development (Mintz 72). For instance, problems appeared in the 
administrative structure. The EPA‘s enforcement work was characterized by lasting and 
intensive squabbling during decision-making among the various offices within the 
headquarters on during the allocation of enforcement mandates and responsibilities. These 
problems prolonged the development of agency policies and negotiating positions (Ibid.). 
The Chief of the Superfund Branch of Hazardous Waste Enforcement Division later stated: 
[EPA] didn‘t have people [in headquarters] who could give answers quickly. 
[In matters of case development strategy] you couldn‘t move from point A to 
point B without getting everyone in the Western Hemisphere to agree…. On 
any particular issue you might have three or four different [agency] positions, 
but it was never consistent….It was the worst management nightmare you 
could think of (Mintz 73). 
This problem was particularly acute in the Superfund Program (Mintz 73). The Environment 
Law Institute stated in March 1989: 
Responsibility for developing and implementing and enforcement strategy for 
the Superfund Program is diffused, on the national level, among four EPA 
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offices—the office of waste programs enforcement, the office of emergency 
and remedial response, the office of enforcement and compliance monitoring 
and the office of general counsel. As a result of this diffusion of responsibility, 
it is unclear who has ultimate responsibility for a national enforcement 
strategy. Each office tries to shape the agency‘s direction, and the agency‘s 
position and performance may be weakened in consequence…[I]t is frequently 
unclear which office has jurisdiction. There appears to be overlapping 
jurisdiction on some matters. Regional [EPA] personnel complain that they 
receive conflicting and inconsistent advice from the different [headquarters] 
office. This organizational structure results in inefficiency, uncertainty and 
duplication. Ultimately, it reduces the accountability of each office for 
Superfund enforcement (Environmental Law Institute 152-153). 
These problems diminished the progress Administrator Thomas achieved (Mintz 72), and 
continually enmeshed President Reagan in anti-environmentalism. In addition, because EPA 
managers at that time were fully concentrated on restoring the Superfund program, they did 
not spend enough time implementing other laws, such as the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) (Mintz 65). Moreover, problems of federal environmental 
enforcement, such as the discord between the EPA and its Justice Department attorneys, 
affected enforcement in all environmental media, especially in the Superfund Program 
(Mintz 76-77). Therefore, congressional oversight committees, environmental organizations, 
and certain representatives of the media viewed the EPA‘s enforcement programs with 
intense suspicion throughout both Administrator Ruckelshaus‘ and Administrator Thomas‘s 
tenures (Mintz 65). 
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3.3.6. Federal Regulatory Reform from the “Quality of Life” Reviews to Reagan’s 
Regulatory Relief 
     The federal regulatory reform began with the ―Quality of Life‖ reviews under the Nixon 
Administration, which required the OMB to review regulations from federal agencies with a 
relatively simple analysis of costs. Due to the EPA‘s strong independence under 
Administrator Ruckelshaus, and cost ignorance in some environmental statues, it had little 
impact on regulations made by the EPA. 
     On November 27th 1974, President Ford signed Executive Order 11821, Inflation Impact 
Statements, which required all major regulations to be accompanied by a statement 
―certifying that the inflationary impact of the proposal has been evaluated‖ (Ford, ―Executive 
Order 11821‖ 41501). The OMB concluded this statement with a review of the alternatives to 
the proposed action, of the costs associated with the recommended alternative, and of the 
inflationary effects of the action on markets, consumers, and businesses. The OMB also 
concluded this statement with a comparison of the benefits to be derived from the proposed 
action, with the estimated costs and inflationary impact. Thus, costs, benefits, and economic 
impact were to be quantified as much as possible (Ibid.). In response to the OMB, the EPA 
adopted final guidelines for Inflation Impact Statements in April 1975, which required the 
analysis of the costs, benefits, risks, and inflationary impact of the proposed action and its 
alternatives (Ibid.). However, the EPA pointed out that these guidelines ―given the 
limitations in the state-of-the-art of benefits assessment of pollution control ...in most cases 
this type of valuation will not be feasible or meaningful‖ (Alm, ―Proposed‖). Executive 
Order 11821 expired at the end of 1976. But President Ford issued Executive Order 11949 on 
December 31st 1976 to extend the previous order for another year with changing the title of 
the required analyses to that of Economic Impact Statements (Ford, ―Executive Order 11949‖ 
1017). In January 1977, the EPA revised its guidelines for these analyses and changed the 
title of the analyses to Economic Impact Analyses in order to avoid confusion with 
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Environmental Impact Statements (Brands, ―Change‖). 
     In March 1978, President Carter signed Executive Order 12044, which replaced the 
Economic Impact Statements with Regulatory Analysis. Although consideration of benefits 
was not an explicit requirement of the analysis, federal agencies were required to consider 
―the direct and indirect effects of the regulation,‖ and to choose the ―least burdensome‖ 
alternative (Carter, ―Executive Order 12044‖ 12661). Responding to Executive Order 12044, 
the EPA published final guidelines for implementation in May 1979. Regulatory Analyses 
included marginal cost-effectiveness curves for each alternative and analyses of the 
economic impacts of the proposed standard and of each alternative (―Regulatory‖). In 1980, 
Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which required all federal agencies to 
analyze the impact of proposed regulations on small businesses, small non-profit 
organizations, and small governmental entities with the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis. 
     Following his inauguration in 1981, President Reagan began to strengthen the regulatory 
review oversight program from the Carter Administration. Regulatory relief, together with 
reducing government spending, tax cuts, and steady monetary growth had been accomplished 
by President Reagan as his four pillars for economic growth. He specifically used the term 
―regulatory relief‖ rather than ―regulatory reform‖ to emphasize his desire to cut back 
regulations, not just to make them more cost-effective (U.S. OMB, Report 9). President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12291, Federal Regulation, on February 17th 1981, and then 
an interagency Task Force on Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice-President George Bush, 
was created to monitor regulatory activity, review regulations already in effect, and 
recommend cancellation of unnecessary or excessively costly regulations (Anderson 492). 
     Executive Order 12291 ―established a process whereby proposed federal regulations with 
an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more would be reviewed by the OMB 
with cost-benefit analyses for potential costs, potential benefits, net benefits and other less 
costly alternatives‖ (Milloy, ―Reagan‘s‖). It also replaced Regulatory Analysis with  
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Table 9 
History of Regulatory Analysis 
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Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). All federal agencies were required to prepare both RIAs 
for most major regulations and Regulatory Flexibility Analyses, except when the 
Administrator certified there would be no significant economic impact on small entities. The 
RIA restored the consideration of benefits to the regulatory process, and agencies were 
directed to choose the alternative that would maximize the ―net benefits to society‖ (Reagan,  
―Executive‖ 13196-13197). It further bestowed upon the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) power from the OMB to ensure that broader economic issues 
were appropriately addressed by the EPA prior to issuing a new regulation through delaying 
rule-making (Weidenbaum 23). Executive Order 12291 was the first to designate ―net 
benefits‖ as the criterion for assessing proposed regulations. To quote Executive Order 
12291, ―regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society,‖ and 
―shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh 
the potential costs to society‖ (Reagan, ―Executive‖ 13193-13194). In June 1981, the OMB 
issued guidance to help federal agencies prepare RIAs. The guidance elaborated the 
requirements of the executive order and explicitly called for estimates of the benefits, costs, 
and net benefits of all major regulatory alternatives (U.S. OMB, Interim 6). In December 
1983, the EPA issued its own final guidelines for performing RIAs. President Reagan 
continually strengthened the OMB‘s overseeing role to tighten controls over line agencies, 
and their heads, with the Executive Order 12498 in 1985, Regulatory Planning Process, 
which required all federal agencies to annually send the OMB a detailed plan on all 
significant rules under development (Shanley 135). ―The OMB coordinated the plans with 
other interested agencies and could recommend modifications‖ (Reagan, ―Executive‖ 13196-
13197). It further required federal regulations to enlarge the use of scientific risk assessment 
procedures to reduce health and safety risks (Milloy, ―Reagan‘s‖). 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
     Based on the ―free market‖ principle, that the government should interfere with the 
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market only in limited circumstances, conservative economists and policymakers questioned 
the wisdom of protective health, safety, and environmental regulation and argued that the 
―free market‖ would provide the level of protection that people were willing to support 
(Ackerman and Heinzerling 1553-1555). They undertook cost-benefit analyses to reduce 
environmental regulations (Ibid.). 
     Cost-benefit analysis sought to translate all relevant considerations into monetary terms of 
cost and benefit to determine whether regulations would be worth conducting or 
implementing in a supposedly neutral, mathematically precise way (Ibid.). The costs of 
protecting human health and the environment through environmental regulations would be 
measured in dollars, while economists created artificial prices for health and environmental 
benefits by studying what people would be willing to pay for them (Ibid.). After calculating 
the costs of a public policy, and monetizing the benefits achieved by the regulation, the ―net 
benefits‖ would come out as the difference between the cost and benefit (Ibid.). 
     During the Reagan Administration, regulations which could not produce analyses with 
positive benefits were terrorized by economists at the OMB (Clark, Kosters, and Miller xi). 
However, the actual use of cost-benefit analyses on major regulations in the EPA‘s decision 
making was very limited. From February 1981 through February 1986, eighteen of 1,000 
regulations issued by the EPA were considered major rules requiring RIAs. They were from 
the CAA, the CWA, the TSCA, the RCRA, CERCLA and FIFRA. The EPA prepared RIAs 
for fifteen of these major rules. The OMB exempted the other three major rules from the RIA 
requirements. Among these fifteen rule-prepared-RIAs, six net benefit cost-benefit studies 
were conducted (see table 10), including three from the CCA, two from the CWA and one 
from the TSCA. The net benefit cost-benefit analyses were mostly prepared for air and water 
regulations, because the data and analytic techniques necessary for the analysis of pollutant 
quantities, exposures, and adverse effects was more readily available for air and water 
regulations than for some of the other regulations. (U.S. EPA, EPA’s Use 11). In the review  
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Table 10  
The EPA‘s Major Rules 
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Table 11 
EPA Cost-Benefit Analyses: 1981-86 
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of these fifteen rule-prepared-RIAs between 1981 and 1986, ―RIAs have in fact been 
influential in guiding agency decision-making, on occasion actually leading to regulations 
than would otherwise have occurred‖ (Goodstein 376). 
Risk Assessment 
     Together with cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment was part of the regulatory process. 
Risk assessment meant ―the methodology used to estimate the danger that something, usually 
a carcinogenic chemical, posed to a population‖ (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499). It was 
expected to provide the best possible scientific characterization of risks based on a rigorous 
analysis of available information and knowledge (Hetes 1010). Like cost-benefit analysis, 
risk assessment emphasized quantitative measures of trade-offs. 
     In 1981, Congress instructed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to arrange for the 
National Research Council (NRC) to undertake a study of federal efforts to use risk 
assessment. Although this study did not recommend specific methods for conducting risk 
assessment, the risk assessment framework, specific definitions and its component steps from 
the 1983 NRC report have been widely adopted (NRC, Science and Judgment 33). Since risk 
assessment is a key source of scientific information for making sound decisions about 
managing risks to human health and the environment, Administrator Ruckelshaus committed 
himself to strengthening the risk assessment capabilities to establish environmental standards 
in compliance with the Clean Air Act. In the National Research Council report of 1983 
(known as the Red Book), the risk assessment processes were divided into four components: 
firstly, hazard identification defining whether exposure to an agent can cause an increased 
incidence of an adverse health effects; secondly, exposure assessment fixing the intensity, 
frequency, and duration of actual or hypothetical exposures of humans to the agent; thirdly, 
dose-response assessment characterizing the relationship between exposure or dose and the 
incidence and severity of the adverse health effect; and fourthly, risk characterization 
estimating the probability of specific harm to an exposed individual or population (NRC, 
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Science and Decisions 174). In addition, Glenn W. Suter and Lawrence W. Barnthouse from 
the EPA‘s Office of Research and Development developed an environmental risk analysis at 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, which was a method for identifying and quantifying the 
probability of adverse changes in the environment from human activities. In 1982 and 1986, 
they estimated risks associated with indirect coal liquefaction, including risks to fish, algae, 
timber, agriculture, and wildlife (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499-500). In 1986, the 
National Research Council (NRC) recommended that the EPA adopt a set of guidelines to 
deal with assessing risks of carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, developmental toxicity, and 
effects of chemical mixtures, which include default options that are essentially policy 
judgments of how to accommodate uncertainties and various assumptions needed for 
assessing exposure and risk (NRC, Science and Judgment 174).  
     Risk assessment enabled scientists to describe ecological threats in the same language that 
the EPA used to describe threats to human health, thus the EPA got away from only focusing 
on human health, and put ecological protection on the agenda (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 
499-500). The risk assessment was used by the EPA to characterize the nature and magnitude 
of health risks to humans and ecological receptors like birds, fish, and wildlife from chemical 
contaminants and other stressors present in the environment. Therefore, the EPA 
concentrated mainly on human health assessments at Superfund sites, and ecological risk 
assessments (Newman and Strojan 5). Risk assessment was viewed by Administrator 
Thomas as the quantitative estimation of the likelihood of adverse consequences (Edelstein 
and Makofske 60). In a multi-volume report published by the EPA in February 1987, 
Unfinished Business: A Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems, Administrator 
Thomas stated: ―In a world of limited resources, it may be wise to give priority attention to 
those pollutants and problems that pose the greatest risks to our society. That is the measure 
this study begins to apply. It represents, in my view, the first sketchy lines of what might 
become the future picture of environmental protection in America‖ (Minard, Jr. 29). In fact, 
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risk assessment became the EPA‘s analog of cost-benefit analysis, and worked as a process 
central to the work of the OMB, and the administration‘s overall effort to reduce regulation 
within the Reagan Administration (Edelstein and Makofske 60). 
3.3.7. Congress, Court and the EPA 
     During Reagan‘s Presidency, members of Congress became more suspicious of EPA 
officials and gradually distrusted the White House and the EPA on rapid environmental 
clean-up (Opie 449). Congress compelled administrative compliance through conducting 
investigations, replacing administrators, strengthening most of the major acts and adding 
much tougher new ones, and adding new, intricate, and far-reaching regulatory programs to 
the responsibilities the EPA already had in order to reduce administrative discretion for 
agency officials, particularly for the EPA after 1983 (Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 38). These new 
acts included the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982 and its Amendment Act in 1987, 
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (RCRA amendment) in 1984, Safe Drinking Water 
Act Amendments in 1986, the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in 
1986, the Water Quality Act in 1987, and the Ocean Dumping Act in 1988. 
     Administrator Burford‘s effort to dismantle the nation‘s environmental programs 
encountered intense opposition in Congress (Kurian 206). Congress was even consistently 
adversarial to the Reagan Administration‘s environmental policy. Two EPA officials noted in 
a candid law review analysis: ―[B]etween 1980 and 1983, Congress perceived the EPA as an 
agency unwilling or unable to fulfill its mandate of environmental protection. Almost every 
section of the RCRA Amendments might be read as expressing a sense of frustration over the 
pace and scope of EPA action‖ (Mugdan and Adler 217). Congressional dissatisfaction also 
resulted in vigorous investigations on EPA clean-up activities. As a congressional 
investigation on toxic waste clean-up was conducted, both the Senate and the House aides 
complained that the administration was ―doing as little as possible to help us‖ evaluate the 
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law and that the requested information went unanswered for months (Brownstein and Easton 
212). Suspicion on rapid environmental clean-up grew in Congress. As subcommittees of the 
House of Representatives demanded thousands of pages of documents relating to toxic waste 
clean-up, EPA Administrator Burford refused to hand them over with the strategy of ―cut 
down the amount of information and make it more of a political debate‖ (Ibid.). She even 
said she would go to jail rather than surrender them to Congress (Martin C13). Thus, 
suspicion was transformed into mistrust of the EPA‘s administration. Congress was 
emboldened by public opinion favoring environmental protection and resisted attempts to 
dismantle the regulatory process of the Reagan Administration (Dunlap, ―Public‖ 88). 
Eventually, the White House gave up its claim of executive privilege to keep the documents 
secret. EPA Administrator Burford was also forced to resign on March 9th 1983 because of 
her mismanagement of toxic waste site clean-up enforcement, especially laxness at the 
dioxin-ridden Times Beach site in Missouri (Opie 449). Congress then forced President 
Reagan to replace Administrator Burford with the pro-environment William Ruckelshaus 
(Hunter and Waterman 117). Administrator Ruckelshaus tried to rebuild Congress‘ trust 
through better management of the Superfund programs. However, due to factors like the 
chronic shortage of resources, the clean-up enforcement was continually operated in the 
shadow of the partially revived Superfund campaign (Mintz 66). Because of the lasting 
residue of mistrust, Congress increasingly favored tougher environmental statutes and 
reduced administrative discretion for the EPA (Dunlap, ―Public‖ 91-92) by enacting highly 
prescriptive laws that went into specific details, technologies, and rigorous timetables for 
fulfillment (Opie 449). In November 1984, Congress enacted the Hazardous and Solid Waste 
Amendments (HSWA) to modify the RCRA. Congress continued to organize different 
investigations on the EPA‘s Superfund programs. In December 1984, the Dingell Committee 
conducted a survey on groundwater monitoring (Mintz 66). This survey found that formal 
enforcement action had only affected about forty percent of the total hazardous waste 
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facilities (Ibid.). It resulted in a hearing by the Dingell Committee on April 29th 1985, which 
criticized EPA enforcement efforts. In response to congressional wrath, the EPA launched a 
loss of interim status initiative against the land disposal facilities. It targeted facilities that 
were required to lose their interim status and close down their operations if their owners or 
operators failed to submit a final permit application and certify compliance with applicable 
groundwater and financial responsibility requirements (Mintz 66-67).  
     During Reagan‘s second term, Congress forced the President to accept expanded 
environmental laws. The Superfund was at the core. In 1980, Congress passed the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to 
deal with highly public incidents involving the improper disposal of toxic wastes, including 
the incident at Love Canal. $1.6 billion was allocated over five years to the Superfund to 
clean abandoned chemical waste sites. In 1986, Congress renewed it, supported by EPA 
Administrator Thomas and some Republican leaders in Congress. Although President 
Reagan was concerned about the fund‘s cost, he reluctantly signed the bill on October 17th 
1986 after votes of 386 to 27 in the House and 88 to 8 in the Senate (Knott and Chidester 59). 
The law increased the Superfund‘s budget nearly five times to $8.5 billion (Ibid.). In addition, 
Congress passed the $18 billion Water Quality Act for sewage treatment programs at the end 
of 1986. President Reagan vetoed it. However, after Democrats took control of both the 
House and the Senate after the 100th Congress, this Water Quality Act was revisited in 
January 1987, and an even costlier $20 billion clean water bill was passed by a large majority 
(Knott and Chidester 60). President Reagan believed it was inappropriate for the federal 
government to spend so much money on the sewage treatment program and vetoed it again, 
claiming that it was ―loaded with waste and larded with pork‖ (Reagan, Remark). In early 
February 1987 the House overrode Reagan‘s veto by a vote of 401 to 26, and the Senate by a 
vote of 86 to 14 (Trager 12).  
     Regarding the EPA‘s enforcement program, the agency could not have fully restored the 
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trust of interested representatives and senators (Mintz 79). Some malfunctions of EPA 
leaders contributed to the continuing tensions between the agency and Congress, such as the 
inability to anticipate and avoid criticism from Capitol Hill or to cultivate informal channels 
of communication with key congressional staff members. These exacerbated the difficulties 
faced by the EPA in obtaining Congress‘s approval and support, and sometimes intensified 
congressional suspicions (Ibid.). In September 1986 Thomas Adam, the Assistant 
Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, transferred Frederick P. Stiehl 
from the agency‘s associate enforcement counsel for hazardous waste enforcement to the 
position of associate enforcement counsel for pesticides and toxic substances. Adams later 
explained that he made the decision to replace Stiehl with a manager who ―knew how to 
make things work politically within the agency,‖ and it would benefit Stiehl‘s career (Mintz 
79). However, this transfer was viewed by Stiehl as ―disruptive to the staff‖ and ―the wrong 
decision, made in the wrong way, at the wrong time‖ (Ibid.). On October 6th 1986, 
Representative Dingell sent a letter to Administrator Thomas questioning the legality of the 
Stiehl transfer and describing this personnel action as a matter ―of some urgency and 
concern‖ which had ―a serious adverse impact on employee morale‖ (Ibid.). Administrator 
Thomas answered that the decision had been made in ―full compliance with statutory 
requirements‖ (Mintz 80). The reassignment of Frederick further raised Congress‘ suspicion 
on EPA enforcement, because Stiehl had participated in the EPA‘s hazardous waste 
enforcement efforts, had established a cordial working relationship with congressional 
committee staff members, and had a reputation as a dedicated, no-nonsense enforcement 
official (Ibid.). The case also caused anxiety amongst many of the Superfund enforcement 
staff, leading to a decline in employee morale. It was said that Adams‘s organizational 
changes had ―sparked fear among some agency staff that a ‗less confrontational‘ style is 
being developed in the enforcement office, that will result in headquarters becoming less 
willing to oppose the region over controversial enforcement actions‖ (―New Criminal‖). 
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Thus, it harmed EPA enforcement efforts, making Congress at times openly hostile to the 
EPA (Mintz 80). Frequent, intense, and often adversarial oversight hearings were conducted 
in the following years by congressional committees and subcommittees on diverse aspects of 
EPA enforcement (Ibid.). The GAO supplemented these investigations with a number of 
reports required by congressional committees or individual senators or members of the 
House of Representatives (Mintz 81). Faults with different components of the EPA‘s 
enforcement program were found by different investigations and reports from Congress 
(Ibid.). On April 11th 1988, a hearing was held by the Subcommittee on Energy, 
Environment and Natural Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations in 
Crystal City, Texas, at the site of a hazardous waste disposal facility that the EPA had earlier 
placed on its National Priorities List. Representative Mike Synar (D-OK), the 
subcommittee‘s chairman, fired at the EPA during the hearing: 
Two years after the [SARA] Amendments became law, the prospect for swift 
and permanent clean-up of these hazardous waste sites is not good. We are 
spending lots of money, we are fattening the pocketbooks of a lot of 
contractors; and we are also subsidizing the development of lots of thick, 
detailed technical documents. But… somewhere in these lengthy, technical 
Superfund processes we have lost sight of the ultimate goal, and that is the 
protection of the environment and public health from hazardous waste (Mintz 
81). 
     Likewise, Representative Dennis Eckart (D-TX), criticized the pace of remedial activity, 
the vigor of the enforcement program, and the selection of clean-ups that emphasize 
treatment of waste and permanent solutions of the EPA Superfund enforcement (Ibid.). 
     Representative Eckart strongly criticized the EPA‘s inconsistency regarding the remedies 
chosen at the Superfund site and its inattention to CERCLA clean-up standards and 
permanent treatment requirements. These congressional concerns were supported by two 
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reports of outside assessments. One was Right Train, Wrong Track: Failed Leadership in the 
Superfund Cleanup Program, by a group of traditional environmental organizations such as 
the Environmental Defense Fund, Friends of the Earth, National Audubon Society, the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the industry trade group, Hazardous 
Waste Treatment Council, on February 1988 (Mintz 82). It analyzed the EPA‘s Superfund 
site remedy selection processes and accused the EPA of unscientifically setting clean-up 
goals, ignoring natural resource damage, and exempting Superfund sites from applicable 
environmental standards (Ibid.). The other report was Are We Cleaning Up?: 10 Superfund 
Case Studies by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). It found that 
the Superfund Program had been inconsistent in its selection of treatment remedies at similar 
sites and criticized the EPA for failing to use central management controls to further the 
agency‘s collective understanding of common site characteristics and common clean-up 
problems and solutions (Ibid.).  
     In response, the EPA initiated a public campaign to defend its Superfund performance. In 
an interview with The New York Times on June 18th 1988, the Assistant Administrator (from 
1985 to 1989), Win Porter, called the OTA‘s report ―a limited, superficial study‖ that drew 
―global conclusions‖ from inadequate data. He said that a few officials sitting in Washington 
conducted the study ―while I have 3,000 people out there working hard to make the program 
a success….I really resent them undermining our credibility with the communities we work 
with‖ (Shabecoff, ―Congress‖ A1). Administrator Thomas gave the same opinion in his 
remarks to the annual conference of the American Pollution Control Association in Dallas, 
Texas, stating that he resented that the OTA had made such broad allegations although it 
examined only ten sites and had ―only minimal contact‖ with the EPA‘s Superfund 
workforce (―EPA Officials‖). However, the defense from the EPA side also heightened the 
legislators‘ distrust, since many congressmen saw this kind of media-focused reports as an 
independent confirmation of their suspicions about poor agency implementation (Mintz 83). 
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Thus, these assured Congress of leaving little room for the EPA in implementation. 
     During the Reagan Administration, Administrator Burford ―made notable progress on this 
front in the lower courts‖ (Nathan 134). For instance, only sixty-nine cases were sent to 
Justice in 1981 (Brownstein and Easton 214). After Administrator Ruckelshaus came back to 
the EPA, it began to take more litigation to protect its authority, and to coerce regulators into 
following its regulations and federal laws. ―In fiscal year 1986, State and federal 
environmental civil, criminal and administrative enforcement actions continued to be 
undertaken at record levels… the agency referred 342 judicial actions to the Department of 
Justice, compared to 276 in the previous year….The criminal Enforcement Program 
experienced its most successful and productive year since the program commenced by 
referring an all-time high of forty-five criminal cases to the DOJ‖ (Mintz 69). And ―in fiscal 
year 1987, the EPA and the States achieved record levels of environmental enforcements, 
using the full range of enforcement authorities. The agency referred 304 civil cases to the 
Department of Justice….The agency established an all-time record for the largest amount of 
civil penalties imposed in a year… over $ 24 million‖ (Mintz 70). 
     In his second term, President Regan tried to ―fundamentally change the majority pattern 
of the U.S. Supreme Court‖ (Nathan 134). He nominated a large number of judges to the 
Supreme Court, to district courts and courts of appeal. For instance, he appointed four 
Justices to the Supreme Court, and another 78 judges to Courts of Appeal, including many 
leading conservative academics, such as Bork, Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Richard Posner, and 
Frank Easterbrook, and 290 judges to district courts (Hall, Ely, and Grossman 709). 
     In turn, courts also had a strong impact on environmental regulations. During the Reagan 
Administration, courts began to define the property rights of environmental regulation. 
―Developers and other landowners instituted numerous lawsuits arguing that any land use 
regulation by local, State, or federal authorities ‗took‘ their property by limiting development 
of it‖ (Paehlke, Conservation 134). A similar case occurred between the Reagan 
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Administration and the State of California. The Reagan Administration argued that 
California had no right to challenge Secretary of Interior James Watt‘s efforts to sell oil 
exploration leases off the State‘s coastline, while the State of California argued that these 
sales must be cleared with State officials to ensure they conform to the State‘s coastal 
development plans. As the Reagan Administration had gone to court to protect federal 
authority on nuclear power and offshore oil exploration, the Supreme Court ruled 
unanimously in California‘s favor on April 20th 1983 and assured the State‘s power ―to 
block construction of new nuclear plants until an adequate federal plan for disposal of 
nuclear waste has been developed‖ (Kenski and Ingram 290).  
      Courts further worked as a vehicle for interest groups. When environmental organizations 
filed a lawsuit to curb abuses of executive oversight review of agency rule-making, primarily 
by the OMB (Rosenbloom and O‘Leary 76), the federal court sometimes ruled against 
arbitrary agency deregulatory actions and agency disregard of statutory requirements 
(Shanley 133). In the case of Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas (1986), the EPA 
missed several statutory deadlines due to the OMB‘s review of EPA regulations on leaking 
underground storage tanks. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) sued the EPA and the 
OMB in the court for the District of Columbia and asserted that the reason for the delay was 
the OMB. The EDF asked for an order for the EPA to issue the regulations in time, and an 
injunction against the OMB to stop further delaying actions by the budget office in the future. 
In January 1986, Judge Thomas A. Flannery ruled that the delay in the issuance of the 
storage tank regulations had been caused by the OMB and that the OMB had no authority to 
cause the EPA to miss statutory deadlines. The OMB had argued that even if it had exceeded 
its authority by blocking regulatory action beyond the statutory deadline, the court was 
powerless to remedy the situation. Judge Flannery thought the court had jurisdiction over the 
OMB, declaring that the OMB must ―obey the law Congress sets down‖ (Rosenbloom and 
O‘Leary 76). 
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3.3.8. Interests Groups and the EPA 
     Under President Reagan‘s strong approach to economic growth, business groups played a 
dominant role in environmental regulation making. Increased environmental regulations at 
the end of the 1970s required large amounts of capital investment and expense to industries 
involved in oil, mining, electricity, coal and nuclear-powered electrical plants. The rising 
cost of federal environmental regulations reduced profits and turned business groups against 
the regulations (Merchant 200). Conservative policy research institutes, such as the 
American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, and the Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, published several reports, books, articles, and position papers to fuel a reaction 
against federal environmental regulation (Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 37). Business groups used 
lobbying, lawsuits, scientific research, and electoral politics to influence issues like air 
pollution, wildlife, and energy conservation. Business groups continually united themselves, 
and improved cooperation. In the 1980s, business groups constituted an up-front, 
professional lobby with professional staff, rather than engaging in widespread under-the-
table practices (Hrebenar 326). They developed a fourfold lobbying strategy of gathering 
information, alerting and activating the grassroots, contracting individual members of 
Congress, and carrying their message to the public via massive media campaigns (Ibid.). As 
Uslaner stated, ―Cabinet departments and all manner of independent agencies… are gold 
mines for lobbyists‖ (Uslaner 206). They targeted Congress and administrative institutions. 
The successful professional coalitional lobbying enabled business groups to continually gain 
clout both in Administration and in Congress in the early 1980s. Thus they reduced 
governmental regulation of business substantially, especially at the beginning of the Reagan 
Administration (Hrebenar 297). EPA Administrator Burford was associated with corporate 
representatives, such as John E. Daniel, the American Paper Institute‘s chief lobbyist from 
1976 to 1980; Kathleen Bennett, a long-time lobbyist for the timber industry; Kitty Adams 
who worked for the Business Roundtable; and Robert Perry, an Exxon attorney, as general 
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counsel (Brownstein and Easton 212). Under Administrator Burford, the EPA allowed 
industries to play a much greater role in regulating themselves than was the case in the 1970s. 
The lobbyists for the biggest polluters were even invited to come into Congress and literally 
rewrite the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act (―Excerpts‖ B14). Business lobbying 
successfully introduced risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis into the regulatory process. 
While conducting direct coalitional lobbying to reduce the burdens and costs imposed on 
industry by new environmental laws, business groups began to displace those costs onto the 
public, raising the prices of consumer commodities. Economists Daniel Faber and James 
O‘Connor argued that: ―Environmental regulations added to the costs of capital but not to 
revenues… [P]ollution abatement devices and clean-up technologies usually increase cost, 
hence, everything else being the same, reduce profits, or increase prices‖ (―Struggle‖ 18). 
Additionally, lots of firms had broken the regulations. Waste was being discharged into 
landfills, inner city neighborhoods, toxic waste dumps, and even being exported to the Third 
World. Pollution was much worse and toxic waste sites more abundant in many areas, 
especially in reservations and inner cities. More dangerous chemicals such as nitrates, arsenic, 
and carcinogens also appeared in the environment than before. The environmental 
deregulation in the early 1980s became the financial and ideological reaction to the 
environmental movement of the 1970s (Merchant 200).  
     However, environmental organizations rarely had the same level of access and resources 
to administrative departments and agencies as business groups (Kraft and Kamieniecki, 
―Analyzing‖ 21), despite the fact that the number of environmental lobbyists of the twelve 
environmental organizations had swelled from forty in 1975, to eighty-eight in 1985 
(Mitchell, ―From‖ 109). Besides concentrating on defending and strengthening the Clean Air 
Act, expanding the Superfund, getting the Clean Water Act reauthorized, and cleaning up 
defense production facilities, mainstream environmental organizations like the Sierra Club 
made protecting wilderness their new environmental agenda during the Reagan 
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Administration. Environmental activities like defending Alaska‘s wildlife, saving old-growth 
forests, and ―keeping the money changers out of the temples‖ captured the hearts of its 
members (McCloskey 80).  
     In 1984, methyl isocyanate was released killing over 3,000 people and injuring another 
300,000 at a plant in Bhopal, India (Hoffman, ―Institutional‖ 363). Similarly, the accidents at 
Love Canal, Times Beach and with the Exxon Valdez ship further provided the media with a 
seemingly endless supply of stories. These disasters turned local communities against 
chemical plants throughout the United States and awakened Americans to the potential 
threats in their backyards (Ibid.). Therefore, grassroots environmental organizations grew up 
quickly at the local community level, initially in response to specific environmental risks like 
the placement of waste disposal areas or incinerators, the building of lead smelters, the heavy 
use of pesticides in local agriculture, and nuclear weapons testing (Stephens 50). Because 
―The most polluted urban communities are those with crumbling infrastructure, ongoing 
economic disinvestment, deteriorating housing, inadequate schools, chronic unemployment, 
a high poverty rate, and an overloaded healthcare system‖ (Bullard, ―Anatomy of 
Environmental Racism and‖ 17), members of grassroots environmental organizations were 
generally poor, ethnic, and working-class, and distinguished themselves from the mainstream 
environmentalists who were generally white, well-educated, and middle-class (Stephens 50). 
The grassroots environmental organizations wanted to participate in public environmental 
decision-making (Dowie 135) and to ―rebuild the United States, community by community‖ 
(Gibbs x). They associated social justice with environmental quality, argued that all people 
have the right to a safe and healthy environment (Ibid.), and asked for environmental justice 
(Stephens 54). They kept the principles of ecological democracy, and utilized ―[c]ommunity 
Right-to-Know laws, and citizen-enforcement provisions in federal and State legislation, and 
local input in waste clean-up methodology and sitting decisions‖ (Dowie 135). As they had 
little access to administrative departments and agencies and Congress, they tried to force 
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environmental issues onto the political agenda through direct confrontation, such as public 
demonstrations, petitions, community education hearings and debates. Some grassroots 
environmental organizations were good at using the media to spread what often seemed to be 
David and Goliath struggles of disenfranchised groups against powerful corporate polluters 
and State federal governments (Stephens 51). Since they were ethnic, poor and working-class, 
they removed ethnic, racial, and class barriers from and introduced diversity to the 
environmental movement (Dowie 217). They also formed multi-issue, multicultural 
coalitions instead of single-issue protests based in particular communities (Stephens 51). 
     Based on different issues such as toxic abatement, ecological economics, civil and human 
rights and wilderness preservation, grassroots environmental organizations were divided into 
four groups: splinter groups, the new conservation movement, environmental justice groups, 
and Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) groups (Dowie 208). Splinter groups were founded, with 
more responsible environmental concerns, by individuals who had belonged to mainstream 
organizations and then left them because their personal ideologies and organizational visions 
clashed with establishment views (Dowie 208-209). David Brower was a good example. 
After being fired by the Sierra Club in 1969, he organized three distinct environmental 
NGOs: Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters, and the Earth Island 
Institute (Dowie 209 supra note 2). The New Conservation Movement consisted of thousands 
of small, local and regional groups formed by dedicated activists to save America‘s forests, 
especially the remaining five percent of ancient forests. Environmental justice and NIMBY 
groups addressed the uneven distribution of the costs of pollution and the benefits of 
environmental protection by connecting environmental issues with social justice, civil rights, 
and the democratic process (B. Edwards 35-36). Environmental justice groups were from 
ethnic communities and they argued that uneven distribution of environmental hazards was 
the result of inequalities in socio-economic and political power. They also argued that poor 
and minority Americans were subjected to disproportionate environmental risks, because 
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Americans who were ethnic or had low incomes were often living in close proximity to 
locally unwanted land uses (Ibid.). They concentrated on such issues as urban air pollution, 
lead paint and transfer stations for municipal garbage and hazardous waste. Sometimes they 
were able to take advantage of established lines of communication, skilled activists, black 
elected officials, and the national network of civil rights advocacy organizations (Ibid.). 
NIMBYs were generally locally-organized anti-toxic groups with the desire to protect their 
families and communities from toxic contamination arising from waste dumps, incinerators, 
ground water contamination, and air pollution (Ibid.). Their protests were scattered and 
disorganized and they lacked the necessary organizational infrastructure, communication 
networks, and sufficient representation in the political process of full-fledged social 
movements (Ibid.). But the Citizen‘s Clearing House for Hazardous Wastes (now known as 
the ―Center for Health, Environment, and Justice‖) and other national organizing centers 
somehow made the grassroots groups more cohesive (Dowie 128 supra note 2). The Love 
Canal Homeowners‘ Association was one of most influential NIMBYs. Love Canal was a 
housing development built on a highly toxic industrial chemicals landfill (Dowie 127-128). 
Due to the polluted land, the local residents suffered from different illnesses, such as skin 
irritations (Dowie 127). The LCHA made a community-initiated health survey, organized 
dramatic protests, and even took EPA officials hostage (Gottlieb 246).  
     Additionally, a number of radical non-lobbying environmentalist groups took direct action 
against governmental decisions, accusing the mainstream environmental organizations of 
being too willing to compromise the environmental agenda. Earth First! was one of them. It 
was founded in 1981, espousing ―No compromise in the defense of Mother Earth‖ and 
employed such radical tactics as direct action, civil disobedience, Guerilla Theater, and 
―ecotage,‖ the sabotage of equipment used for clear cutting, road-building, and dam 
construction (Geary).  
     Despite the ever-growing grassroots environmental movement, the clean-up did not get at 
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the roots of the problems themselves. For example, a successful protest against high levels of 
lead contamination in the soil of a poor, largely Latino community in West Dallas led to a 
clean-up project. But this project moved the lead-contaminated soil to a landfill in Louisiana 
and resulted in the redepositing of lead-contaminated soil there (Bullard, ―Anatomy of 
Environmental Racism‖ 29). 
     The grassroots environmental movement during the Reagan Administration changed 
America‘s attitude toward the environment and public health. A New York Times national 
poll in June 1989 showed that eighty percent of the population agreed with the statements, 
―Protecting the environment is so important that requirements and standards cannot be too 
high, and continuing environmental improvements must be made regardless of the cost.‖ In 
1981, early in the Reagan Administration, only forty-five percent of respondents had agreed 
with this position (―Grass-roots‖ A1). While the grassroots environmental organizations 
enriched themselves with more groups and more members during the Reagan Administration, 
mainstream environmental organizations also expanded their membership. Between 1980 
and 1990, the Sierra Club‘s membership multiplied from 180,000 to 630,000, while the 
Wilderness Society‘s membership soared from 45,000 to 350,000 (see table 4). They kept 
environmental issues at the forefront of public consciousness, fought the additional cuts all 
the way to the President, and asked for new federal laws and regulations to increase 
industry‘s accountability to the public for the environmental impact of their operations 
(Brownstein and Easton 209). Therefore, a number of new environmental laws were passed, 
including the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Amendments of 1984, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, and the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986.  
     When President Reagan came to the White House in 1981, the United States was under 
the shadow of large governmental administration and heavy financial burden, high inflation, 
declining productivity and stubborn unemployment. In addition, the United States needed 
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money to pull through the economic and military competition with the Soviet Union. 
Regulatory relief was carried out by President Reagan to reduce costs. This cost-focus made 
the EPA‘s environmental protection orientation shift from life value to money. This change 
caused the Reagan Administration to balance economic costs and environmental benefits on 
a dollar basis (Paehlke, ―Environmental‖ 81), and strongly constrained environmental 
regulation. President Reagan pursued an ―administrative strategy‖ by focusing on his 
appointment power, the use of executive orders, and other means to influence the various 
environmental regulatory processes, and to alter environmental policies instead of directly 
confronting Congress. EPA Administrator, Burford supported ―industrial revitalization‖ and 
lightened the regulatory ―overburden‖ that the EPA had placed on industry (Opie 449). The 
EPA lost its principles while pursuing a cooperative relationship with industries in a manner 
of bottom-up negotiations with the industrial groups. Because of closed meetings and rumors 
of secret deals, the EPA suffered negative publicity (Hoffman, From Heresy 86-87). 
Administrator Burford cut one-third of the EPA budget and one-fifth of the EPA staff 
between 1980 and 1983, leaving the EPA without the resources to fulfill all of its functions, 
and the EPA‘s 1983 fiscal year budget proposal even called for a twenty-eight percent cut 
from 1981 levels (Knott and Chidester 57). It resulted in slashed funding for the Superfund 
and slow implementation. Thus, the EPA acted as a deregulator, and was pulled back from 
key programs overseeing hazardous wastes, toxic substances, clean air, and clean water. 
President Reagan further let the public down. He eliminated tax credits on solar energy for 
homeowners, cut the federal research-and-development funding for solar power, and even 
removed the solar panels from the White House roof (―Congress‖). In April 1986, 
Administrator Ruckelshaus observed that the public‘s distrust of the president‘s 
environmental policies ―was worse today than it‘s been at any time‖ (Knott and Chidester 
60). However, Congress, supported by environmental organizations, offset the White 
House‘s unwillingness to protect the environment and forced President Reagan to replace 
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Burford with Ruckelshaus at the EPA. Congress continually wrote new laws and forced the 
EPA to deal with problems like hazardous waste. Strong political support for environmental 
programs encouraged Congress to assert public concern and hold the EPA accountable for 
protecting the environment (Fiorino, Making 69). Although Administrator Thomas tried to 
repair the Superfund implementation, the intensified conflict between the EPA and Congress 
made the EPA more cautious about implementing Superfund programs.  
3.4. The EPA under the George H. W. Bush Administration 
     The EPA entered another transition era during the Bush Administration, which 
transformed the environmental deregulation and the reluctant environmental protection 
during the Reagan Administration into an active, rational advocate of environmental 
protection in the Clinton Administration. Contrary to the first transition in the Carter 
Administration, which tried to slow down the environmental regulation process through 
regulatory reforms, the Bush Administration took the initiative to somehow revitalize 
environmental protection in the first two years of term. This environmental revitalization was 
enabled by the Bush Administration‘s efforts to work in harmony with Congress in signing 
legislation to phase out ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons (Ringquist 34), and to craft the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.  
     Learning lessons from the anti-environmental behaviors of the early eighties, President 
Bush chose to use and lead with environmental issues in national politics, just as President 
Nixon had. During the presidential campaign of 1988, he changed President Reagan‘s public 
conservatism to conservationism on environment, and attacked the environmental record of 
his Democratic competitor, Michael Dukakis, on the clean-up of Boston Harbor (Mintz 84). 
He pledged to be an ―environmental president,‖ promising firm measures to halt the 
greenhouse effect and declared that ―all existing wetlands, no matter how small, should be 
preserved‖ (―Swamp‖ A18). He said that it was time to put America‘s best minds to work, to 
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turn technology and the power of the marketplace to the advantage of the environment, to 
create, to innovate, and to tip the scales in favor of recovery, restoration, and renewal (Bush, 
―Remarks‖). He also announced that every American expects and deserves to breathe clean 
air, and, as President, it was his mission to guarantee this (Ibid.). On Earth Day in 1990, he 
even stated that ―Every day is Earth Day‖ (Ibid.). However, environmentalists viewed his 
commitment and credentials with some suspicion, as he had worked for President Reagan in 
chairing the President‘s Task Force on Regulatory Relief (Shanley 131).  
     President Bush faced fiscal problems left by President Reagan, such as almost $3 trillion 
deficit, a savings and loan bailout and a nuclear weapons plant clean-up estimated to cost 
hundreds of billions of dollars (Ibid.). He chose to balance economic development and 
environmental protection. On the one hand, he preserved his pledge to be an 
environmentalist president through his appointment strategy, budgetary policy, and the 
EPA‘s cabinet-rank status. While appointing the conservative candidate in the natural 
resources field, particularly in the Departments of the Interior and Energy, he chose 
professional environmentalist William Reilly as EPA Administrator, who was the president 
of the World Wildlife Fund and the Conservation Foundation and considered a protégé of 
former EPA Administrator Russell Train (Mintz 84). In addition, the Bush Administration 
significantly increased the budget for protecting the environment. The EPA budget was 
increased from almost $5.03 billion in 1988 to about $6.67 billion in 1992, and the workforce 
from 14,442 in 1988 to 17,010 in 1992 (see chart 1). In the natural resources area, the Bush 
Administration‘s budget requests for FY 1991 and FY 1992 centered on its ―America the 
Beautiful‖ program, wetlands protection, and soil conservation. The ―America the Beautiful‖ 
initiative had a $630 million budget in FY 1991 and $925 million in FY 1992 from the 
Department of the Interior (Shanley 139). President Bush believed in ensuring strict 
enforcement and the ―polluters pay principle,‖ and emphasized prevention instead of just 
clean-up (Bush). Although President Bush has been less committed to using administrative 
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reorganization and privatization in his administrative presidency, he did support raising the 
EPA to cabinet-rank status, and revived and reorganized the President‘s Council on 
Environmental Quality (Shanley 137). He also tried to improve relations with Congress 
through cooperating with them to formulate the CAA Amendment of 1990. On November 
15th 1990, President Bush signed the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This Act 
tightened auto emission standards and pollution control requirements for cities that did not 
fulfill federal air quality standards, and mandated a forty percent reduction in sulfur dioxide 
to promote acid rain control (Shanley 144). This Act also required control technology for 
major toxic air installations, prescribed cleaner gasoline and the introduction of clean fuel 
vehicles most polluted areas in the U. S. (Ibid.). This Act even included an elaborate and 
detailed Command-and-Control system of permits, standards, deadlines, and stronger civil 
and criminal penalties (Ibid.). Supported by Administrator Reilly, the Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1990 was signed as part of the Reconciliation Act. It set up a modest sixteen-million-
dollar pilot program for 1991-1993 with technical assistance and matching grants to States to 
create and encourage pollution source reduction programs (Shanley 145), thus forcing the 
EPA to focus on the prevention — not just the correction (clean-up) — of environmental 
damage. 
     On the other hand, President Bush placated opposing interests and more conservative 
allies through extending the regulatory review program of the Reagan Presidency. During the 
first two years, the Bush Administration also kept the pace of new health, safety, and 
environmental regulations the same as at the end of the Reagan Administration (U.S. OMB, 
Report 32). In response to concerns about increasing regulatory burdens, he established the 
Council on Competitiveness in March 1989, which replaced the Task Force on Regulatory 
Relief from the Reagan Administration as the new regulatory traffic cop (Milloy, 
―Reagan‘s‖). The Council on Competitiveness headed by Vice-President Quayle not only 
reviewed all federal regulations with the aim of eliminating those that inhibited U.S. 
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competitiveness, but also intervened in many specific regulatory matters. For instance, it 
stopped an EPA proposal that would have required municipalities to divert twenty-five 
percent of their solid waste destined for incineration into recycling programs (Weidenbaum 
23). President Bush also preserved and refined the power of presidential and OMB 
overseeing of agency regulatory policies and their annual agendas under Reagan‘s executive 
orders, and further expanded OMB overseeing of agency risk assessments (Shanley 137). 
Thus, the OMB continued to wield significant and controversial power in information 
collection and regulatory review. The OMB reviewed almost three-quarters of all agency 
rules of eight federal agencies. The EPA had the largest percentage of agency rules deemed 
consistent with change, and had the largest number of rules returned by the OMB for 
reconsideration. In the first year of the Bush Administration, the number of rules withdrawn 
by an agency, returned for reconsideration or suspended by the OMB was even slightly 
higher than that of Reagan‘s last year (Shanley 142). The regulatory process was intensified 
in January 1992. President Bush placed a three-month moratorium on the issuance of new 
regulations. Agencies like the EPA were required to evaluate existing regulations and to 
accelerate action on initiatives that would ―eliminate any unnecessary regulatory burden‖ 
(Weidenbaum 23-24).  
The EPA under Administrator Reilly 
     President Bush‘s more pro-environmental attitude from his balance strategy left room for 
EPA Administrator Reilly to make changes in environmental protection, especially in the 
EPA‘s enforcement efforts in the first two years of the Bush Administration (Mintz 84). 
     In Administrator Reilly‘s opening remarks at his January 1989 confirmation hearing 
before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, he committed himself to 
assertive EPA enforcement effort with the following words: 
I want to stress before this committee that I understand and accept as my duty, 
first and foremost, to implement the environmental laws of this land as 
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Congress has written them….[E]nforcement must be inspired by a sense of 
vigor and urgency, for the aim of the enterprise is no less than the protection 
of human health, of life, and of the natural order that sustains civilization. So I 
pledge to take aggressive and timely enforcement action, whenever it is 
warranted, to safeguard public health or environmental quality (Mintz 86). 
He promised his first act as Administrator would be to make legislation to strengthen the 
CAA. The key component of that legislation would be a program for reducing acid 
precipitation caused by pollution from coal-burning power plants and other sources. He also 
claimed that members of the Bush transition staff and EPA staff had been working out details 
of the legislation and that the bill would be ready to go to Congress within a few weeks with 
the specific goal of reducing the pollution caused by acid rain (Shabecoff, ―E.P.A.‖ A1). His 
commitment played a key role in revising the CAA of 1970 and of 1977, and led to the 
passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. On June 13th 1989, the EPA released a 
report titled The Ninety Day Study, which was undertaken by a task group of EPA managers 
and professionals ―as thorough a review of the [Superfund] program as could be completed 
in about ninety days‖ (Mintz 87). In order to restore public confidence, The Ninety Day Study 
contained detailed recommendations for the EPA‘s implementation of CERCLA (Superfund), 
such as several measures promoting consistency in the selection of Superfund site clean-up 
remedies, and specific steps for accelerating and improving remedial actions, bringing 
innovative techniques to reduce pollution in the Superfund Program, improving CERCLA 
management and administrative support, and communicating program results to the public 
(Ibid.). Administrator Reilly also pledged to request greater budget from Congress to 
implement the Ninety Day Study suggestions. For Capitol Hill, his acts were seen as salutary 
and encouraging, and somehow substantially succeeded in boosting the EPA‘s credibility in 
Congress, thus generating a ―rhetorical cease-fire‖ with Congress and other critics (Ibid.). To 
further improve credibility on Capitol Hill and the EPA-Congress relations in enforcement, 
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Administrator Reilly appointed James Strock as the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement 
and Compliance Monitoring. James Stock was a special assistant to the EPA Administrator 
from 1983 to 1985. Later, he became a member of the staff of the Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works, and gained a reputation as an advocate of strong and 
effective EPA enforcement on Capitol Hill (Mintz 88). Unlike his predecessor, Thomas 
Adams, he devoted a lot of time to holding informal dialogue with interested congressional 
committee staff members. Both these private talks and his existing reputation on Capitol Hill 
helped restore the faith of at least some congressional observers in the agency‘s commitment 
to vigorous enforcement (Ibid.). 
     Administrator Reilly pointed out: ―Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, Congress 
constructed an arsenal of laws, typically in response to an episode of media attention and 
public alarm ... Many of these laws addressed serious problems but they were typically 
conceived in isolation, and constructed without reference to other environmental problems or 
laws…No law ever directed that we seek out the best opportunities to reduce environmental 
risks, in toto; nor that we employ the most efficient, cost-effective means of addressing 
them‖ (von Mühlendahl 500). After that, direct actions were taken to solve these problems on 
EPA enforcement. The EPA extended the responsibility and influence of the Office of 
Enforcement to overcome the fragmentation of enforcement authority at the EPA 
headquarters level. The EPA replaced the Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Monitoring with the new Office of Enforcement, and created a new multimedia Office of 
Federal Facilities Enforcement through reorganizing the former Office of Solid Waste and 
Emergency Response, Federal Facilities Hazardous Waste Compliance Office, and the Office 
of Federal Activities from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring. In 
addition, the EPA made the jurisdiction of the Pesticides and Toxic Substance Enforcement 
Division cover enforcement actions under the community Right-to-Know provisions of 
CERCLA Title III, and divided the former headquarters Hazardous Waste Enforcement 
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Division into two new units: a Superfund Enforcement Division and an RCRA Enforcement 
Division with emphasis on RCRA enforcement. The RCRA Enforcement Division was 
headed by aggressive attorney Kathie Stein, who had been recruited from the staff of the 
Environmental Defense Fund. Moreover, the EPA required its regional counsel to report all 
legal aspects of the enforcement work of EPA regional offices to the Assistant Administrator 
for Enforcement, rather than to the agency‘s general counsel. The EPA Administrator and his 
Deputy were also required to periodically rate his regional Administrators and deputy 
Administrators as to their job performance on enforcement activities (―Enforcement‖). The 
Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, James Strock, created 
a new enforcement agenda. In this agenda, he emphasized the development of regional 
screening processes to judge the strategic value of individual enforcement, geographically-
based approaches for developing special enforcement initiatives, and compliance-based 
approaches on multimedia initiatives and cooperation across EPA programs and regions. 
This case-screening process was to ―aid the decision whether a single-media or multimedia 
response is warranted and what form of authority should be used to address the violation,‖ 
and it ―should involve coordination among the Program directors, Regional counsels and 
criminal enforcement agents to assure that the best remedy is selected for a particular case‖ 
(Strock, ―EPA‘s‖ 10330). Alongside the overall goal of ―twenty-five percent enforcement 
with multimedia efforts‖ established by Administrator Reilly on September 25th 1990, James 
Strock emphasized better communication of the EPA‘s goals and achievements (Mintz 90-
91). 
     Several other incentives were contained in Strock‘s new enforcement agenda, such as 
assisting State agencies to develop their own cross-media targeting and case-screening 
capability, developing a comprehensive enforcement training capability with emphasis on 
multimedia casework, reviewing existing permits and regulations with a view to enhancing 
their precision and enforceability, and developing the right mix of EPA administrative, civil, 
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and criminal enforcement cases (Strock, ―EPA‘s‖ 10327-10328). In the criminal enforcement 
programs, Strock favored more resources, improved training of investigators, and the 
fostering of a team approach among special agents, enforcement attorneys, and technical 
staff (Strock, ―Environmental‖ 917, 937). 
     Ecological protection characterized the EPA in the Bush Administration. Since the Nixon 
Administration, human-health-centered environmental protection had been supported by 
environmental laws from Congress and environmental regulations from the EPA. The U.S. 
government focused on human wellbeing in environmental protection and ―Administrators 
always found it easier to justify EPA actions to hostile Congressional committees when they 
based actions on human health‖ (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 500). Therefore, the EPA had 
a culture of emphasizing human health. Human health deserved protection, but Americans 
debated the extent to which nonhuman species deserved protection (Ibid.). Administrator 
Reilly said that huge sums of money had been spent on hypothetical risks experienced by a 
few individuals, while ecological matters affecting millions of people were not adequately 
addressed (Pediatr 241-242). Inspired by what William Ruckelshaus called ―the essential 
unity of nature,‖ and due to the conviction that human wellbeing was linked to the wellbeing 
of other species, Administrator Reilly made ecological assessments a part of EPA duty and 
began to direct the EPA to ecology-centered environmental protection in order to prevent and 
solve ecological problems arising in the United States. In 1991, the EPA issued its 
Framework for Ecological Risk Assessment, which formalized its ecological risk assessment 
procedure. In this report, ecological risk assessment was defined as ―a process that evaluates 
the likelihood that adverse ecological effects may occur or are occurring as a result of 
exposure to one or more stressors‖ (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499). Ecological risk 
assessment was also divided into three phases: problem formulation; analysis; and risk 
characterization. Each of these phases was further divided into smaller steps, most of which 
were analogues of steps in health risk assessment (Ibid.). The EPA‘s ecological assessments 
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strengthened the agency‘s agendas. It was reported by Science in a 1992 article: ―As if trying 
to determine human health risks from radiation, dioxin, and other hazards isn‘t enough 
trouble, the Environmental Protection Agency may soon try its hand at the even more 
difficult chore of assessing ecological risk‖ (Ibid.). Since interest in ecological issues had 
been growing in the EPA, by 1993, ecological assessments had been undertaken by various 
programs from the Office of Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances, the Office of 
Solid Waste and Emergency Response, the Office of Water, and the Office of Air and 
Radiation (Ibid.). Administrator Reilly also set an example on conducting ecological 
assessments for future administrations. He announced that it would be a ―matter of policy‖ 
not to tolerate ―an unnecessary risk of regularly repeated bird kills‖ from pesticides without a 
countervailing benefit (Ibid.). He also vetoed a one billion dollar dam project in Colorado 
entitled Two Forks by explaining that he understood the value of water for Colorado, but that 
he had to ―respect other values important to Coloradans and all Americans: a beautiful free 
flowing trout stream of the highest quality, wetlands, a downstream habitat of endangered 
whooping cranes, and other environmental resources‖ (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 499). 
     Despite the efforts made by the EPA, enforcement failed to overcome the continuing 
fragmentation of enforcement authority within EPA headquarters (Mintz 94). The agency‘s 
ineffectual enforcement structure went unchanged during the Bush Administration, although 
the GAO reviewed this question (Mintz 95). This continued damaging the efficiency of the 
EPA‘s enforcement work (Ibid.). Additionally, the agency‘s efforts to approach a multimedia 
enforcement encountered two significant difficulties: inadequate information management 
capability due to poorly designed information systems and internal resistance from single 
medium-oriented enforcement personnel (Ibid.). These difficulties significantly limited 
effectiveness in certain EPA regions (Mintz 96). The EPA still suffered problems, such as 
personnel shortages, inconsistencies in the enforcement approaches of its regional office, and 
inadequate guidance from headquarters (Mintz 97). On ecological assessments, many 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 162  
employees, especially managers, often had no formal training in ecological disciplines, and 
the EPA needed internal expertise and knowledge to support its actions on a wide range of 
ecological issues (Russell III, ―Environmental‖ 500). 
     Facing a nagging recession, relatively high unemployment, and an impending election in 
1992, the Bush Administration increasingly shifted its emphasis toward developing natural 
resources, altering environmental law, easing up pollution control regulations, and limiting 
citizens‘ appeals to prevent private enterprise activities in public lands (Shanley 151). As a 
result, certain important categories of violations were ignored by the EPA and its regional 
offices and sometimes appropriate enforcement action on other RCRA infractions was not 
taken in time (Mintz 97). Since Administrator Reilly lacked enough consensus of opinion 
with President Bush on further environmental protection after 1990, the EPA often clashed 
with ―Quayle Council,‖ the Council on Competitiveness headed by Vice President Dan 
Quayle, The ―Quayle Council‖ intervened in regulatory processes to rewrite environmental 
rules and regulations, and tried to revive the flagging national economy at the expense of the 
environment during the last eighteen months of the Bush Administration (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 
110). These disagreements resulted in several painful and significant defeats for 
Administrator Reilly during the spring and summer of 1992 (Schneider A1), and the morale 
of the enforcement staff again declined within the EPA. Moreover, the improved relationship 
between the EPA and Congress at the beginning of the Bush Administration did not continue 
and Congress and the GAO intensified criticism of EPA enforcement, especially after Jim 
Strock left the EPA in 1991 (Mintz 97). Renewed suspicion and mistrust lay between 
Congress and the EPA at the end of the Bush Administration (Mintz 100). 
     During the first year of the Bush Administration, the EPA made 364 civil judicial referrals 
to the Department of Justice and more than 4,000 administrative actions (Mintz 92). 
Superfund settlements and judicial enforcement actions increased significantly, and $34.9 
million in civil penalties were assessed against violators of environmental laws in FY 1989, 
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including $21.3 million in civil judicial penalties and $13.6 million in administrative 
penalties (Mintz 183 note 31). The environmental regulations published in the code of the 
Federal Register from 1986 to 1991 also increased from under 9,000 to over 18,000 (Wilson 
and Sasseville 17). President Bush followed President Reagan, and continued to nominate 
and appoint judges that were relatively hostile to environmental protection and regulation in 
general to the Supreme Court, district court and courts of appeal (Emmert and Traut 54-56). 
For instance, he nominated Circuit Judge David Souter as an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court on July 25th 1990 and Judge Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court one 
year later. Both nominations were confirmed in the Senate. Therefore, courts gave large 
support to environmental challenges and became keen on reducing the impact of 
environmental regulation (Kovacic 706). 
     The Bush Administration expanded market-based economic incentives rather than 
Command-and-Control regulations to achieve emission reductions more efficiently (Vig, 
―Presidential‖ 110). These economic incentives included a system of marketable pollution 
allowances for sulfur dioxide emissions, banking emissions credits for utilities and emission 
trading for chemical companies (Shanley 144). He further supported incentives for energy 
conservation and renewable energy alternatives. In his National Energy Strategy (NES), a 
variety of actions were taken to promote both energy efficiency and improved and new 
energy technologies. These actions involved improving energy efficiency in buildings and 
transport, and accelerating development and improvement in nuclear power production of 
electricity. These actions also included expanding the use of natural gas and clean coal 
technology, and renewable energy alternatives such as hydropower, biomass, and solar and 
wind technology (U.S. DOE 172, 181, 183-4). As a result, more funds were sought for solar-
related and alternative energy options, and greater attention was given to issues like acid rain, 
global warming, and the health impacts of air pollution (Shanley 141). 
     Supported by President Bush, the EPA approached reduction in regulatory burdens and 
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costs with market-based incentives and encouraged cooperative and voluntary agreements 
with industry (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 221). Administrator Reilly 
understood the balance strategy and he stressed solutions made by the reconciliation of 
interests. He said at his 1989 confirmation hearing before the Senate Environment and Public 
Works Committee: 
We must usher in a new era in the history of environmental policy, an era 
marked by reconciliation of interests, by imaginative solutions arrived at 
through cooperation and consensus, by the resolve to listen and work out our 
differences (Faber and O‘Connor, ―Environmental‖ 559). 
To reach the reconciliation of interests, President Bush established a President‘s Commission 
on Environmental Quality to bring business and environmental leaders together (Ibid.). The 
EPA began to promote partnership with industry. Administrator Reilly further stressed a 
voluntary, collaborative, and flexible approach to pollution prevention. In 1991, the EPA 
created a voluntary industry partnership for energy-efficient lighting and for reducing toxic 
chemical emissions. It launched the Green Lights Program, which encouraged companies to 
perform energy audits and install energy-efficient lighting (Wilson and Sasseville 22), 
Because there were 1.4 billion pounds of releases or transfers of seventeen priority pollutants 
reported to the EPA Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) in 1988 (Ibid.) and it covered many new 
kinds of toxic releases, Administrator Reilly initiated programs to encourage industry to 
voluntarily reduce them instead of seeking legal authority to control them. The 33/50 
program launched by Administrator Reilly in 1991 was one of these. It committed publicly to 
reducing releases of seventeen priority TRI chemicals by thirty-three percent in 1992 and 
fifty percent in 1995 (Fiorino, New Environmental 134). Over 1,100 firms, including General 
Motors, W.R. Grace, and the Gillette Company, were involved in this voluntary emission 
reduction. In 1994, a year ahead of schedule, the 33/50 program achieved its aim, as releases 
of TRI chemicals had declined by fifty percent from the 1988 base year (Wilson and 
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Sasseville 22-23). Beginning with the 33/50 program, the EPA steadily strengthened the use 
of consensus-based cooperative and voluntary agreements with business while making 
regulations (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 221). This voluntary commitment was 
carried over into the Clinton Administration. Therefore, cooperation programs among 
business, government and environmental communities increased. Some business groups even 
entered cooperative agreements with environmental advocacy groups through taking part in 
EPA programs. The 1992 accord fashioned between McDonald‘s restaurant and the 
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) entered the public spotlight, phasing out the Styrofoam 
clamshell packages in which hamburgers were served. Companies like General Motors and 
British Petroleum one after another signed agreements with the EDF to work together on a 
much broader range of issues, such as the scrapping of old vehicles, fuel efficiency standards, 
pollution-reduction credits, urban smog, and the source of global warming, the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Moreover, in 1991, Chevron enlisted the World Wildlife Fund to advise it 
on environmental issues (N. Miller, Environmental Politics: Interest 123). These cooperation 
programs also changed companies. For instance, in 1991, approximately half of the Fortune 
100 companies, and more than two-thirds of Fortune 50 companies had environmental vice-
presidents (Hoffman, From Heresy 107-140). Therefore, in the National Press Club on new 
environmentalism on April 30th 1992, Administrator Reilly concluded that the EPA was 
leading environmental protection by integrating environmental goals with the economic 
goals  
The environment-versus-economy formulation that has characterized so much 
of the environmental policy debate in America for the past twenty years is 
increasingly rejected by both the public and leading elements of the business 
community. In the newly emerging marketplace, the green of environmental 
protection is beginning to form a ready alliance with the green of profits. A 
new environmentalism is taking shape in this country; it integrates 
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environment and economics (Wilson and Sasseville 22). 
     In his first two years, President Bush overcame President Reagan‘s legacy as an 
environmental deregulator by working in harmony with Congress, signing environmental 
legislation and implementing it, such as the Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990. Later, 
however, the EPA fell victim to the constraints of the Council on Competitiveness, headed 
by Vice-President Dan Quayle. The EPA under the Bush Administration began to move 
away from heavily prescriptive environmental regulation (Kraft, Environmental Policy and 
Politics 221). It ushered in an era of actively seeking possible reduction in regulatory burden 
and costs through building partnerships with industry as well as with state and local 
governments, and spreading economic incentives and encouraging voluntary action from 
industry while making regulations (Ibid.). It further provided the Clinton Administration with 
environmental protection topics such as pollution prevention from primary causes, the Cap-
and-Trade emissions trading and ecological assessments. 
3.5. The EPA under the Clinton Administration 
     Bill Clinton and Al Gore won the presidential election in 1992. Since Gore attracted a 
large turnout from environmentally-oriented voters, he was responsible for creating the 
administration‘s environmental focus and for developing candidates for senior positions who 
oversaw environmental issues during the transition after the election. Carol Browner who 
worked as Legislative Director for Senator Gore from 1988 to 1991, became EPA 
Administrator. She shared environmental opinions with Vice-President Gore, who could 
directly affect President Clinton regarding the environment. Under Administrator Browner, 
the EPA became a rational advocate for protecting the environment. It advocated 
environmental protection through achieving greater pollution control for less money, and 
rationally accelerated economic growth through ensuring energy security, creating jobs, and 
promoting market incentives and cleaner production.  
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3.5.1. President Clinton and Vice-President Gore 
     When Bill Clinton was Governor of Arkansas, his record on the environment was fair to 
poor (―Bill Clinton‖ A14). He received very little support from environmentalists during the 
primary elections when he ran for the Presidency (Dowie 177). But later he changed his mind 
and decided to lead environmental initiatives to promote the national economy. In a speech 
on Earth Day 1992, he said, ―Over the years, I have learned something that George Bush and 
his advisors still don‘t understand, to reject the false choice between economic growth and 
environmental protection. Today, you can‘t have a healthy economy without a healthy 
environment, and you don‘t have to sacrifice environmental protection to get economic 
growth‖ (Levin 304). He thought that the false choice made by President Bush resulted in 
weak standards and lax enforcement that failed to hold polluters responsible, and that 
Americans must have both a clean and safe environment and a growing economy (Clinton, 
Between Hope and History 103-105). 
     Vice-President Al Gore was an advocate for environmental protection. He had made 
himself popular among Greens by announcing that Rachel Carson would ―sit in on all 
important decisions of this administration‖ (Buell 178). President George H.W. Bush 
mocked Gore as ―ozone man‖ in the 1992 campaign against Bill Clinton, and claimed: ―This 
guy is so far out in the environmental extreme we‘ll be up to our necks in owls and outta 
work for every American‖ (Remnick 47). President Clinton and his Vice-President Gore 
were in accordance on ―making greater use of environmental initiatives to promote larger 
strategic and economic goals …helping American environmental industrial sectors capture a 
larger share of a $400 billion global market‖ (Luke 128). They argued that the jobs-versus-
environment debate presented a false choice because environmental clean-up creates jobs, 
and the future competitiveness of the U.S. economy would depend on developing 
environmentally clean, energy-efficient technologies (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 111). They began 
to create a new developing model of a strong economy with a clean environment through 
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working to grow green business from new environmental technologies and responsible 
polluters. Vice-President Gore even emphasized economic growth with ecological 
responsibility. Gore argued that America‘s mass consumption resulted in biosphere abuse, 
and that Americans must reestablish ―a natural and healthy relationship between human 
beings and the earth‖ and replace the brutal exploitation of nature and mass consumption 
with an ―environmentalism of the spirit‖ (Gore 218). He thought that ―the task of restoring 
the natural balance of the Earth‘s ecological system‖ could reaffirm America‘s long-standing 
―interest in social justice, democratic government, and free market economics‖ (Gore 270).  
3.5.2. Administrator Carol Browner 
     Administrator Carol Browner earned a B.A. in English, and a law degree from the 
University of Florida in Gainesville. After working as an aide in the Florida House of 
Representatives, she came to Washington D.C. and worked for Citizen Action, a grassroots 
organization that lobbies for a variety of issues, including the environment. From 1986 to 
1988, Browner was the chief legislative aide on environmental issues to Sen. Lawton Chiles 
(D-Fla.), who later became Florida‘s governor. Following that, she was Senator Al Gore‘s 
(D-Tenn.) senior legislative aide until 1991, when she was appointed Florida Secretary of the 
Environment. In Florida, she settled a lawsuit against the State for environmental damage 
done to Everglades National Park, and launched the largest ecological restoration project to 
purify and restore the natural flow of water to the Everglades (Romero). At her swearing-in 
ceremony as EPA Administrator in January 1993, She said: ―I want my son to be able to 
grow up and enjoy the natural wonders of the United States in the same way that I have, I 
believe that we will now be able to make the investment in our economy that we so 
desperately need, yet preserve the air, land, and water‖ (Ibid.). Her 1999 official biography 
on the EPA website noted that Administrator Browner is guided both ―by the philosophy that 
safeguarding the environment means protecting where we live and how we live‖ and by the 
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idea that ―the environment and the economy go hand in hand‖ (Ibid.). Since Administrator 
Browner won strong urban and minority support, she became a staunch advocate of 
environmental justice (Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 309). 
3.5.3. The Optimistic Beginning 
     After Bill Clinton won the 1992 election, ―environmental activists were on the run for the 
first time since the green lobby swept through Washington more than two decades ago‖ 
(Dowd 91). President Clinton had even promised to elevate the EPA head to full cabinet 
status. Since Vice-President Gore was responsible for creating the administration‘s 
environmental focus, and for developing candidates for senior positions that oversaw 
environmental issues, Bruce Babbitt, president of the League of Conservation Voters, was 
chosen as the head of the Department of the Interior; Carol Browner, Gore‘s former Senate 
aide, was appointed as EPA Administrator; retired Senator Tim Wirth as the head of the 
Department of Energy. Environmentalists prized both the access to the President and the 
access to the four key environmental agencies: the Interior; the EPA; the DOE; and the 
Department of Agriculture. Additionally, the new administration hired about two dozen 
environmentalists directly from national environmental organizations. They were assigned 
not only to agencies and departments like the EPA, Agriculture, and Interior but also to the 
EPA‘s offices in the States, the Office of Management and Budget, and the National Security 
Council (Dowie 178). On his first day in office, President Clinton abolished former Vice 
President Dan Quayle‘s Competitiveness Council, and shortly after that he signed the 
Biodiversity Treaty that Bush had refused to sign at the Earth Summit in Rio. He held the 
ancient-forest summit he had promised, and increased funding for endangered species and 
renewable energy. He also directed the government to support green production, and signed 
an executive order both mandating government-wide use of civil rights laws to advance 
environmental equity in poor communities and requiring all federal agencies to ―make 
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environmental justice a part of what they do‖ (Dowie 191). 
3.5.4. Hard Reality in Clinton’s First Two Years 
     President Clinton showed his rational stance on environmental protection and tried not to 
cause regulatory burden for his Administration. President Clinton cancelled the Council on 
Competitiveness (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 139), but signed Executive Order 
12866 on regulatory planning and review in September 1993. This order retained the 
requirement for cost-benefit analysis of major rules, and for the OMB‘s authority to review 
proposed and final rules before agencies could issue them. It also gave the EPA more 
discretion in using qualitative data to compare costs and benefits (Fiorino, Making 77) and 
asked the EPA to seek balance in the implementation of environmental statutes (Kraft, 
Environmental Policy and Politics 138).  
     In New Hampshire during the 1992 election campaign, Bill Clinton promised to support 
an increase in Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards to the current 27.5 miles 
per gallon. He repeated this to the League of Conservation Voters and printed it in his 
campaign literature. However, during his first year in office, he not only allowed the auto 
lobby to block the appointment of fourteen separate candidates to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (which would enforce the CAFE standard), but also refused to 
raise the standard above 27.5 mpg (Dowie 182). In addition, he allowed former NRDC 
lawyer Mary Nichols, who was appointed to oversee clean air matters at the EPA, to cut a 
deal with Detroit car makers in 1994. This deal rejected the auto emission levels with the 
California‘s strict clean air standards proposed by thirteen Eastern States, and thus made the 
country lose the opportunity to stimulate a booming new automobile industry through 
creating sufficient demand for electric cars by high emission standards (Ibid.). Similar 
incidents also happened to Vice-President Gore. During the presidential campaign of 1992, 
Gore promised a group of supporters that the EPA would not allow any hazardous waste 
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incinerators to be located near an elementary school in Liverpool, Ohio, which was operated 
by Waste Technologies Incorporated during the Bush Administration. However, Vice-
President Gore signed off on a test burn of Waste Technology Inc.‘s massive garbage 
incinerator near a working class neighborhood in Liverpool, Ohio early in the first year of the 
Clinton Administration (Frank). With the approval from Vice-President Gore, the EPA 
issued an operating permit for the toxic burner. Administrator Carol Browner explained that 
the previous Administration had issued the permit and that the EPA Ethics Officer removed 
her from participation in this case because her husband worked for an organization that has 
taken a position on the WTI (W. Nixon). However environmentalists argued that this was 
because the money behind WTI came from Jackson Stephens who was one of Clinton‘s top 
campaign contributors (Frank). In winter 1993, the EPA was still not in the cabinet and the 
CEQ had been shut down and replaced with the White House Office on Environmental 
Policy. Compared to FY 1993, both the EPA budget and the EPA workforce in 1994 had 
been cut (see chart 1). Although both Congress and the administration were Democratic-
controlled from 1993-94, the Clinton Administration did not pass a single piece of 
meaningful federal legislation (Dowie 176). Incidents like the removal of the Delaney Clause, 
which caused negligible risk to be embedded in the philosophy of regulation by executive 
order, was a particular let-down for environmentalists. 
The Delaney Clause Confusion 
     The Delaney Clause was a 1958 amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 
named after Congressman James Delaney of New York. It said: ―The Secretary of the Food 
and Drug Administration shall not approve for use in food any chemical additive found to 
induce cancer in man, or, after tests, found to induce cancer in animals‖ (Singer). It focused 
on processed foods with cancer-causing pesticides, and was designed to prevent cancer in 
humans by setting up zero-tolerance for carcinogenic residues in all food products. Due to 
technology advancement, this zero-risk standard was thought unscientific. In 1988, the EPA 
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eased restrictions on several pesticides, but this change was legally challenged by the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC). In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in San 
Francisco ruled in favor of the NRDC on the basis of the Delaney Clause. The EPA therefore 
had no choice but to follow the law, and limit or totally ban 35 compounds. Many of them 
were basic pesticides used in agriculture (Ibid.). Almost immediately upon taking office, 
Administrator Carol Browner decided to reevaluate the Delaney amendment to the Food and 
Drug Act (Dowie 181). On August 3rd 1996, the Delaney Clause was removed with the 
passage of the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which amended the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) to provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme for pesticides. The new FQPA 
established a health-based safety standard for pesticides in foods, citing ―reasonable certainly 
of no harm‖ for cancer and non-cancer health effects as the standard in processed foods and 
raw agricultural commodities, thus replacing the Delaney amendment to require a less than 
―one-in-a-million‖ (a risk of less than one excess cancer per million persons exposed) 
lifetime risk threshold (Somogyi and Appel 234). The key point was that the criterion of risk 
assessment, a zero-risk standard, was replaced by a negligible risk standard and thus set the 
standard for future environmental legislation, for instance, on standard setting of cancer risk 
from asbestos and radon. FDA Commissioner, David Kessler, called it ―an assault on forty 
years of consumer protection‖ (Hamowy 190). 
3.5.5. Clinton’s Achievement on Environmental Protection 
     After the election in November 1994, Republicans took control of both the Senate and the 
House. Environmental regulations were criticized by Congress for being too costly, too 
inflexible, and for often focusing on problems that posed too few environmental and health 
risks (Kurian 208). President Clinton was under pressure from Congress, various critics and 
the coming election in 1996. In response to Congress‘s criticism, on March 16th 1995, the 
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Clinton Administration announced plans for an initiative, ―Streamlining Environmental 
Regulation‖, which defined the reinvention agenda at the EPA for the rest of the 1990s 
(Fiorino, New Environmental 53). These initiatives called for improving the EPA‘s current 
system through twenty-five high priority actions, and aimed at greatly enhancing flexibility, 
cost-effectiveness and innovation. They covered eight aspects: Performance and Market-
based Regulations, Setting Priorities based on Sound Science, Building Partnerships, Cutting 
Red Tape, Better Accountability Compliance and Enforcement, the Power of Information, 
Alternative Performance-based Strategies, and New Tools for Government and Industry. 
Under each aspect, there were different initiatives. For instance, under Performance and 
Market-based Regulations, there were open-market air emissions trading and effluent trading 
in watersheds, Project XL, alternative strategies for sectors, alternative strategies for 
communities, and alternative strategies for agencies under Alternative Performance-based 
Strategies (U.S. White House, Reinventing 2-4).  
     Like President Reagan, President Clinton was forced, by congressional opposition, to 
employ his executive power to pursue his environmental agenda (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 114). 
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12873, Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste 
Prevention, which set the theme of protecting the environment through prevention, and 
directed federal agencies to evaluate the environmental attributes of the products and services 
they purchased. President Clinton also signed Executive Order 13101, Greening the 
Government through Waste Prevention, Recycling, and Federal Acquisition, on September 
14th 1998, which required the EPA to incorporate waste prevention and recycling into the 
agency‘s daily operations, and asked the EPA to work to increase and expand markets for 
recovered materials through greater Federal Government preference and demand for such 
products. President Clinton even signed Executive Order 13148, Greening the Government 
through Leadership in Environmental Management, on April 21st 2000, which required the 
EPA to incorporate environmental management systems into its day-to-day decision-making 
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and long-term planning processes (―Laws‖). 
     The Clinton Administration further promoted three environment laws in the following 
years: a safe Drinking Water Act, a revitalized Clean Water Act and a reformed Superfund 
program (Clinton, My Life 576). In 1993, a cryptosporidium broke out in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 400,000 people were sick, and more than 100 died due to drinking water. This 
accident led the Clinton Administration to take action to expand drinking water protection 
and provide stronger protection for communities. On August 6th 1996, President Clinton also 
signed the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments. The Act authorized a $9.6 billion drinking 
water treatment loan fund directly to States to upgrade drinking water treatment systems in 
communities nationwide throughout 2003 (―President‖). On February 19th 1998, President 
Clinton further announced a Clean Water Action Plan to continue making America‘s 
waterways safe for fishing and swimming, for instance, by reducing ―nonpoint‖ pollution — 
run-off from farms, city streets and other sources and coastal waters from outbreaks of 
harmful organisms like Pfiesteria and alarming conditions like the ―dead zone‖ in the Gulf of 
Mexico (―Clean‖). On November 29th 1999, President Clinton even signed a reformed 
Superfund program, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act (SREA). The Clinton 
Administration continually protected public lands and endangered species. It arranged 
agreements to protect the Florida Everglades, Yellowstone National Park, and ancient 
redwood groves in California, and actively promoted voluntary agreements to establish 
habitat conservation plans in order to protect endangered species and other wildlife 
throughout the Unites States. President Clinton even used his executive authority to issue 
proclamations establishing nineteen new national monuments and enlarging three others, in 
total covering 6.1 million acres. One example was the new Grand Staircase Escalante 
National Monument created in 1996, which protected 1.3 million acres of the red rock 
canyon in Utah. In January 2001, President Clinton further issued one more executive order 
protecting nearly 60 million acres of roadless areas in national forests from future road 
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construction and hence from development (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 117-118). Moreover, he often 
vetoed bills containing riders that would have weakened environmental protection from 
Republican Congress (―The Legislative‖). By the year 2000, the EPA budget for 
environmental programs increased from about $6.52 billion in 1996 to about $7.56 billion 
and the workforce from 17,081 in 1996 to 18,100. In spite of congressional opposition, 
Clinton signed the ‗Kyoto Protocol‘ treaty in 1998, which would reduce U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions to seven percent below 1990 levels by 2008 to 2012 (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 114). 
Before leaving office, President Clinton claimed to have protected more land in the lower 
forty-eight States than any president in history, including Teddy Roosevelt. He also 
acknowledged in his book, My Life: ―It was important to me and Al Gore, and by the time we 
left office we had cleaned up three times as many Superfund sites as the Reagan and Bush 
administrations combined‖ (Clinton, My life 576).  
3.5.6. EPA Initiatives under Administrator Browner  
     In testimony before the House of Representatives subcommittee on Energy and 
Environment of the Science committee in May 1997, EPA Administrator Browner 
proclaimed ―The Clinton Administration views protecting public health and environment as 
one of its highest priorities‖ (Browner, ―Proposed‖). She took advice from three former EPA 
administrators, Train, Ruckelshaus, and Reilly, to assess risks, weigh costs and benefits and 
made the EPA a rational environmental advocate. Administrator Browner led the EPA to 
expand the use of market incentives and cleaner production, to enlarge public-private 
partnerships, and to reach extensive public involvement in environmental decision-making 
while protecting the environment. She emphasized environmental protection at lower costs, 
and a new partnership between the regulated and the regulators. In an interview with 
FORTUNE, she said: ―We need to create incentives for plant managers in companies all 
across the country to look for ways to get the most pollution control for the least amount of 
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money. I need those guys working with me‖ (Dowd 102). 
     To enlarge public involvement in environmental decision-making, the EPA expanded the 
public‘s access to information about local pollution through steadily enhancing America‘s 
Right-to-Know. Firstly, the EPA doubled the number of chemicals that must be reported to 
communities, and issued a citizen Right-to-Know list of toxic chemicals. On August 3rd 
1993, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order 12856, Federal Compliance with 
Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements, to require polluters to disclose 
information to the public, and added toxic releases to the Right-to-Know. To strengthen this 
order, at the beginning of 1994, the EPA announced a new citizen Right-to-Know toxic 
substance list aimed at preventing chemical release accidents in the United States. It was the 
first time that the EPA had ever issued a final rule with chemical accident prevention (―EPA 
Administrator‖). Administrator Browner said: ―Like the recent announcement on doubling 
the size of the EPA‘s Toxics Release Inventory, today‘s rule signifies this Administration‘s 
commitment to putting people first… By providing citizens with a list of potential toxic 
dangers, it will empower communities to deal with risk in their environment‖ (Ibid.). 
Secondly, the EPA expanded the Right-to-Know about pollution in their neighborhoods 
through building an information center with an Internet website, which enabled Americans to 
easily obtain up-to-date, comprehensive, accurate environmental information about their 
communities simply by entering a zip code (―New EPA‖). Thirdly, the EPA extended a lead-
based paint Right-to-Know program to single-family home transactions to cooperate with the 
August 1995 Pollution Disclosure Executive Order requiring federal contractors to inform 
the public about pollution. It marked the first time that all home buyers and tenants had the 
right to know about potential lead-based paint hazards before they bought or rented older 
housing beginning on December 6, 1996 under a new EPA or Department of Housing and 
Urban Development program. The EPA even offered home buyers and renters a short 
pamphlet — ―Protect Your Family from Lead in Your Home‖ containing basic lead-
                                                                                                                                          Liu 177  
poisoning prevention tips (―Lead-Based‖). 
     Administrator Browner promoted new topics through focusing EPA programs further on 
concrete groups of people, typically the most vulnerable. The EPA organized its agenda to 
protect children on a national level from environmental risks, and to protect the interests of 
minority groups through expanding environmental justice. In 1995, the EPA established an 
agency-wide policy to ensure that environmental health risks to children were explicitly and 
consistently evaluated in risk assessments, risk characterizations, and environmental and 
public health standards. In 1996, this policy was strengthened by the national agenda to 
protect children‘s health from environmental threats to ensure a consistent improvement of 
risk assessments specifically addressing children (―EPA Leadership‖). On September 11th 
1996, the EPA released a report, Environmental Health Threats to Children, on how and why 
children were affected by environmental threats. In this report, the EPA recognized that 
environmental protection primarily derived to protect adults might prove insufficient to 
protect children who faced an array of complex environmental threats to their health, such as 
asthma-exacerbating air pollution, lead-based paint in older homes, treatment-resistant 
microbes in drinking water, and persistent chemicals that may cause cancer or induce 
reproductive or developmental changes (Collin 132).
 
Through emphasizing healthy children 
and strong families as fundamental to the future of the nation, the EPA made children‘s 
health issues both a top priority and a central focus of its efforts to protect public health and 
the environment (Ibid.). This report resulted in Executive Order 13045, Protection of 
Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks, on April 21st 1997. To help 
implement this order, Administrator Browner created an Office of Children‘s Health 
Protection at the EPA in 1997, to ―make the protection of children‘s health a fundamental 
goal of public health and environmental protection in the United States‖ (―Carol‖). The new 
office incorporated a Children‘s Health Protection Advisory Committee to make policy 
recommendations to the administration. In its first years, the office focused on issues like 
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asthma rates and exposure to toxic chemicals like lead-based paint (Ibid.). Administrator 
Browner said in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works 
in May 1997: ―We have prided ourselves on protecting the most vulnerable among us, 
especially our children, from the harmful effects of pollution‖ (Ibid.). 
     Besides protecting children from environmental risks, environmental justice became 
another focus of the EPA. It had been an important issue with environmental grassroots 
movements since the Reagan Administration, which mixed environmental protection with 
racism. Minority groups found that they were mostly living in polluted areas, and their 
homelands were easily polluted and uneasily cleaned up. Therefore, they concluded that they 
were being treated racially. Studies of air-quality demographic proved this finding. Among 
Americans breathing polluted air, 57 percent of whites resided in counties with federally 
substandard air quality, while 65 percent of blacks and 80 percent of Hispanics lived in 
counties with similar or worse conditions (Wernette and Nieves 16-17). Two examples also 
offered facts to support the finding. One was that African Americans made up 78.9 percent 
of the population of Emelle, Alabama, the site of the nation‘s largest hazardous waste 
landfills (R. Moore, ―Toxics‖). The other was that almost all the 10,000 citizens in Chicago‘s 
Altgeld Gardens were African Americans. Altgeld Garden was a typical example. Its night 
sky was lit by the vapor lamps of oil refineries, chemical plants, sewage treatment plants, 
steel mills, and smelters, which owned half a dozen incinerators and scattered over 100 
abandoned toxic dumps through the community (Grossman 31-33). These resulted in less 
than half of the residents being in good health; about half of the pregnancies in the families 
studied ended in miscarriages, birth defects, or sickly infants and about 25 percent of the 
children suffered from pulmonary diseases (Ibid.). Many facts proved that not all Americans 
had not been treated equally and poisoned equally, although created equal (Lavelle and 
Coyle 2). Marianne Lavelle and Marcia Coyle published a comprehensive analysis of all 
environmental lawsuits settled during the previous seven years in 1992 in the National Law 
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Journal in Washington. They found that ―penalties against pollution law violators in 
minority areas are lower than those imposed for violators in largely white areas‖ (Ibid.). The 
average penalty imposed by courts for violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act was $335,000 in white areas, and only $55,000 in minority areas (Ibid.). In addition, 
under the Superfund clean-up program, it took 20 percent longer to place abandoned 
hazardous-waste sites in minority communities on the National Priority list than those in 
white neighborhoods. The factor in such cases was clearly not poverty, but race (Ibid.). After 
conducting an analysis of every residential toxic-waste site in the Superfund program, 
Lavelle and Coyle also found that the EPA took much longer to address hazards in minority 
communities than it did in white communities. Even when cleanup was ordered, the EPA 
was likely to order a ―containment‖ procedure in minority areas and permanent ―treatment‖ 
in white areas (Ibid.) Lavelle and Coyle further studied 352 Clean Air Act cases and found 
that the populations benefiting from enforcement of the act were 78.7 percent white, 14.2 
percent black, and 8.2 percent Hispanic (Ibid.). 
     In response to public concerns, in 1992, the EPA under former Administrator Reilly, 
created the Office of Environmental Justice, and implemented a new organizational 
infrastructure to integrate environmental justice into EPA policies, programs, and activities 
(Collin 247). Administrator Carol Browner strengthened it, and listed environmental justice 
as one of the top priorities for the EPA by stating that: ―incorporating environmental justice 
into everyday activities and decisions will be a major undertaking. Fundamental reform will 
be needed in agency operations‖ (Davies and Mazurek 180). On September 30th 1993, the 
EPA established the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC), which 
included representatives from community-based groups, business and industry, academic and 
educational institutions, State and local governments, Tribal governments, indigenous 
organizations, non-governmental and environmental organizations. Through bringing these 
members together, the NEJAC solved environmental justice problems by creating dialogue 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 180  
and improving cooperation, and helped to devise an environmental justice strategy for the 
EPA (Ibid.). In addition, the NEJAC provided a valuable forum for integrating 
environmental justice with other EPA priorities and initiatives (Collin 247). In February 
1994, the Clinton Administration issued Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, which focused 
federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions of minority and low-
income communities, and assured that federal regulations did not have a disparate impact on 
minority and low-income groups (Lee A21). The EPA further emphasized the belief that ―all 
Americans deserve to be protected from pollution‖  (U.S. EPA, EPA’s Environmental 1). In 
April 1995, the EPA published its ―Environmental Justice Strategy‖ with two goals which 
mixed activism and regulatory caution. One goal was: ―No segment of the population, 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income, as a result of EPA policies, programs, 
and activities, suffers disproportionately from adverse human health or environmental effects, 
and all people live in clean, healthy, and sustainable communities‖ (Ibid.). It required the 
EPA to examine its internal administrative procedures, and to assure that its programs and 
policies contributed to environmental justices (Davies and Mazurek 180). The other goal was: 
―Those who live with environmental decisions — community residents, State, Tribal and 
local governments, environmental organizations, and businesses — must have every 
opportunity for public participation in the making of those decisions. ―An informed and 
involved community is a necessary and integral part of the process to protect the 
environment.‖ (U.S. EPA, EPA’s Environmental 102) It asked the EPA to increase public 
participation in environmental decision-making (Davies and Mazurek 180). To fulfill the 
responsibility of environmental justice, the EPA established numerous environmental pilot 
projects both at headquarters and in the regions, which ranged from research in risk 
communication strategies to explaining pollution risks to urban minority communities to 
projects that involved linking clean-ups at hazardous waste sites to minority hiring 
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requirements (Davies and Mazurek 181). Furthermore, the EPA promoted environmental 
justice in different ways. For instance, it developed different training programs for both the 
EPA and State regulatory officials, and established a small grants program in 1994 that 
offered $3 million to some 170 community-based or grassroots organizations and Tribal 
governments to help them in public outreach and to employ technical experts to analyze and 
interpret environmental data. The EPA further developed the Community or University 
partnership program to increase training and educational opportunities for local communities, 
and to develop collaboration models between universities and affected communities (Ibid.). 
Moreover, the EPA tried to integrate environmental justice into its policies, programs, and 
activities. It initiated a new internal infrastructure to work with the expanded Office of 
Environmental Justice. This new Office established an executive steering committee with the 
top management team from both media program offices like air, water, toxic, and the ten 
regional offices to ensure that environmental justice was incorporated into agency operations 
through having direct oversight of the EPA‘s operating plans, budget needs, and research 
direction (Gaylord and Bell 36). 
     As a problem-oriented administrative agency, the EPA tried to find problems and made 
rational decisions to deal with them. The incident in Pretty Prairie, Kansas, was one of them. 
Pretty Prairie, Kansas was a little town with a population of 600. It faced a financial crisis 
caused by an EPA requirement, which asked the little town to spend as much as $450,000 to 
build a new water-treatment plant or dig a new well in order to reduce nitrates in the water 
from twenty to ten parts per million, and lowering the risk of so-called blue-baby syndrome, 
a treatable blood condition affecting babies under six months. However, there were only four 
babies of that age in Pretty Prairie, and all were ―red-cheeked and cooing‖ (Dowd 98-99). 
One rational solution for the town was to buy the children bottled water. The EPA refused it. 
Then the town offered to buy all 600 residents bottled water. The EPA still wanted either a 
new water-treatment plant or a new well (Ibid.). These problems also included the incident 
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that happened at the Amoco refinery in Yorktown, Virginia. Amoco found that it could 
achieve a far greater reduction in benzene emissions through spending $6 million to improve 
the way it loaded gasoline into barges than by spending $30 million upgrading its waste-
water treatment system. But that route wasn‘t an option under existing laws because EPA 
regulations focused on sewage systems and ignored barges (Ibid.). 
     To solve these problems, on July 20th 1994 Administrator Browner announced the 
Common Sense Initiative, which was focused on a more cooperative, consensus-building 
approach to environmental regulation (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 135). It was 
―based on the principle that we best protect the environment by setting tough environmental 
goals, while encouraging flexibility and innovation in how the goals are met‖ (―Common‖). 
It built stakeholder panels, and involved diverse interests in a collaborative process through 
bringing together government officials at all levels, environmentalists and industry leaders to 
achieve greater environmental protection at a lower cost (Fiorino, New Environmental 131). 
It created pollution control and prevention strategies on an industry-by-industry basis rather 
than by the current pollutant-by-pollutant approach, and focused on results rather than ―one-
size-fits-all‖ regulations. Administrator Browner selected six industries to participate in the 
Common Sense Initiative, which included auto, computer and electronic, iron and steel, 
metal finishing and plating, petroleum refining, and printing manufacturers, employing 
almost four million Americans and representing almost fourteen percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (―Browner‖). By the end of 1998, the EPA‘s Common Sense Initiative set a 
partnership with more than 300 individuals from industry, State and local governments, 
environmental justice groups, and labor, and it served as a laboratory for testing new 
environmental management approaches, based on the needs of industry and other interest 
groups (―EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner receives‖). On December 17th, Vice-
President Gore‘s Hammer Award was presented to Administrator Browner for bringing 
Common Sense reform to environmental regulation. Gore said: ―This Common Sense 
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Initiative is reinventing government at its best… Together, government, industry and the 
private sector are finding new, more effective ways to protect our environment and our 
children‖ (Ibid.). Although the GAO under the Republican Congress found that the Initiative 
was not achieving its desired results in 1997 (S. Johnson 349), the GAO acknowledged the 
progress made by the EPA. The most important factor was that it provided useful 
experiences for the reinvention initiatives in the coming Clinton years (Fiorino, New 
Environmental 131). 
     The EPA further stimulated a number of voluntary government programs, which included 
Project XL from the Reinventing Environmental Regulation. Firms voluntarily participated 
in these programs for many reasons. Some firms wanted recognition from the government, 
and by extension, from others, such as investors, employees, insurers, and communities. 
Others desired positive relationships with regulators and the access to information and 
resources, and a public commitment, and thus to hold the firm or facility accountable for its 
performance (Fiorino, New Environmental 137-8).  
     Project XL was a consensus-based approach to prevent pollution and achieve climate 
change (Fiorino, New Environmental 133). It relied on four key elements: a site-specific 
approach, regulatory flexibility, achievement of ―superior environmental performance,‖ and 
the active involvement of stakeholders, including local communities and environmental 
organizations (Grimeaud 173). It aimed at providing more environmental and public health 
protection at a lower cost, and encouraging industry to achieve ―cleaner, smarter and 
cheaper‖ results and to explore innovative solutions to their environmental problems through 
offering regulated firms ―the flexibility to develop alternative strategies that will replace or 
modify specific regulatory requirements on the condition that they produce greater 
environmental benefit‖ (―Regulatory‖). Project XL was a ―consensus-based approach,‖ in 
which government and industry would work together to create a ―win-win‖ solution 
improving both the environment and the economy (Fiorino, New Environmental 140). 
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Regional Administrator John H. Hankinson, Jr. said: ―The EPA has found that allowing 
facilities and other entities to explore non-traditional pollution control solutions can result in 
the regulated community achieving environmental protection results beyond those 
anticipated by traditional means. We have also found that better environmental decisions 
result from a collaborative process with people working together‖ (―First XL‖). Because 
participation in Project XL was voluntary, it was carried out without specific statutory 
authority and thus enabled the government to respond to issues and try new ideas free from 
detailed legal prescriptions (Fiorino, New Environmental 133). 
     Project XL works as follows. The EPA requires the applicant (company from industry) to 
work with federal, State, and local authorities and citizens groups on a final project 
agreement. This project agreement defines the steps the company would take to improve its 
performance, the flexibility regulators would provide, the way to measure performance, and 
the expected environmental benefits that would be achieved. A company can implement the 
final project agreement following approval from the EPA and local stakeholders. Because 
these agreements would be challenged under the citizen suit provisions of environmental 
statutes, companies take it seriously (Fiorino, New Environmental 140-1). The EPA launched 
the first Project XL plan of its fifty pilot Project XL initiatives on July 12th 1996. By 
November 2000, more than 50 XL projects and XL project proposals on air, water, 
hazardous waste and multimedia had been produced throughout United States. Among them, 
sixteen projects had been in implementation for a year or more, covering various industry or 
public sectors, such as Air Force bases, specialty chemical manufacturing, printed wiring 
board manufacturing, semiconductor manufacturing, microelectronics manufacturing and 
pharmaceutical manufacturing. These projects were described in some detail, including 
background, progress in meeting commitments, benefits for the environment, benefits for 
stakeholders, benefits for the project sponsors, spin-off benefits, key issues needing 
resolution, lessons learned, and information resources. At that time another thirty-seven  
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projects had been under implementation for less than one year or still under development, 
covering industry or public sectors like industrial facilities, abandoned coal mines, bioreactor 
landfills and solid waste management facilities (U.S. EPA, Project XL Volume 2 16). By 
November 2000, the EPA‘s XL projects recycled 10,855 tons of solid waste, reused 1,846 
million gallons of water (see table 12) and explored more than 70 innovations (U.S. EPA, 
Project XL Volume 1 2). 
     The EPA‘s behaviors of saving energy, improving energy efficiency, and spreading 
economic incentives further demonstrated its rational characteristic. In 1991, the EPA 
created the first program to promote energy efficiency, the Green Lights Program, to 
improve lighting efficiency. Its participants were required to achieve a prescribed level of 
lighting energy efficiency. Through surveying all of their domestic facilities and upgrading 
their lighting, its participants typically cut their lighting bills in half while maintaining or 
improving lighting quality and increasing employee productivity. By June 1995, Green  
Lights had hundreds of partners, including forty percent of the Fortune 500 companies, and 
covered industries such as electric utilities, lighting manufacturers, and distributors (Rocky 
Mountain Institute 329). Based on the Green Lights Program, together with the DOE, the 
EPA established a series of Energy Star programs, which built a partnership with industry to 
promote the manufacture and purchase of energy-efficient products. The Energy Star 
Buildings Program helped commercial buildings attain additional energy savings (Ibid.).The 
Energy Star Computer Program helped the computer industry to promote the manufacture of 
energy-efficient personal computers, monitors and printers. On October 20th 1994, the EPA 
presented the first Energy Star Computer Awards in Washington, D.C. to twelve 
organizations in six States that had made outstanding voluntary efforts in manufacturing 
energy-efficient computers, monitors and printers, and educated the public on the benefits of 
energy-efficiency and pollution prevention. By the year 2000, participation had increased 
from 150 participants to more than 500, accounting for about eighty-five percent of the U.S. 
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Table 12 
Selected Cumulative Environmental Benefits*000 
 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Office of the Administrator. Project XL 2000 
Comprehensive Report—Volume 1:   Directory of Regulatory, Policy, and Technology Innovations (EPA-R-
00-023A). Washington: GPO, 2000. 12. Print. 
* This summary is based on results reported by Crompton Sisterville (formerly Witco), Intel, Molex, 
Vandenberg AFB, and Weyerhaeuser. 
** Eliminations in emissions are calculated by subtracting reported actual emissions from established 
baselines for the environmental parameters for each project. 
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sales of desktop computers and ninety percent of the laser printer market (―EPA Presents‖).  
     In addition, the EPA under Browner developed its market-based economic incentives 
keeping to the rule: ―the more an enterprise pollutes, the more it pays‖ (Whitaker 73). In 
1995, the EPA extended the option of reducing acid rain by trading pollution credits to all 
industrial fossil fuel-burning sources, and later revitalized open-market trading to enable the 
spreading of emissions trading.  
     Because human behaviors like burning fossil fuels caused more and more acid rain, which 
particularly damages lakes, streams, forests, plants and animals, the EPA used a Cap-and-
Trade system to reduce the emission of sulfur dioxide (SO2). The Cap-and-Trade emission 
trading provided an incentive for those that could easily reduce emissions most cheaply to do 
so, and reached the goal of achieving pollution reduction at the lowest possible cost to 
society (Montgomery 396). Trading pollution credits under the Cap-and-Trade could be 
generated through pollution control in excess of regulatory requirements, and plant shut-
downs. Following the rule ―the buyer was paying a charge for polluting, while the seller was 
being rewarded for having reduced emissions by more than was needed‖ (Ibid.), companies 
that needed to increase their emission allowance must buy credits from those who polluted 
less. The trading unit of the Cap-and-Trade was counted in terms of the quantity (x tons) of 
emissions reduced, and the credits could be used in the same year, or banked for use in future 
years. However, some proportion (usually ten percent) of credits must be retired if they were 
banked for use in future years. Thus emission trading resulted in a net decrease in emissions. 
There was a range of purposes for purchasing credits, such as offsets for new or modified 
sources, to allow operational flexibility (by permitting temporary pollution spikes), or as an 
alternative route to compliance with permit limits (OECD, Implementing 54).  
     Because the Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) is required on existing 
sources in areas that are not meeting national ambient air quality standards, and certain State-
level requirements were more stringent than those of the EPA, the agency encouraged the 
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development of open-market trading in the mid-1990s. The EPA also published an Open 
Market Trading Rule (OMTR) to improve company flexibility in reducing emissions of SO2, 
NO2, Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), carbon monoxide, Particulate Matter (PM), or 
Reactive Organic Gases (ROG) through the exchange and banking of emission-reduction 
credits (OECD, Implementing 54). The OMTR program did not require establishment of an 
emissions baseline (a time-consuming and very contentious process) or an emissions cap, but 
allowed a facility to reduce emissions by whatever means feasible to create emission-
reduction credits expressed in terms of tons of emissions (Erbes 160). Credits could also be 
generated through pollution control in excess of regulatory requirements, and plant shut-
downs and could be sold to other facilities to use as needed to meet other emission limits 
(Ibid.). Because purchased credits could be used for a range of purposes, including offsets for 
new or modified sources, to allow operational flexibility, or as an alternative route to 
compliance with permit limits, it took full advantage of natural market forces (OECD, 
Implementing 54). 
     As a rational advocate, the EPA further promoted cleaner production. Unlike the 
traditional ―end-of-pipe‖ Command-and-Control, which tried to reduce pollutants or curb 
pollution emissions at the end of the production process, the cleaner production prevented 
pollution through reducing generation of pollutants at the source by using cleaner products 
and production methods. Firstly, the EPA stimulated the development of cleaner products 
through emphasizing recycling, using cleaner technologies and improving production process 
with better design, better controls, material substitution, lifecycle analysis and product 
stewardship (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 235). The EPA was required by 
Executive Order 12873 in 1993, Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention, and 
Executive Order 13101 in 1998, Greening the Government through Waste Prevention, 
Recycling, and Federal Acquisition, to incorporate waste prevention and recycling into its 
daily operations and to work to increase and expand markets for recovered materials. The 
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EPA, together with the DOE, promoted the clean production of refrigerators. They 
encouraged refrigerator manufacturers to build new, chlorofluorocarbon-free, super-efficient 
models by offering manufacturers a guaranteed market and making up price difference with 
the conventional ones that exceeded energy performance standards. This program was further 
expanded to other industries to accelerate the commercialization of advanced, energy-
efficient technologies through partnerships with key market players (―Energy‖). The EPA 
also spread industry ecology that included technological innovation, voluntary and 
cooperative approaches to environmental management, substitution of services for products, 
and recycling and reuse (V. Thomas et al. 6). Secondly, the EPA further encouraged cleaner 
production. One good example was renewable energy. In 1994, the Clinton Administration 
signed Executive Order 12902, Energy Efficiency and Water Conservation at Federal 
Facilities, to formally define the administration‘s ―green energy sources.‖ The Order cited 
renewable energy sources as ―agriculture and urban waste, geothermal energy, solar energy, 
and wind energy‖ (Clinton, ―Executive Order 12902‖ 11463), and instructed the federal 
government to ―begin implementing cost-effective recommendations for the installation of 
energy efficiency, water conservation, and renewable energy technologies‖ for most federal 
facilities (Clinton, ―Executive Order 12902‖ 11463). The Clinton Administration further 
accelerated the development of renewable energy through rewarding the pioneers in the field, 
and building partnerships with companies to develop more powerful wind turbines. For 
instance, Central and South West Services, Inc. was awarded $1 million by the Department 
of Energy (DOE) for a wind turbine plant near Fort Davis, Texas in 1994. Two years later, 
this company hired Zond Energy Systems to install twelve wind turbines. In 1998, the DOE 
began developing a wind power technology facility in Storm Lake, Iowa with Zond Energy 
Systems, and one year later announced the ―public-private partnership‖ with Zond Energy 
Systems (Morano). On June 3rd 1999, the Clinton Administration signed Executive Order 
13123, Greening the Government through Efficient Energy Management to reinforce 
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Executive Order 12902. Sec.403. (4) (h), Off-Grid Generation, stipulated that federal 
agencies ―shall use off-grid generation systems, including solar hot water, solar electric, solar 
outdoor lighting, small wind turbines, fuel cells, and other off-grid alternatives, where such 
systems are lifecycle cost-effective and offer benefits including energy efficiency, pollution 
prevention, source energy reductions, avoided infrastructure costs, or expedited service‖ 
(Clinton, ―Executive Order 13123‖ 30856). Thus, the EPA, together with the DOE, expanded 
the Energy Star program to office buildings, hospitals, homes, and over thirty categories of 
Energy Star products. This was also good preparation for the EPA‘s Green Power 
Partnership in 2001, which encouraged private and public organizations to buy green power. 
     The EPA also boosted the use of renewable ethanol as an alternative fuel, mainly because 
ethanol as a substitute energy source could enhance U.S. energy security and boost economic 
growth. In the late 1970s, two main fuel additives existed. One was Methyl Tertiary-Butyl 
Ether (MTBE) that had been used for oxygenating gasoline. It was a cheaper, non-renewable 
substance as it was derived from fossil fuels, and was linked to groundwater and soil 
contamination. The other was ethanol. As a renewable corn-based gasoline substitute, 
ethanol not only reduced the demand of fossil fuels, but also enhanced the fuel performance 
because it raised the level of oxygen in gasoline when used as a blended fuel. In June 1994, 
the EPA issued a proposed rule to ensure a market for ethanol, requiring that at least thirty 
percent of gasoline contain a ―renewable oxygenate‖ by 1996 (Vogel, ―Trouble‖ 115). This 
action was strongly favored by the Clinton Administration. It was not only because the 
biggest ethanol producer, Archer Daniels Midland Corporation, spent a fortune donating to 
the Democrat Party and on lobbying Capitol Hill over the past twenty years (S. Moore), but 
also because it could reduce dependence on imported oil, and boost economic growth. The 
political economy of ethanol lies in farm welfare and job creation. Farm income increased 
due to annual ethanol subsidies of $770 million, and farmers benefited from increasing corn 
prices raised by increasing demand for ethanol (Vogel, ―Trouble‖ 116-117). Accompanied 
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by protecting ethanol domestic producers through imposing a prohibitive tariff on ethanol 
imports, jobs were created by promoting greater production of ethanol due to rising demand. 
To better protect air and drinking water, the EPA announced actions to significantly reduce 
or eliminate the use of the fuel additive MTBE, and boost the use of safe alternatives like 
ethanol on March 20th 2000 (―Clinton-Gore‖). The indirect effect of ethanol replacing 
MTBE, and reducing fossil fuel consumption helped protect drinking water and soil and 
reduce air pollution. However, whether ethanol itself preserved clean-air benefits was not 
proved. The GAO said in 1997: ―Available evidence suggests that the ethanol program has 
little effect on the environment,‖ and getting rid of ethanol subsidies would ―slightly increase 
carbon monoxide emissions… but slightly reduce emissions of ozone precursors,‖ and 
―change in greenhouse gas emissions that would occur if ethanol fuel were not subsidized is 
likely to be minimal‖ (S. Moore). Indeed, expanding the use of ethanol in gasoline was 
mainly a strategy for the EPA to help the Clinton Administration reduce fossil fuel 
consumption and create jobs. 
     EPA initiatives under Administrator Browner still made great progress in public health 
and ecology through strengthening existing regulations and regulation enforcement. For 
instance, on protecting drinking water, the EPA not only played a key role in enacting rules 
to strengthen the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1996, which overhauled public water system 
standards, but also worked feverishly with environmental organizations and farm worker 
unions to produce new regulations in January 2001, to require substantially lower quantities 
of arsenic (a naturally occurring substance) in drinking water (Olson 89). On protecting air, 
the EPA set a final rule: to reduce, by almost ninety percent, toxic air emissions from the 
chemical industry and another final rule for electric utility power plants to reduce acid rain 
on March 1st 1994 (―EPA Announces‖). The EPA further protected the ozone layer in 1993, 
through phasing out products like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that deplete ozone, and 
issuing tighter ambient air quality standards for ozone and small particulate matter, thus 
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indirectly protecting children, the elderly, asthmatics, and other vulnerable population groups 
against lung disease. Besides cleaning air and water, in March 1997, the EPA also issued a 
comprehensive, detailed plan for implementing the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) 
that included sweeping new food safety protection and required major changes in how 
pesticides were regulated, with the goal of improving environmental and public health 
protection, especially for children (Collin 343). Moreover, the EPA banned two pesticides 
that studies found to disrupt brain development in children in 1999. The EPA further showed 
its interest in performance-based regulation in July 1999 in its Aiming for Excellence report. 
In June 2000, the EPA launched its National Environmental Performance Track, which was 
the final reinvention initiative of Administrator Browner, and left a legacy that carried over 
into the next Administration (Fiorino, New Environmental 145). 
3.5.7. Congress, Court and the EPA 
     In 1993, Democrats had single-party control of Congress and the presidency. Although 
the EPA budget was increased to its highest ever levels from 1993 to 1997, the single 
Democrat government proposed to leave environmental issues untouched. Congress reduced 
its interest in pollution control from 1993 to 1994. For instance, in air pollution control, the 
intensity of law setting was notably lower than in the 1980s. The high number of bill 
introductions and committee hearings were just marginal adjustments of the existing 
environmental laws (C. Bailey 249). With the exception of the Desert Protection Act, not a 
single piece of significant environmental legislation was signed into law. This was as a result 
of the absence of conflict on environmental issues between Congress and the Administration, 
and a loose but powerful coalition of business leaders who lobbied excessive regulation. This 
was also due to sensible economics dominating the Clinton Administration and Congress, 
and State and local government officials who were tired of taking concrete measures when 
Washington issued new clean-up calls, and the fact that more and more farmers, ranchers, 
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and other landowners became angry about environmental laws increasingly eroding private 
property rights (Stinebrickner 224). In spring 1993, despite strong opposition from the green 
lobby, the Clinton Administration and Democratic Congress passed, with a final vote of 95 to 
three, an amendment that required risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis on all major new 
environmental rules (Ibid.). Sound science and sensible economics became Congress‘ focus 
in making new rules. Representative Billy Tauzin (D-Louisiana) stated: ―We can no longer 
ignore the costs government imposes when it regulates. The heartbeat of this movement is a 
call for restraint and responsibility as the cornerstone of our nation‘s regulatory system‖ 
(Ibid.). Therefore, a majority of members in both the House and the Senate were supporting 
―no money, no mandate‖ legislation (Dowd 99).  
     The Republican takeover of both the Senate and the House in the November 1994 mid-
term elections changed this pattern of interest and conflicts on environmental issues occurred 
again. Congress began to limit the EPA‘s ability to enforce the law, and introduce new bills. 
It also repealed parts of the Clean Air Act to remove federal rules, and strengthened 
regulatory review to require extensive cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for major 
regulations and even cut the EPA‘s budget (C. Bailey 249). 
     Congress further reformed the general regulatory process by intensifying regulatory 
review and intervening in it. In 1996, it passed the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
and Fairness Act, which provided for congressional review of ―major rules‖ from federal 
agencies‘ regulations. ―Major rules‖ involving annual costs of $100 million or more on the 
economy, industry, government, consumers, or those affecting competition, productivity, or 
international trade could not take effect until congressional review was complete. Congress 
has sixty days from the publication of the final rule in the Federal Register to review and 
stop the implementation (Weidenbaum 24-25). In addition, the Center for Regulatory 
Effectiveness (CRE) was founded in 1996, at the request of the House and the Senate 
leadership, to aid the implementation of the Congressional Review Act. The CRE presented 
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its proposals to the general public, to the regulated industry, and to interest groups on its 
website, refined its proposal through considerable discussion, and handed findings and 
conclusions over to Congress (Tozzi). 
     Congress still tried to pick apart federal rules through introducing new bills, including 
repealing some portions of the Clean Air Act, making moves to increase logging on public 
lands, and scaling back rules on pesticides in foods (―Carol‖). Bills on the Clean Air Act in 
the 104th Congress (1995-96) provided a good example. More than thirty-two bills were 
introduced in the House to extend deadlines, exempt particular industries, introduce greater 
flexibility, or repeal portions of the Clean Air Act, while only two bills were introduced in 
the House to strengthen the Act. Twelve bills, introduced in the Senate to amend the Clean 
Air Act, covered similar ground, but none went as far as to recommend repeal (C. Bailey 
258). Senator Fairchild introduced a bill to undermine EPA efforts to control hazardous air 
pollutants. The bill allowed States to opt out of the federal permit system which required all 
pollution sources to keep information about emission levels and compliance records in one 
document, and eliminate automobile emissions and maintenance programs (C. Bailey 259). 
Fortunately, while many of these bills passed the House, they encountered strong opposition 
in the Senate. 
     Republican leaders also sought to dismantle the EPA through budget cuts and riders. The 
House Appropriations Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs-Housing and Urban Development 
(VA-HUD) chaired by Rep. Jerry Lewis (R. CA) reported the FY 1996 appropriations bill on 
July 10th 1995, which not only proposed to reduce the EPA‘s budget by thirty-three percent, 
but also contained seventeen riders that restricted the EPA‘s authority to implement a variety 
of environmental laws. The bill was approved on July 18th 1995 by both the House 
Appropriations Committee and the House. On September 26th 1995, the Senate‘s version of 
FY 1996 VA-HUD Appropriations Bill passed in the Chamber. It was slightly less extreme 
than the House-passed bill, and proposed to cut the EPA‘s budget by twenty-two percent and 
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contained seven riders which reduced the EPA‘s authority. Later, in a conference committee, 
the Senate and the House reached a compromise on the bill, proposed cuts of twenty-five 
percent in the EPA budget, and included eleven environmental riders. Four of these riders 
specifically limited the EPA‘s authority to enforce sections of the Clean Air Act 1990 (C. 
Bailey 261-262). President Clinton vetoed the final version of the bill on December 18th 
1995, and claimed that the bill ―would threaten public health and the environment‖ (Clinton, 
―Message‖ 1901). Administrator Browner complained about her years working with 
President Clinton, Vice-President Gore and a Republican Congress: ―I think one of the most 
difficult moments for the agency was when the Republican leadership in Congress literally 
shut us down, wouldn‘t give us our funding, tried to limit our ability to enforce the law, you 
know, not once, not twice, but I think 17 times. Those were some difficult days, not just for 
the EPA, but I think for the entire country. And thankfully, we had a Vice-President who said 
no, who was prepared to veto bills‖ (Romero). In addition, an EPA budget of $7.7 billion 
was proposed by President Clinton in FY 1998, while $7.4 billion was approved by Congress. 
Similarly, The FY 1999 budget sought $7.8 billion for the EPA; Congress approved $7.6 
billion (U.S. Cong. CRS, Environmental 16). 
     In response to Congress, the Clinton Administration accepted a need for change and took 
reinventing environmental regulation initiatives as ―Streamlining Environmental Regulation‖ 
on March 16th 1995 (Kurian 208). Congress had also sent clear signals that it expected the 
EPA to change the way it implemented environmental statutes to reduce the regulatory 
burden on businesses and property owners since 1995, because the EPA had implemented 
several initiatives and few of them were consistent with congressional directives (Eisner, 
Worsham, and Ringquist 166). However, in 1997, the EPA continually announced new 
tighter regulations for the amount of ozone and small particulate matter (PM) that States 
could have in their atmosphere. The agency claimed that the revised standards would result 
in 1.5 million fewer annual cases of significant breathing problems from ozone and 15,000 
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fewer deaths each year from particulate air pollution (Judis 16). Whilst opponents argued that 
air quality was better than at any time in the last thirty years, and feared the burdens these 
regulations could place upon industry. Republicans claimed that the new regulations were 
not scientifically justified, and introduced legislation requiring the EPA to establish scientific 
certainty before issuing new regulations. Even congressional Democrats and traditional 
Democratic constituents (labor unions and big-city mayors) opposed the new regulations 
(Eisner, Worsham, and Ringquist 166). Furthermore, the EPA took few congressional 
directives into consideration in the 1997 global warming conference in Kyoto, Japan. At the 
conference, EPA officials played a prominent role in the U.S. delegation, and the Clinton 
Administration pledged that the United States would reduce its emissions of greenhouse 
gases by seven percent below 1990 levels by 2012, a fifteen percent reduction from current 
levels, and a forty percent reduction from projected levels for 2012 (Eisner, Worsham, and 
Ringquist 166-167).  
     Courts had been pushed back to a moderate position on the environment by President 
Clinton‘s appointment of two Justices to the Supreme Court and several judges to Courts of 
Appeal and to District Courts. The EPA had achieved a record in enforcement actions in 
1999. It referred 403 civil cases to the DOJ and 241 criminal cases for prosecution. It also 
filed 3,935 civil and administrative actions, assessed $52 million in criminal fines and $167 
million in civil penalties (Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 137). The EPA imposed 
the largest civil penalty ever, a $30 million fine, on a single pipeline operator, Koch 
Industries, for ―egregious violations of the Clean Water Act‖ (Ibid.). The new phenomenon 
was that the court‘s oversight of administrative regulatory decisions abandoned the 
traditional deference to bureaucratic expertise, and was promoted to question both the 
process and the substance of administrative activities (Weissert 219). The case American 
Trucking Associations Inc. v. EPA provided a good example. After the EPA announced 
tighter regulations for the amount of ozone and small particulate matter, Congress tried to 
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stop them with the rights written in the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness 
Act of 1996. But Congress failed to strike them down within sixty days. Together with the 
lobbyists of K Street, the American Trucking Associations Inc. sued the EPA to overturn the 
standards, because its diesel trucks would be directly affected by them. The lobbyists from K 
Street were against the standards on behalf of automobile companies, steel producers, mining 
and oil companies, utility companies, and other affected industries. They asserted that the 
costs of compliance exceeded the benefits to public health, and the Clean Air Act stipulated 
that the EPA can only consider what is requisite to protect public health. They also 
introduced an argument developed by the Cato Institute, the think tank funded by 
corporations that oppose government regulation. Citing the Supreme Court‘s 1935 ruling in 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, in which the Court overturned the National 
Industrial Recovery Act partly on the grounds that Congress‘ delegation of power was far too 
sweeping, the Cato Institute argued that Congress was violating Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution, which vested ―all legislative powers‖ in the Congress itself, by granting the 
EPA the authority to set specific rules about environmental standards. Two corporate 
lobbyists, C. Boyden Gray, and Alan Charles Raul, were also involved in the case and argued 
that the EPA had failed to scientifically prove that new standards were needed to protect 
public health (Judis 17). On May 14th 1999, the three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit with two Reagan appointees sided with the petitioners 
and found that the EPA was violating the delegation of power by stating: ―Although the 
factors the EPA uses in determining the degree of public health concern associated with the 
different levels of ozone and PM are reasonable, the EPA appears to have articulated no 
‗intelligible principle‘ to channel its application of these factors; nor is one apparent from the 
statute. …[W]hat the EPA lacks is any determinate criterion for drawing lines. It has failed to 
state intelligibly how much is too much‖ (Tietenberg 269). However, the Supreme Court 
reversed the holding of the Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit that the 
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EPA‘s interpretation of the CAA resulted in an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
powers to the EPA through the case Whitman v. American Trucking Associations on 
February 27th 2001. A unanimous Supreme Court ruled that the way the federal government 
set clean-air standards is constitutional, rejecting industry arguments that the EPA must 
balance compliance costs against the health benefits of cleaner air, and thus upheld the 
authority of the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), without regard 
to cost or disability, in order to protect public health from air pollution, and removed any 
legal constrains that might prevent the EPA from issuing standards that were unattainable 
(Lutter, ―Head‖). 
3.5.8. Interest Groups and the EPA 
     At the beginning of the Clinton Administration, mainstream environmental organizations 
in particular suffered serious financial and membership losses, such as the Sierra Club whose 
membership dropped from 630,000 to 500,000 between 1990 and 1994. Whilst grassroots 
movement had been growing rapidly, fighting for environmental justice, mainstream 
environmental organizations still participated in governmental decision-making through 
public education, collection and dissemination of scientific information, lobbying of public 
officials, and litigation. At local, regional and State levels, these groups had shifted ―from an 
earlier adversarial style to one characterized much more by cooperation, collaboration, and 
professionalism‖ (Kraft, ―Influence‖ 147). Several leading environmental organizations, 
particularly the Sierra Club, and the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), still placed 
considerable importance on campaign contributions and candidate endorsements in election 
campaigns. In 1996 and 1998, the Sierra Club spent as much as $7 million on voter education, 
issue-advocacy advertisements, and direct support for the candidates (Kraft, 
―Environmental‖ 52). Environmental lobbying, however, had been fading, although they had 
a larger number of lobbyists than before (Dowie 192). The reason was that money played a 
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very important role in making environmental decisions. The energy and natural resource 
industries and corporate Political Action Committees (PACs) made much higher 
contributions to congressional candidates than pro-environmental organizations. In 1992, 
pro-environmental organizations contributed about $1.3 million to congressional candidates, 
while the energy and natural resource industries alone gave almost $22 million (Dowie 193) 
and all business PACs contributed $295.4 million (Dowie 280 note 23). An environmental 
lobbyist said: ―The most I can offer a congressional representative is $10,000 — $5,000 for 
the primary and $5,000 for the general election. That seems like a lot until you consider that 
the guy coming in after me from the Chemical Manufacturers Association has a hundred 
companies behind him, each with their own PAC that can offer $10,000 a piece. I‘m out-
gunned‖ (Dowie 193). Some changes occurred in environmental organizations during the 
Clinton Administration. For example, some organizations like the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) distinguished itself from other groups by supporting regulatory market 
incentives such as tradable permits for acid rain control (Stavins 16). In 1996, 
environmentalists formed a national Green Party to challenge the two-party system, in order 
to push through needed environmental change. The party first gained widespread public 
attention during Ralph Nader‘s presidential runs in 1996 and 2000. In 2000, Green Party 
candidate Ralph Nader received 2,882,955 votes, or 2.7 percent of the popular vote (Cook, 
Jr.). 
     As the non-mainstream grassroots environmental organizations had been developing into 
a national political force, fighting for environmental justice, business groups constituted a 
genuine environmental ―backlash,‖ through supporting some public relations groups and 
think tanks. Various topics were involved, for instance: ―The economic costs that 
environmental regulation imposes on both the private and public sectors were crippling to the 
economy and taxpayers and disproportionate to the benefits it promotes; and environmental 
concerns were most effectively and economically addressed by laissez-faire government and 
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a free market economy‖ (N. Miller 117-118). One of these public relations groups and think 
tanks was the ―Wise Use‖ group, a loose coalition of around 400 small groups of ranchers, 
representatives of extractive industries, property rights activists, off-road vehicle 
recreationists, farmers, and right-wing ideologues (N. Miller 118). The name ―Wise Use‖ 
came from the ―wise use‖ idea of the former chief of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot, 
to describe responsible conservation, the balancing of preservation and the profitable use of 
land in a manner that accomplishes all. The group enlisted the substantial support of 
corporations such as Chevron, Exxon, and the American Farm Bureau, as well as the help of 
national lobbies of the extractive industries. It was intent on promoting the expansion of 
private property rights and the reduction of government regulation of publicly-held property. 
For instance, repealing the Endangered Species Act, opposing repeal of the 1972 Mining Act, 
and generally opening up federal lands to development. The Wise Use group had spread 
throughout much of the United States since the late 1980s, and had challenged the 
constitutional validity of government regulation during the Clinton Administration (Ibid.). 
Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), and the Cato Institute (The CSE was founded by 
David and Charles Koch. Charles Koch also co-founded the Cato Institute.), were two typical 
members of the Wise Use group. The CSE was almost totally supported by corporations. For 
instance, eighty-five percent of its 1998 revenues of $16.2 million was generated from Koch 
Industries as well as other corporations, including U.S. West and Philip Morris. In order to 
inform the public that ―environmental conservation requires a commonsense approach that 
limits the scope of government,‖ acid rain was a ―so-called threat [that] is largely non-
existent,‖ and global warming was ―a verdict in search of evidence,‖ the CSE spent $17 
million on producing more than 130 policy papers, delivering them to every single 
congressional office, sending out thousands of pieces of mail, and getting their viewpoints 
published in more than 4,000 news articles around the nation in 1995 (C. Moore 56). CSE 
representatives also appeared on hundreds of radio and television shows and published 235 
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op-ed (opposite the editorial page) articles (Ibid.). As the Clinton Administration‘s 1993 
proposal for an energy tax was designed to curb consumption of imported oil and gasoline, 
Senator David Boren (D-Okla.) was hammered on radio and television as well as in print, 
and then opposed the Clinton tax (Ibid.). In the end, the legislation was defeated with the 
help of a massive press and public relations campaign mounted by the CSE. Besides 
influencing public opinion, the Wise Use group affected the judiciary. The Cato Institute 
actively took part in the case American Trucking Associations Inc. v. EPA, which, in 1999, 
successfully overturned the air standards of 1997 for the amount of ozone and small soot 
particles set by the EPA. 
     The Clinton Administration tried to reduce the conflicts on environmental regulation 
among the EPA, business and environmental organizations. It initiated the Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation to search for ways to protect the environment at low cost by 
approaching market incentives and building collaborative stakeholder partnerships among 
the EPA, business and environmental organizations, and communities. As a result, 
cooperation and collaboration between business groups and the government increased 
(Kamieniecki 31). The EPA launched a number of voluntary government programs to 
encourage companies to join the cleaner production movement. The Energy Star program 
certified energy-efficient appliances, electronic equipment, personal computers and computer 
equipment, and many other products, and achieved considerable energy and cost savings 
(Press and Mazmanian 282-283). Project XL began in November 1995, to support industry in 
seeking cleaner, more cost-effective environmental management strategies through 
rewarding superior corporate environmental performers with greater statutory and regulatory 
flexibility. The EPA tried to develop integrated, comprehensive strategies for protecting air 
and water quality and land through employing the Common Sense Initiative to move 
environmental protection beyond the traditional Command-and-Control, pollutant-by-
pollutant approach to a new industrial sector-by-sector approach (Kamieniecki 32). In 
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addition, media like daily newspapers, mass-circulation magazines, and industry publications 
advertised that ―green‖ was practical and profitable. Even Science published the article 
―Environment and the Economy‖ in its June 25th 1993 issue with an extensive, multi-part 
section (N. Miller 112).  
     As the principal target of environmental regulation, business groups faced a strong EPA 
supported by Vice-President Gore. They were forced not only to adopt corporate codes of 
conduct, and undertake a systematic advertising campaign highlighting ―green‖ products and 
―green‖ imagery, but also shifted to work jointly with, and often fund, environmental 
advocacy groups and even improve their environmental management practices (N. Miller 
127). Corporate social responsibility and sustainable development had been steadily adopted 
by both the government and firms. It concentrated on a ―win-win‖ solution that realized 
substantial cost savings, and pollution reductions with the increasing cooperation in the form 
of partnerships and stakeholders (Ehrenfeld 228). As a result, business groups‘ cooperative 
agreements with environmental advocacy groups were expanded during the Clinton 
Administration. For instance, the Rainforest Action Network urged Home Depot to phase out 
the sale of wood products from environmentally sensitive areas by 2002, and ―certified‖ 
wood as the product of environmentally sound logging practices. Another example came 
from a major fish marketer, Unilever. Together with the World Wildlife Fund, Unilever 
created a Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) in 1997, which rewarded sustainable fishing 
practices with an eco-label and fishery certification program. Fish with the blue MSC eco-
label indicated that the fishery did not contribute to the environmental problem of 
overfishing (N. Miller 123). These agreements were ―win-win.‖ Environmental organizations 
made these programs reliable, and won public support through protecting the environment, 
whilst business groups funded them and profited from associations with environmental 
organizations. Industry had also taken initiatives, such as developing voluntary programs to 
improve its environmental management practices. For instance, the Chemical Manufacturers 
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Association instituted the Responsible Care program, to quiet criticism of their industry, by 
improving the environmental, health, and safety performance record of their members. The 
Responsible Care program contained a variety of elements from community education and 
emergency response to pollution prevention, process safety, and employee health (N. Miller 
115). During the 1990s, the core functions of the environmental health and safety field were 
becoming institutionalized in most firms, and a professional environmental culture was 
emerging with the addition of staff with specialized environmental education and training. 
Company environmental managers were now directly engaging with environmental 
organizations, business associations and other corporations (Jamsion 5). 
     During the eight-year Clinton Administration, the EPA functioned as a rational advocate 
for protecting the environment and set the precedent for the future EPA. The Clinton 
Administration sustained economic growth while protecting the environment. Under 
Administrator Browner, the EPA not only effectively protected the environment, for instance, 
through promoting the protection of ecosystems, fighting for the depleting ozone layer and 
global warming and giving higher priority to the protection of children and environmental 
justice, but also made rational choices to eliminate red tape by reducing paperwork, creating 
jobs and realizing greater and cheaper pollution control by promoting the use of market 
incentives and public-private partnerships. By the late 1990s, clear evidence of progress was 
that the levels of many pervasive air pollutants had declined, and major water bodies were far 
cleaner than they had been in the 1960s. Public awareness of the need to protect the 
environment also strongly increased (Kurian 208). 
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4 
Case Study: Automobile Emissions 
     By the 1960s, automobiles had become popular in the United States due to the world‘s 
cheapest gasoline and the advantages the automobile brought to Americans, such as freedom 
from space constraints and an elevation of personal social status. As a result, the personal 
automobile became the single greatest polluter in numerous cities (U.S. EPA, Automobile 
Emissions 1). Auto emissions in major urban areas contributed thirty to sixty percent of main 
air pollutants, resulting in such diseases as cancer, bronchitis, pneumonia, emphysema, 
asthma, and the common cold. In the 1960s, it was estimated that the health effects of auto 
emissions cost the U.S. $680 million annually in health care, lost productivity, and premature 
death (Opie 457). 
4.1. What are Automobile Emissions? 
     The combustion process of fuel in an engine produced both the power to move a car and 
the air pollutants. The main air pollutants included hydrocarbon (HC) emissions, nitrogen 
oxides (NO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and carbon dioxide (CO2). Both fuel evaporation and 
fuel burning partially in the engine resulted in hydrocarbon emissions. Various nitrogen 
oxides (NO2) formed in the engine under high pressure and temperature. Carbon monoxide 
(CO) resulted when carbon in the fuel was partially oxidized in combustion process of fuel, 
while carbon dioxide (CO2) resulted when carbon in the fuel was fully oxidized in the fuel 
combustion process. In addition, evaporation of the fuel itself also produced air pollutants 
(see figure 10). Hydrocarbons reacted with nitrogen oxides and sunlight, and thus formed 
ground-level ozone (a major component of smog). Ozone irritated the eyes, damaged the 
lungs, aggravated respiratory problems, and even caused cancer. Nitrogen oxides (NO2) 
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contributed to both the formation of ozone and acid rain. Carbon monoxide (CO) was 
particularly dangerous to persons with heart disease because it reduced the inward flow of 
oxygen. Carbon dioxide did not directly impair human health, but it was a kid of 
―greenhouse gas,‖ which caused global warming (U.S. EPA, Automobiles and Carbon 1-4). 
4.2. The EPA Role in Controlling Automobile Emissions  
      The EPA‘s auto emissions control covered different activities, such as making 
regulations and setting standards, conducting Compliance Programs with Certification, 
Inspections or Investigations of the manufacturers‘ certification records and facilities, 
imports (supports certification by preventing the entry of uncertified vehicles into the United 
States), Selective Enforcement Auditing (identifies a number of production models for 
assembly line testing throughout a given model year) (―U.S. Environmental‖). The history of 
auto emissions control is a vivid portrayal of the EPA‘s role in protecting the U.S. federal 
environment. The variance and changing intensity of auto emissions regulation from the EPA 
proved the agency to be a single-minded advocate during the Nixon-Ford Administration, a 
deregulator of environmental regulation at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, and a 
rational advocate during the Clinton Administration, and reflected the EPA as an end product 
of balancing science, law, economics, politics and social needs. 
      From 1970 to 1973, the EPA worked as a single-minded advocate. It established and 
maintained stringent standards against auto emissions. The CAA Amendment of 1970 
required the EPA to set pollution emission standards to protect public health. This Act gave 
specific instructions on the regulated pollutants, and set the date of meeting the standards in 
terms of vehicle or engine model years (―Ibid.‖). This Act also called for a ninety percent 
reduction in both hydrocarbon (HC) and carbon monoxide (CO) emissions beginning with 
automobiles from the year 1975, a 0.41 gram per mile HC standard and a 3.4 gram per mile 
CO standard were required to be met by new cars since 1975, and NO2 emissions must be  
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Figure 10. Sources of Auto Emissions 
 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Automobile Emissions: An Overview (EPA 400-F-92-
007). Washington, D.C.: U.S. EPA, Office of Mobile Sources, August 1994. 1. Print. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Basic Controls for Exhaust and Evaporative Emissions 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Automobile Emissions: An Overview (EPA 400-F-92-
007). Washington, D.C.: U.S. EPA, Office of Mobile Sources, August 1994. 4. Print. 
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reduced to 0.4 grams per mile by 1976 (Holum 173). Because no particular technology was 
specified to meet auto emission standards under the CAA, automakers were required by the 
CAA to decide how to meet the pollution limits through developing new emission control 
technologies (Train 169). 
     In 1971, the EPA formulated air pollution regulation, and established the National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six air contaminants that were present to some 
degree in auto emissions. These contaminants were ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM), 
carbon  monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NO2) and lead (Pb). 
Administrator Ruckelshaus differentiated States and ordered a two-tier system: one was a 
very tight standard for California that required catalysts; another was a slightly less stringent 
standard for the rest of the nation that did not require catalysts (Whitaker 100). In the same 
year, for the first time, new cars were required by the EPA to meet evaporative emission 
standards. As a result, charcoal canisters were designed by automakers to collect 
hydrocarbon vapors (see figure 12). Besides the charcoal canisters, in 1972, exhaust gas 
recirculation valves were used to reduce nitrogen oxides. The emission reductions were 
further enabled by the fundamental improvements in engine design (U.S. EPA, Automobile 
Emissions 1-4). In 1972, as five companies, Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, International 
Harvester, and Volvo, asked for a one-year suspension of the 1975 hydrocarbon and carbon 
monoxide standards, Administrator Ruckelshaus denied the application without hesitation 
(Whitaker 97). Although these five companies later sued, the court also denied their request 
for the suspension of the deadline, and remanded the case to the EPA for further 
consideration according to a National Academy of Sciences‘ report which said that the 
technology was not available to meet the 1974 emission standards (Whitaker 99). In 1973, 
the EPA began to initiate its inspection program when a major domestic auto maker was 
alleged to be filing false certification reports (―U.S. Environmental‖). To reduce lead 
emissions, at the end of 1973, the EPA set new regulations to phase out lead, which restricted  
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Figure 12. Typical Canister System for Evaporative Emissions 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Automobile Emissions: An Overview (EPA 400-F-92-
007). Washington, D.C.: U.S. EPA, Office of Mobile Sources, August 1994. 4. Print. 
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the average lead content, measured quarterly, in all grades of gasoline produced by any 
refinery to 1.7 grams per gallon (gpg) by July 1st 1975, 1.2 grams per gallon by July 1st 
1976, 0.9 grams per gallon by July 1st 1977, and 0.6 grams per gallon by July 1st 1978 
(―EPA Requires‖). However, the sudden rise in imported oil prices caused by the Arab oil 
boycott in late 1973 forced Congress and the Nixon Administration to change the auto 
emission laws by passing the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act in 1974, 
which provided an extension until 1977 of the 1975 auto emission standards and postponed 
the HC and CO standards until 1978 (Train 169). In March 1975, the EPA announced the 
deadline extension. Administrator train, meanwhile, made it clear that emission levels would 
continue to go down (―Mr.‖). In the same year, the EPA enacted the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) regulations to improve fuel economy (expressed in miles per gallon (mpg)) 
for passenger cars and light trucks. In addition, the Department of Transportation established 
standards for light trucks in the 1978 model year (MY), and improved the average fuel 
economy of cars and light trucks sold in the U.S. since 1975.  
     The regulations on the phase-out of lead at the end of 1973 prompted the requirement of 
new catalytic converters on imported cars from July 1975, because the catalytic converter 
was seen as an invention that sharply reduced smog from cars through breaking down 
compounds of nitrogen and oxygen from car exhausts (M. Wald A16). The EPA required 
most 1975 cars to install two-way catalytic converters to oxidize both carbon monoxide to 
carbon dioxide, and unburnt hydrocarbons (unburnt and partially-burnt fuel) to carbon 
dioxide and water (see figure 11). Since catalytic converters could only be run on unleaded 
gasoline, the use of two-way catalytic converters in 1975 expanded the use of unleaded 
gasoline. This resulted in dramatic reductions in ambient lead levels (U.S. EPA, Automobile 
Emissions 1-4). To deal with the energy crisis, Administrator Train also created many 
incentives to save fuel, such as the reduction of the average vehicle weight with 
corresponding reductions in fuel use, increasing the population of small autos, encouraging 
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development of more efficient automotive power systems through research funding (―EPA‘s 
Position‖), and especially subsidizing oil and the creation of a national speed limit at fifty-
five miles per hour (Conlan 91). In 1976, the Selective Enforcement Auditing (SEA) 
program from the EPA took effect to implement the assembly line testing authority (―U.S. 
Environmental‖). 
     During the Carter Administration, the CAA was amended by Congress in 1977. This act 
further expanded the EPA‘s authority to regulate the content of fuels, and directed the EPA 
to promulgate testing regulations and test existing and new fuels and fuel additives (Reitze, 
Air 321). In September 1978, Administrator Costle set a new atmospheric air quality 
standard, which was the first national ambient air standard the EPA had issued since 1971. It 
was mainly to protect public health from exposure to airborne lead (lead harms human 
nervous and blood-forming systems) (―EPA Sets‖). At the request of automakers, the HC 
standard was further delayed until 1980, and both the CO and NO2 standards were also 
delayed until 1981. In that year, for the first time, new cars met the standards of the CAA 
Amendment of 1977 (U.S. EPA, Milestones 1-3). Between 1980 and 1981, automakers 
installed new cars with even more sophisticated emission control systems in response to 
tighter standards, which included a three-way catalyst with on-board computers and oxygen 
sensors. This three-way catalyst could convert carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons to carbon 
dioxide and water, and could also reduce nitrogen oxides to elemental nitrogen and oxygen 
(U.S. EPA, Automobile Emissions 1-4). This contributed to the continuing phase-down of the 
use of lead in gasoline in the 1980s.  
      The EPA‘s deregulatory role under Administrator Burford during the Reagan 
Administration was also reflected by auto emissions regulations. Between 1981 and 1983, 
except for Inspection and Maintenance (I/M) programs which were conducted by States and 
required passenger vehicles to undergo periodic testing for malfunctioning emission control 
systems in 64 cities nationwide, little was done to strengthen auto emissions regulation. 
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During Administrator Thomas‘ tenure, the EPA‘s new limits on lead in gasoline started on 
Jan. 1st 1986 and the stringent emission standards for diesel-powered trucks and buses were 
adopted by the EPA, but they would take first effect in 1994 (U.S. EPA, Motor Vehicles 5). 
     During the first two years of Bush‘s tenure, the EPA actively responded to auto emissions. 
In 1989, the EPA set fuel volatility limits to reduce evaporative emissions. The agency 
continued to impose strict limits on diesel fuel sulfur content to help buses and trucks meet 
the 1985 emission standards in 1990. The CAA Amendment of 1990 added provisions for 
acid rain, ozone depletion and toxic air pollution to the EPA‘s agendas, and set stricter 
tailpipe emission standards for cars, trucks, and buses to further reduce HC, CO, NO2, and 
particulate emissions (Hollembeak 208). This Act also expanded Inspection and Maintenance 
programs with more stringent testing, and encouraged the EPA to launch new vehicle 
technologies and clean fuels programs (the development of alternative fuels) (Ibid.). 
According to this Act, the EPA began to study non-road engines (that is, boat, farm 
equipment, home equipment, construction equipment), and to set possible regulation for 
emissions from non-road vehicles in heavily polluted cities (Ibid.). However, after 1990, the 
Bush Administration reduced the speed limit to control auto emissions. In 1991, the EPA 
announced lower tailpipe standards for HC and NO2, which would take effect beginning with 
1994 models. In the next year, the EPA further set emission limits both for carbon monoxide 
at cold temperatures (20°F) and on maximum gasoline vapor pressure nationwide, and 
validated regulations setting minimum oxygen content for gasoline in areas where carbon 
monoxide levels exceeded national pollution standards. (U.S. EPA, Milestones 1-3). 
     As a rational environmental advocate under the Clinton Administration, the EPA tried to 
enhance national energy independency and economic growth with auto emissions regulations. 
It intensified the auto emissions control, and regulated the federal auto emission through a 
―win-win‖ approach of building cooperation partnerships and creating various stakeholders. 
In 1993, the EPA set limits on the sulfur content of diesel fuel, and made it illegal to produce 
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vehicles requiring leaded gasoline. In the same year, the EPA further validated new standards 
for sulfur content of diesel fuel. Both the illegal leaded gasoline production and the new valid 
standards enabled sulfur to be reduced at the maximum level by eighty percent (U.S. EPA, 
Motor Vehicles 5). To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, energy demand, and the importation 
of foreign oil, the EPA added ethanol to gasoline with a thirty percent share. Administrator 
Brower said: ―The EPA‘s proposal would help farmers by boosting the demand for ethanol 
while protecting the environment‖ (Adler 11). In 1993, besides the Motor Challenge program 
launched by the DOE to improve the efficiency of electric motor systems, the Clinton 
Administration announced a joint research program entitled ―a new Generation of Vehicles‖ 
(PNGV) with the Big Three auto companies, Ford, GM and DaimlerChrysler, to develop, by 
the year 2004, a passenger vehicle that would be three times more fuel efficient than a 1994 
intermediate size car. In this research program, the Clinton Administration and automakers in 
Detroit became partners and worked together to improve automobile fuel efficiency and 
emissions reductions (Dunn 71). In the early 1990s, cars, trucks, and buses contributed to 
almost half the emissions of ozone precursors, volatile organic carbon (VOCs) and nitrogen 
oxide, and up to ninety percent of the CO emissions were in urban areas. Additionally, a 
large portion of the emission reductions gained from motor vehicle emission controls had 
been offset by the rapid growth in the number of vehicles on the highways and total miles 
driven (Spellman 184). Therefore, in 1994, the EPA introduced cleaner vehicle standards and 
technologies, and set both tighter tailpipe emission standards for hydrocarbons, nitrogen 
oxides and carbon monoxide, and cold temperature carbon monoxide standards for light-duty 
vehicles with congressional formulas and guidelines. These required that trucks and buses 
must meet stringent diesel particulate emission standards, and that new cars must be 
equipped with on-board diagnostic systems (U.S. EPA, Motor Vehicles 5). In 1995, the EPA 
launched new programs requiring cleaner or reformulated gasoline for the cities with the 
worst ozone problems and in other areas that voluntarily join the program (Spellman 184-
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185). In the same year, the EPA further barred leaded gasoline from commerce, banned 
leaded gasoline from use in motor vehicle fuel, and required all 1996 model year cars and 
light trucks to meet new tailpipe and cold-temperature carbon monoxide standards in 1996. 
On November 27th 1996, the EPA conducted the first update in twenty years for ozone and 
the first in ten years for particulate matter through amending the National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, and put into effect the two NAAQS for ozone and particulate matter 
smaller than 2.5 µm diameter (PM2.5) (Spellman 184). At this time, reactions also came 
from automakers. In 1996, the Big Seven automakers, Ford, GM, DaimlerChrysler, Honda, 
Hyundai, Nissan and Toyota, began to commit to manufacture zero-emission vehicles. In 
March 1998, the EPA launched a voluntary program, the National Low Emission Vehicle 
(LEV) program, after receiving notifications from all auto manufacturers and the relevant 
States lawfully opting into the program (Reitze, Air 311). The National LEV program was a 
measure to reduce air pollution, and to harmonize federal and California motor vehicle 
standards. It was also intended to reduce design and testing costs for manufacturers, and to 
prevent inconsistent State regulatory requirements. It tried to achieve emission reductions in 
north-eastern States by voluntarily adopting the California LEV program (Ibid.). New cars 
and light-duty tricks would meet more stringent tailpipe standards than the EPA could 
mandate prior to model year 2004, starting in the north-eastern States in model year 1999 and 
nationally in model years 2001 (Ibid.). The EPA further initiated the clean-fuel fleet 
programs with various stakeholders in 1998 (U.S. EPA, Motor Vehicles 5). In 1999, the EPA 
implemented modifications to the passenger car and light-duty truck certification process by 
reducing upfront certification requirements while expanding the use of in-use testing to 
verify compliance. In December 2000, Administrator Browner proposed the Diesel Engine 
and Low-Sulfur Diesel Fuel rule, which required a ninety-seven percent decline of the sulfur 
content of diesel fuel, and it was adopted by the EPA in 2002 (―Carol‖). Although the 
regulations generated little demand from environmentalists, and the Sports Utility Vehicles 
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(SUVs) and small trucks that became popular during the 1990s were largely exempt from 
federal auto regulations (Levy 125), the EPA strengthened reducing auto emissions by 
cooperating with automakers and States in the form of partnerships and stakeholders. In 
late1999, the EPA further issued tougher vehicle emission standards to begin taking effect in 
2004. It was the first time that both cars and light trucks (including sport utility vehicles) 
would be subjected to the same national emission control system (Kraft, Environmental 
Policy and Politics 133). 
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5 
Conclusion 
5.1. Strategies, Methods and Problems in the EPA’s Roles 
     By 2000, the EPA had thirty years of history. Its resources have grown from about a $1 
billion budget and 4,000 staff in 1970 to a hefty more than $7.5 billion and a workforce of 
18,000 (see table 13). As cost was becoming more important in environmental protection, 
Command-and-Control strategy was steadily supplemented by regulatory reforms, cost-
benefit analysis, risk assessment, co-operation and collaborative decision-making, public-
private partnerships, the use of market-based economic-incentives, and voluntary agreements 
with interest groups on pollution control. Therefore, relations between the EPA and industry 
changed from the regulator versus the regulated to a collaborative stakeholder partnership 
with shared responsibilities (Sexton, Murdock, and Marcus 66). Cooperative, voluntary 
agreements were added to federally-dominant Command-and-Control (Ibid.). The EPA also 
developed its theme of environmental protection from reducing or repairing environmental 
damage by the end-of-pipe controls to pollution prevention by reducing generation of 
pollutants at their point of origin (Blodgett 58). Public participation on environmental 
decision-making was also expanded. The environmental decision-making process from the 
EPA also changed from a ―top-down‖ regulator-centered Command-and-Control model 
(regulators decide, announce, and defend decisions) to a form with mixed stakeholders and 
broad public participation from both ―bottom-up‖ and ―top-down.‖ The one-size-fits-all 
federal regulation was changed to place-based environmental decision-making (Sexton, 
Murdock, and Marcus 66). 
     The CAA of 1970 established the ―Polluter-Pays Principle‖ and ―Command-and-Control‖ 
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strategy, and both have remained intact until now (Kraft and Kamieniecki, ―Analyzing‖ 12). 
The ―Polluter-Pays Principle (PPP)‖ has been guiding the management on the EPA‘s 
attainment of environmental regulations (Ulbert 101). It requires the costs of pollution to be 
paid by those who cause it. It aims at realizing that the prices of goods and services fully 
reflect the costs of production, thus promoting efficiency and justice, and defining how to 
allocate costs within a State (Portney 12). It was first mentioned in the 1972 
Recommendation by the OECD Council on Guiding Principles concerning International 
Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies. It stated that: ―The principle to be used for 
allocating costs of pollution prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of 
scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and investment 
is the so-called Polluter-Pays Principle. This principle means that the polluter should bear the 
expenses of carrying out the above-mentioned measures decided by public authorities to 
ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state‖ (Lucia). In 1989, costs related to 
accidental pollution were also added to the PPP by the OECD. The PPP was reaffirmed in 
the 1992 Rio Declaration (Ibid.). 
     The federally-dominant Command-and-Control strategy is accompanied by an overall 
goal of reducing pollution to a given level with ambitious target dates (Opie 455). It requires 
various types of industrial and business activities to be regulated by the EPA under 
environmental laws, and thus forces companies to improve and adopt new technologies and 
processes to clean up pollution emissions by specified dates (Kurian 207). Like its 
appearance, Command-and-Control contained the ―command‖ to set regulations with 
environmental standards and the ―control‖ to control the sources of pollution after setting the 
environmental standards. The ―command‖ relied on regulations and standards with adequate 
margins of safety, because environmental standards could improve the design of federal 
intervention as to what must be done and how to better identify the issues. The EPA had 
adopted the zero-risk principle (prior to the Clinton Administration) and the negligible-risk 
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Table 13  
The EPA‘s Budget and Workforce, 1970-2003 
 
 
Source: Colin, Robert W. The Environmental Protection Agency: Clean up America’s Act. Westport, 
Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 2006, pp. 3. 
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principle (since the Clinton Administration) to guide management in designing federal 
intervention in environmental, health and safety regulations. The EPA further adopted the 
balance principle to avoid the problems caused by standard-setting like high or low 
regulatory levels. Because Congress set some laws to reduce pollution in a given medium, 
like ambient air or drinking water, and others focused on the sources or effects of pollution, 
such as pesticides or acid rain (Fiorino, Making 97), the EPA set two types of environmental 
standards at levels that ensured against any adverse health effects: ambient standards and 
emissions standards. Ambient standards must be maintained and set the minimum desired 
level of air or water quality and the maximum level of a pollutant; while emissions standards 
specified the maximum level of permitted emissions (Asafu-Adjaye 84). After selecting 
environmental standards from the ―Command‖, the EPA takes ―Control‖ of the regulation by 
supervising environmental monitoring and enforcement conducted by States. The 
enforcement from States is sometimes in the form of different kinds of punishment such as a 
fine from State governments (Kurian 207).  
     While setting environmental standards to protect health and other values, the EPA had to 
pay more attention to cost and other adverse consequences of the regulations. This was 
expressed in terms of dollars versus health (Portney 19). Stringent environmental regulations 
and standards imposed significant economic costs on corporations and firms for pollution 
control (Hetes 1009). These costs were either shifted to consumers in the form of higher 
product prices or borne by stakeholders, laborers or management in the form of reduced 
earnings. Consumers might be discouraged by these higher prices from purchasing products 
whose production generates pollution; leading to a decline in sales and the production of 
certain products from corporations and firms; thus reducing profits. This could result in 
employees being laid-off, or even bankruptcy of some corporations and firms and the 
diminution of some industry branches (Portney 19-20). At this time, this dollar-versus-health 
was characterized by conflict: environmental protection against economic development or 
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against jobs. 
     The EPA employed its strategies and methods to protect the environment, and to reach the 
goals of different administrations. With these strategies and methods, the EPA had engaged 
both in centralizing environmental regulations, for instance, through Command-and-Control 
and in decentralizing environmental regulations, for instance, with market-based economic 
incentives. 
5.1.1. Strategies and Economic Incentives forming the EPA’s Roles from the Nixon to 
the Clinton Administration 
     President Nixon decided to use and lead with environmental issues in national politics. He 
led environmental issues and thus won public support. In a 1970 message to Congress, he 
even announced his goal of producing an ―unconventionally powered, virtually pollution-free 
automobile within five years‖ (Train 89). From 1970 to 1973, the EPA worked as an 
environmental advocate. It emphasized pollution reduction and prevention mainly through 
taking control of emissions and effluents in air, water or soil (Mazmanian and Kraft 10-13). 
The EPA centralized environmental regulations by supplementing ―end-of-pipe‖ to the 
Command-and-Control. Under the ―end-of-pipe‖ Command-and-Control, pollutants were 
reduced or emissions were curbed at the end of the production process. As the federal 
environmental regulations continued, the conflict of environmental protection versus 
economic development was deeply felt during the Arab oil embargo in 1973. To deal with 
the energy crisis, the Nixon-Ford Administration switched energy consumption from oil to 
coal to limit the demand for imported oil. The Nixon-Ford Administration further applied 
different methods to save and ration energy and raw materials, such as subsidizing oil, setting 
a speed limit, resource recovery programs encouraging reuse, recycling in place of extracting, 
for instance, recycling steel, aluminum, fuel economy labeling programs, etc. 
     During the Carter Administration, the EPA made changes. The agency was pulled back to 
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actively protecting the federal environment by the newly set environmental statutes and by 
the EPA‘s big budget. Because the enormous federal expenses forced the democratic 
government to strengthen regulatory reform to reduce it, environmental programs from the 
EPA began to be put under the control of regulatory reforms. The Carter Administration 
further invested millions of dollars in researching alternative sources for electrical power 
(Koff), and federally developed fuel substitutes like ethanol and renewable energy sources 
like solar power and wind. Thus, the modern solar power industry was born, and led to the 
insulation of millions of American homes. In the National Energy Plan of 1978, the 
promoted incentives of both business solar credit and business tax credits showed the Carter 
Administration‘s intention to emphasize this conservational and renewable energy (Lazzari 
2). The Carter Administration also published a report called A New Prosperity, detailing how 
emerging technologies and smart policies could together help the United States meet twenty-
eight percent of its electricity needs from renewable sources by the year 2000 (―Congress‖). 
Accompanying governmental initiatives, individuals also voluntarily promoted 
environmental protection. Denis Hayes, the national coordinator of the first Earth Day in 
1970, organized a one-day program, Sun Day, ―to convey to the American public that there 
were options, that it was possible to run a modern industrial state on sunshine‖ (Weltman). 
On May 3rd 1978, Sun Day began with a sunrise ceremony at the United Nations led by 
Ambassador Andrew Young, and continued with hundreds of events across the United States 
(Ibid.). On Earth Day 1979, President Carter announced an additional $100 million in federal 
solar spending, and even installed a solar thermal water heater on the roof of the White 
House. His administration further extended federal solar energy tax credits to homeowners. 
An example was the American Solar King company, which sold solar water heating systems 
and reported sales of more than $30 million in 1985. Thus, solar industry began to get more 
economic attention (―Congress‖). These energy actions indirectly helped the nation protect 
the environment. In 1977, Congress enacted the CAA Amendment to improve the flexibility 
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and effectiveness of the environmental regulations and promote economic growth. The CAA 
Amendment of 1977 authorized emissions trading with ―offset‖ or ―credit‖ in ―non-
attainment areas‖ which were highly-polluted urban areas that did not meet national air 
quality standards (NAAQS). EPA Administrator Douglas Costle developed incentive-based 
methods of emissions trading like the ―bubble concept.‖ These approaches to emissions 
trading had a great influence on future environmental regulations because they built the 
stepping stones and provided valuable practical experience for the development of more 
efficient and cost-effective trading programs in the future (U.S. EPA, Tools of the Trade 2-
11). In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (Superfund), and thus the theme of pollution clean-up was added to the 
environmental protection agenda.  
     President Reagan believed his ―New Federalism‖ with decentralization and defunding to 
promote economic recovery in terms of incentives, enforcement, cost efficiency and 
administrative ease. Since the basic parameters of environmental protection were defined by 
environmental statutes such as the Superfund, the CAA, the CWA, the SDWA, FIFRA, the 
RCRA, the TSCA, and CERCLA, the Reagan Administration chose to alter the direction of 
federal policies by maximizing control of policy implementation within the executive branch 
rather than rewriting them (Vig, ―Presidential‖ 107). He appointed Anne M. Gorsuch 
Burford as EPA Administrator. Administrator Burford strongly believed in decentralization, 
which meant nearly all responsibility for environmental regulations should be devolved to 
the States. She also put these beliefs into practice during her tenure (Ringquist 45). President 
Reagan established a more formal and comprehensive centralized regulatory oversight 
program, entitled ―Regulatory Relief‖, to eliminate or revise regulations considered 
burdensome by industry (Vig and Kraft 436). Regulatory Relief introduced the concept of 
―net benefit‖ into the regulatory process, and thus strongly differed from the regulatory 
reform during the Carter Administration. President Reagan further created the Task Force on 
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Regulatory Relief, chaired by Vice-President Bush, to oversee the regulatory process (U.S. 
OMB, Report 6). Both regulatory relief and the Task Force on Regulatory Relief enabled the 
Reagan Administration and EPA Administrator Burford to decentralize the EPA‘s regulatory 
powers, reduce the EPA‘s budget, make closed decisions and achieve regulatory delays 
(Kraft, Environmental Policy and Politics 129). Thus, the EPA was transformed into an 
environmental deregulator. When Administrator Ruckelshaus returned to the EPA, he 
reorganized the agency‘s enforcement structure by creating a new Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Monitoring, and reestablished the General Counsel as a separate office (Shanley 
112). Administrator Ruckelshaus continued to list environmental regulation violators in the 
Federal Register, promoted risk assessment, and expanded environmental protection from 
the emphasis on public health to all species. Besides preceding most of what Ruckelshaus 
pursued, Administrator Thomas shifted the EPA from focusing on the public health strategy 
of former Administrator Costle towards focusing on criminal environmental enforcement. It 
was because ―The willingness of the administration to bring criminal actions against 
corporate officials has enhanced their interest in supervising their lower-ranking personnel to 
pay attention to environmental values, and reading in the paper about criminal actions being 
brought against one‘s industry or one‘s company is a great motivator‖ (Mintz 70). Thus, the 
EPA‘s enforcement actions formed a process ranging from notices of violation to 
administrative orders, to civil judicial actions and to criminal prosecutions (Mintz 102). In 
his eight-year tenure, President Reagan never proposed any legislation to strengthen the 
Clean Air Act (Shabecoff, ―E.P.A.‖ A1). His administration even strongly enlarged exports 
of toxic waste to the Third World. The amount rose from about nine million metric tons in 
1970 to at least 247 million in 1984 (Jensen 213). Because of President Reagan, the EPA was 
in the shadow of deregulating environment and unwillingly protecting the environment. 
     During the Bush Administration, the EPA also made changes. After President Bush won 
the presidential election in 1988, he decided to use and lead with environmental issues in 
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national politics just as President Nixon had done. He balanced and placated opposing 
interests, and made difficult political choices by straddling issues and buying time whenever 
possible (Shabecoff, ―In‖ 20).  
     President Bush decentralized responsibility for environmental protection to private 
industry by enhancing the use of market incentives for pollution control (Ringquist 45), 
because he believed that marketable pollution allowances would achieve more efficient 
emission reductions than Command-and-Control regulation (Shabecoff, ―In‖ 20). Title IV of 
the CAA Amendment of 1990 brought the Cap-and-Trade mechanism to achieving cost-
effective emissions reductions to the Acid Rain Program. Since then, the use of trading in 
Clean Air Act programs has been significantly expanded. Helped by the Environmental 
Defense Fund, the Bush Administration ensured the smooth operation of a sulphur emission 
market, which reduced sulphur emissions cheaply (at a cost of about ten percent of critics‘ 
estimates in opposing acid rain control legislation in the 1980s) and rapidly (faster than 
expected) (Graff 17).  
     Due to the mismanagement of Administrator Burford, Congress continually strengthened 
control of the EPA by prescribing extremely detailed and rigid requirements for 
implementation to compel administrative compliance (Kraft, ―Environmental‖ 39). The EPA 
was also directed to focus both on pollution prevention and on clean-up (Shabecoff, ―In‖ 20). 
Under the growing congressional concerns on the Superfund program, on June 19th 1991, 
Administrator Reilly directed the EPA‘s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response to 
investigate EPA decision-making in accelerating the rate of the Superfund remedial actions 
and the EPA‘s methods to evaluate and manage environmental risks (Mintz 97-98). 
Administrator Reilly further appointed an agency task force to study the EPA‘s Superfund 
contracting system (―Reilly‖). Thus, the EPA introduced pollution prevention through 
pollutant source reduction, and emphasized ecology in protecting the environment (Opie 
454). The EPA further promoted partnership with industry and stressed a voluntary, 
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collaborative, and flexible approach to pollution prevention.  
     However, President Bush abandoned the cooperation with Congress under the pressures 
from a stagnant economy and the conservative wing of his party. The Bush Administration 
launched a number of anti-environmental initiatives since late 1990. Against his ―no net loss 
of wetlands‖ campaign promise, he proposed redefining wetlands in such a way that half of 
all those remaining could lose federal protection (Ringquist 34). He allowed polluters to 
exceed emission limits for toxic air pollutants without public notice or comment, and 
proposed the elimination of public hearings and court challenges to oil, coal, gas, mineral, 
and timber leases and sales of public lands (Ibid.). Vice-President Quayle‘s Council on 
Competitiveness further weakened the 1990 Clean Air Act (Ibid.). 
     Cost-effective pollution prevention programs, cleaner production, and the expansion of 
public participation in environmental decision-making made the EPA under the Clinton 
Administration a rational advocate. In 1994, the EPA launched its ―Common Sense 
Initiative‖ to make health protection cheaper and smarter by focusing on results with place-
based environmental decisions rather than one-size-fits-all regulations (Collin 336-337). The 
EPA then launched reinventing environmental regulation to improve the agency‘s flexibility, 
cost-effectiveness and innovation. Initiative programs like Project XL built public-private 
partnerships and fostered stakeholders among business, government, environmental 
communities, and other related parties, in which incentives for action arose from mutual 
interests. One example was the Public-Private-People Partnerships (4P), which enabled 
industry, government and the environmental community to work together for success. The 4P 
were voluntary agreements between governments and individual firms taking the form of 
―non-mandatory contracts between equal partners, one of which is government, in which 
incentives for action arise from mutual interests rather than from sanctions‖ (OECD, Meeting 
7). The 4P were led by a core group of experts from the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Amoco Petroleum, the Dow Chemical Company, Monsanto, Rayonier, and the New Jersey 
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Department of Environmental Protection. Through site-specific work, the group dealt with 
internal, external, or regulatory barriers and conducted cost-saving pollution prevention 
(Gunningham and Sinclair 86). Since President Clinton wanted to continually support State 
discretion in environmental regulation (Ringquist 45), emission trading was encouraged by 
the Clinton Administration. The EPA allowed emission trading in its air and water programs 
and gave companies the broadest flexibility in finding the lowest cost approaches to pollution 
reduction through its Economic Incentive Programs. The Acid Rain Program was one of 
these. It was consistent with the Reinventing Environmental Regulation and part of the 
Common Sense approach to the integration of smarter environmental and public health 
protection. In the Acid Rain Program, since 1995 the EPA had offered trading pollution 
credits under the Cap-and-Trade system to all industrial fossil fuel-burning sources in order 
to reduce acid rain (―EPA Expands Open-Market‖). 
     Besides promoting waste prevention and recycling in its daily operations, the EPA further 
developed new sources of energy with an emphasis on renewable sources like solar power 
and wind. Additionally, the Clinton Administration improved its management to promote 
cleaner production from many industries. For instance, offering market share for green 
products with green procurement. Because government consumed far more office equipment 
and motor vehicles than that of any other single purchaser, it was the dominant purchaser in 
many markets. This market dominance enabled the Clinton Administration to dictate market 
preferences for green products (Gunningham and Sinclair 84). 
     Voluntary cooperation from firms also helped the EPA be a rational advocate. 
Competition on customers‘ preferences, on corporate image, and on internal priorities drove 
firms willing to generate incentives to innovate, to respond market demands and thus achieve 
green production. The cleaner production partnership led by government brought mutually 
beneficial outcomes. Smaller firms reduced compliance costs, improved productivity and 
improved their environmental performance through gaining expertise, quality control, 
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product design and advice on clean technologies or regulatory compliance audits from larger 
firms, whilst larger firms not only gained a cleaner production supply chain by building more 
reliable, clean and efficient suppliers (Ibid.), but also assured market share through the 
administration‘s green procurement. 
     As a rational advocate, the EPA tried to reach the goal of sustainable development 
through further enhancing environmental protection while maintaining economic prosperity 
(Kraft, ―Influence‖ 146-147).  
5.1.2. Problems 
     As an environmental regulator, the EPA faced a lot of problems in its thirty-year history. 
During the Nixon Administration, industry resentment of the EPA‘s enforcement gradually 
increased (Mintz 30). Conflicts, such as jobs versus environment, and cost against health, 
appeared in the mid-1970s (Ibid.). From then on, these conflicts became the focus of 
environmental regulation under each administration and each EPA. Especially at the 
beginning of the Reagan Administration, cost defeated health and the stringent use of risk-
assessment had made the EPA a risk-assessment agency instead of a pollution-reduction 
agency (McCloskey 81). 
     As an administrative agency, the EPA faced environmental controversies from the federal 
government, because federal government itself was both a polluter and a regulator. Power 
plants and environmentally damaging water projects were good examples. In general, they 
were both sponsored, and built by government agencies. Other government agencies even 
sponsored some of the most ambitious and least economically sustainable electricity 
generation projects, such as the Washington Public Power Supply System with a network of 
nuclear power plants in the Pacific Northwest (Graff 14-15). Therefore, federal and State 
governments were widely viewed as the cause of environmental problems. They were both 
part of the problem and part of the solution in environmental controversies (Ibid.). Since the 
                                                                                                                                          Liu 227  
Nixon Administration, the EPA has been involved in the planning of future power facilities 
because of the confrontation between the location of power plants and the related 
environmental concerns (R. Nixon, ―President‖). This kind of problems continued to be 
caught in the issues around federal energy reserve in the following administrations. The 
Clinton Administration made changes in power plants illegal activities. Because many power 
plant owners estimated that the administration would not enforce environmental laws and 
regulations, they routinely disobeyed environmental laws, and their companies did not follow 
pollution controls in their modernization. Thus, they saved money but damaged health and 
air quality. The illegal activities of the power plant owners were called by Sylvia Lowrance, 
the EPA‘s top official for enforcement and compliance from 1996 to 2002, ―the most 
significant non-compliance pattern the EPA had ever found‖ (Shulman 67). Since 1997, the 
EPA had been investigating these power plants for non-compliance with environmental laws. 
In November 1999, Attorney General Janet Reno sued eight utility holding companies that 
operated fifty-one older coal plants in ten States, charging that they violated the New Source 
Review of the Clean Air Act (Goodell 157). It was alleged that ―these power plants had been 
illegally releasing enormous quantities of pollution, in some cases for twenty years or more‖ 
(Shulman 67). They were referred to by the Justice Department lawsuit as ―significant 
contributors to some of the most severe environmental problems facing the nation today‖ 
(Goodell 157). With the exception of power plants, issues such as water projects and the use 
of nuclear energy still confused the EPA. 
     During the Reagan Administration, cost-benefit analysis also became one of the EPA‘s 
problems, because it undermined environmental standards, which curbed known dangers to 
health and safety (Brownstein and Easton xv). That was why Representative John D. Dingell 
(Democrat) from Michigan asked: ―What is the cost-benefit analysis that is going to 
determine the price of a healthy child?‖ (Benenson 680) The stringent use of risk-assessment 
was also at the expense of public health. 
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      In the process of the EPA‘s environmental decision-making, environmental decisions had 
increasingly been driven more by media hype and partisan politics than by sensible science 
(Dowd 95). They were also increasingly made through balancing environmental goals with 
economic and political needs, rather than utilizing reliable science. The Clinton 
Administration expanded public involvement in environmental decision-making and founded 
a ―win-win‖ approach to environmental protection. However, ―it was unclear if the goal of 
opportunities for the public to participate in environmental decisions will lead to increased 
opportunities for the public to determine final outcomes‖ (Clarence and Mazurek 181), and 
in a ―win-win‖ solution, how many ―win‖ was at the expense of the environment? 
     Environmental statutes also caused problems at the EPA. Each statute was written to 
solve the immediate environmental problem at hand and often without any regard to how that 
environmental problem related to other environmental problems and programs implanted by 
the EPA (Sussman). These defects in environmental statutes brought the EPA the need for 
better coordination between regions, headquarters enforcement offices, and media program 
offices, and made improving management efficiency a priority, for instance, through 
performing management reforms such as cross-media, cross-program, or cross-statute 
cooperation, especially when more environmental laws came out. 
     The EPA still had other shortcomings on management. For instance, its management, 
reliable science, and reliable information were criticized for lacking complete and 
sufficiently accurate information on managing risks and measuring results (U.S. Cong. GAO, 
Environmental Protection: Observations 6), and for narrow thinking about problems 
encouraged by the EPA‘s media-specific program offices and the statutes they implement 
(U.S. EPA, Studies Addressing 17).  
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5.2. The EPA and Science 
     Since its creation, the EPA was had not been a science agency, rather primarily a 
regulatory and enforcement agency (Powell 57). All environmental research in the United 
States is allocated to the federal government, State governments, universities, private 
companies, etc. The federal government only carries out a portion of all environmental 
research, and the EPA accounts for only less than fifteen percent of federal environmental 
research (Davies, Science at EPA ix). Other federal agencies like the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA), the Department of Energy, and the Department of 
Defense carry out more environmental research than the EPA (Ibid.). 
     In addition, the Office of Research and Development (ORD) from the EPA owned about 
one-third of the EPA‘s budget in 1973. Due to the energy crisis, the 1974 budget for ORD 
was largely cut. Since 1977, the ORD proportion of funding in the EPA‘s total budget had 
remained low and it reached its lowest point in 1983 (approximately three percent) (see table 
14 and figure 13). Although, in 1983, EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus emphasized the need 
for science at the EPA (Ruckelshaus 1026), the agency‘s research still suffered from uneven 
quality, inadequate funds, poor direction and a lack of first-rate scientists and equipment due 
to the shortage of budget for research and development under the Reagan Administration 
(Leary A13). In 1992, the budget for ORD returned roughly to its 1980 level after adjusting 
for inflation (Carnegie 16). During the Clinton Administration, ORD‘s appropriations 
increased steadily, but still had only around a five percent portion of the EPA total budget 
(see table 14 and figure 13). 
     Moreover, other federal administrative institutions and agencies also influenced the 
generation and use of research within the EPA. Congress set the general framework for 
research by enacting laws and amendments, and impacted the day-to-day research work 
through oversight and informal contact. The courts significantly influenced the use of 
research through judging right or wrong to EPA actions (Davies, Science at EPA ix).  
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Table 14 
EPA Research and Development Budget Appropriations Account Compared with EPA 
Budget Authority, FY 1976-1996 ($ million, unadjusted) 
 
 
Source: Powell, Mark R. Science at EPA: Information in the Regulatory Process. Washington D.C.: Resources  
    for the Future, 1999. 58. Print. 
a. Enacted appropriations. 
b. The figure is the administration‘s proposed appropriations for ORD. The House-Senate conference bill  
allocated $525 million to an agencywide Science and Technology (S&T) account (Washington Post, 
November 17, 1995, p.A18). The agency‘s S&T account authorization for FY 1997 was $552 million 
(U.S. CRS 1997). 
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Figure 13. EPA Research and Development Budget Appropriations Account Compared with 
EPA Budget Authority, FY 1976-1996 ($ million, unadjusted) 
a
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The OMB did so as well because it controlled the flow of scientific and technical information 
into the EPA (Tozzi). Outside sources like universities and firms were also influential 
because EPA research partly relied on outside sources. Thus, the EPA was constrained to be 
a regulatory and enforcement agency. 
     Since the EPA‘s science had also been tempered by economic and political reality, the 
agency‘s role in protecting the federal environment from the Nixon Administration to the 
Clinton Administration became an end product of the process of balancing science, law, 
economics, politics and social needs. While protecting the environment, the EPA also 
changed Americans‘ minds and offered experiences and ideas for the future. Today, 
economic incentives such as the trading of emission rights, the taxing of pollutants, and 
subsidies for pollution control (for instance, government subsidies on products like organic 
fuels to improve the market competitiveness of eco-friendly products) are willingly accepted 
by Americans to meet environmental objectives (Graff 15). Pollution-free automobiles from 
President Nixon have become a reality; solar-energy panels and groups of wind turbines can 
be seen everywhere; speed limit signs have been set up on each highway and main street; 
drinks with deposits can be bought in every shop; organic and environmentally sound 
products have become popular and more and more people are motivated to voluntarily 
protect the environment. 
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